

The Exercise of Influence: The Secretary-General and Decision-making at the United Nations

Excerpt submitted as part of report on sabbatical leave

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Fig 1: Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (second from right) meets with officials of his Executive Office in 1955.
(Source: www.un.org)

** This study – an excerpt from a longer manuscript – is submitted in compliance with the UN Sabbatical programme. This is an independent study and does not represent the official position of the United Nations. The opinions expressed herein are the author's own.*

Table of Contents

Abstract

PART I: LEADERSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING [INCLUDED]

Introduction. “Great Leaders are Great Decision-Makers”

- *Why study decision-making?*
- *Can we compare the UN to other organizations?*
- *Overview of this study*

Chapter 1. “Power itself isn’t what it used to be”: the Changing Nature of Leadership

- *Problems without passports: the changing global landscape*
- *Governance without governments: the impact on international cooperation and collective action*
- *The changing nature of leadership*

Chapter 2. “The Fog of Peace”: Understanding political decision-making

- *The leader: setting tone and direction from the top*
- *The group: the value of collective responsibility*
- *The social space: institutional culture and structures*
- *The gatekeepers: front offices and their role*
- *The decision: crisis, strategic and everything in between*
- *The process: the anatomy of influence*
- *The result: translating power into action*

PART II: THE UNITED NATIONS ECOSYSTEM [NOT INCLUDED]

Chapter 3. “The Sacred Drama by the East River”: the UN Ecosystem

- *The three UNs*
- *The sources of the Secretary-General’s authority*

Chapter 4. “A Personality-driven Organization”: portraits of the Secretaries-General

- *Trygve Lie (Norway), February 1946 to November 1952*
- *Dag Hammarskjöld (Sweden), April 1953 to September 1961*
- *U Thant (Burma, now Myanmar), November 1961 to December 1971*
- *Kurt Waldheim (Austria), January 1972 to December 1981*
- *Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Peru), January 1982 to December 1991*
- *Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt), January 1992 to December 1996*
- *Kofi Annan (Ghana) January 1997 to December 2006*
- *Ban Ki-Moon (South Korea) January 2007 to present*
- *Conclusion*

Chapter 5. “People in Glass Houses”: the Secretary-General and the Secretariat

- *In-Box and Relations with Member States then and now*
- *Personality and Decision-making style then and now*
- *Relations with the Senior Echelon then and now*
- *The Gatekeepers then and now*
- *The relationship with and effect on the field*

Chapter 6. The Buck Doesn't Stop Here: Cabinet-Level Decision-Making in the Secretariat

- *The Senior Management Group*
- *The Executive Committees*
- *The Policy Committee*

Chapter 7. “The Barons and Baronesses”: the Chief Executives of the UN System

- *Relations with the wider UN system then and now*

Chapter 8. “193 Mothers-in-Law”: the Member States

- *The Security Council*
- *The General Assembly and ECOSOC*
- *The disconnect between policy decisions and the budget*
- *The problem with priorities*

PART III. CONCLUSION [INCLUDED]

Chapter 9. “He Moves the World but Cannot Direct it”: Reflections on Effective Secretary-General Decision-Making in a Changing Global Landscape

- *Restating the case for strong leadership of the UN*
- *Ten balancing acts:*
 1. *Stated versus actual goals*
 2. *193 bosses but speaking for “we the peoples”*
 3. *The strong and the weak*
 4. *Accountability without authority*
 5. *Leading and managing at the same time*
 6. *Honest broker or interested actor?*
 7. *Advocate in chief or diplomat in chief?*
 8. *Balancing pragmatism and principle*
 9. *Asking for permission versus asking for forgiveness*
 10. *Collective responsibility in an irresponsibly designed system*
- *Reflections on effective decision-making: people and process*

Chapter 10. Recommendations for the Secretary-General

- *The leader sets the tone and expectations*
- *Reconsider the top management structure,*
- *Senior appointments based on merit and ability to function in a team*
- *Fewer direct reports and clearer accountability (including in the field)*
- *Say no*
- *Structured decision-making is essential.*
- *Collective responsibility as a clear principle.*
- *A system for multiple advocacy*
- *Subsidiarity*
- *No more labels fragmenting decision-making landscape*
- *Crisis decision-making has to be simple, quick and routine.*
- *Many important decisions will still need to be taken in private*
- *EOSG: strong enough to shape decision-making but not overbearing*
- *EOSG as the link across the pillars.*
- *Resurrect a capacity for long-range thinking*
- *EOSG as guardian of decisions already taken*
- *Realign substance, management, and budget.*
- *More central attention to Member State relations and legislative affairs.*
- *Strategic communications.*

Abstract

People all over the world invest their hope, trust and taxpayer resources in the UN. It is time there was a better understanding of how to get the most out of this deeply complex organization. It starts at the top. This study takes its reader under the proverbial hood to see how the role of UN Secretary-General feels from the inside. Its basic premise is that the Secretary-General has a lot less actual authority than is commonly assumed but considerable ability to shape the course of world affairs all the same, as long as he understands the complex nature of his power and influence (because the Secretary-General has always been a man, this study uses “he” throughout rather than distracting the reader with constant references to “he or she”. This is no comment on the desirability of a woman as Secretary-General). It further argues that character, intelligence, moral courage, charisma and competence shape a Secretary-General’s tenure as much as the Charter or any structural or political constraints. This combination of characteristics doesn’t need to come in the form of one person. Indeed it may be impossible to find in one person. Leadership by a UN Secretary-General must be understood to be carried out not by one individual but by the leadership team at the top of the Organization. It therefore matters enormously that there are people and processes in place to allow that team to function effectively. This is not an esoteric problem. The way members of the UN senior leadership team relate to one other, and the decisions they take, have major repercussions for people around the world.

The ninth Secretary-General will confront a complex, fast-changing and deeply interconnected world. His ability to influence a broad range of actors on a bewildering array of issues will be crucial to shaping the course of events. An effective Secretary-General will have to understand what motivates not only UN Member States and the many entities that compose the UN system, but also parliamentarians, civil society, the private sector, the social media space, concerned citizens and the larger public. His task will be to move these many actors towards collective solutions to global problems. In many cases, his most critical contribution will be to shift the dial of global public opinion so that politically difficult solutions to major issues become possible. In some cases, the United Nations will need to deliver that solution. The Secretary-General will lead an Organization that has more troops deployed around the world under its flag than any country with the exception of the United States and a larger annual budget than many countries¹. He will thus have almost unparalleled global agenda-shaping authority but less managerial authority than most big city mayors or indeed the heads of UN agencies whom he is expected to lead.

Member States and their people have high expectations of the United Nations and deserve leadership that can deliver on these many challenges. They need to trust that its leadership can perform effectively and, in turn, the leadership of the UN needs to trust that Member States will use the UN responsibly. This study attempts to show what it takes for the Secretary-General to shape responsible use of the organization by the membership and to then manage it effectively in delivering on what the membership asks. By examining the factors that shape decision-making at the top of the Organization, the study sheds light on how the Secretary-General’s agency – diffuse and widely misunderstood as it is – translates into action. Part I examines the nature of political power and decision-making. Part II looks at the UN ecosystem and at how well past Secretaries-General have understood and exercised their power. Part III reflects on the trade-offs and realities of the Secretary-General’s role before concluding with a set of concrete recommendations to an incoming Secretary-General about the value of rigorous, strategic decision-making processes that allow him or her to maximise his influence over Member States, the vast UN machine, and the world. Absent this rigour, opportunities will be missed, costly mistakes made, trust further eroded, and the Organization’s quest to stay relevant in a rapidly changing world will be badly undermined.

PART I: LEADERSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING

“The need for a brave and decisive new secretary general is literally a matter of life and death, in fact many deaths”².

Introduction: “Great Leaders are Great Decision-Makers”

In all the ink spilled on the role of the Secretary-General, surprisingly little has been devoted to the day-to-day realities: the pressures, personalities and politics that shape his key decisions and actions. Biographers have provided important insights into the personal stories of individual Secretaries-General. They have told the story of diplomatic and normative endeavours but have not, by and large, examined the institutional context within which the Secretary-General must operate. Most comparative scholars, on the other hand, have treated the role as if the person who occupies it is secondary to larger questions about power and international institutions. To the extent any attention has been paid to decision-making within the UN, most of the focus has been on the vertical decision-making processes involving Member States and the intergovernmental machinery. Very little has been written on the horizontal decision-making processes involving the senior leadership of the UN system, which are almost as consequential a factor in his effectiveness and on which a Secretary-General spends as much, if not more, time³. As such, the story about what it really means to be Secretary-General has not been fully told.

This is not unique to those who study the UN. International relations theory has typically treated states and international organizations as unitary actors and focussed at a very macro level on the broad features and structure of the international system. Even studies of specific international organizations have tended to assume they act cohesively⁴. But in the 1950s, a field of international relations theory emerged dedicated to studying the “black box” of (mostly American) foreign policy decision making. This body of research recognized that foreign policy making was not simply a rational calculus of powers and interests but a deeply human process involving “diverse personalities, competing—and sometimes unclear—role assignments, misperceptions, biased processing, wishful thinking, problematic group dynamics, ineffective lines of authority and communication, and other common human elements”⁵. There thus emerged an extensive body of literature examining the agency of individual decision-makers, and the complexities, peculiarities, processes and conditions that shape decision-making by world leaders⁶. Nobody has yet turned this lens on the United Nations. This study attempts to do so.

To fill the gap, the study looks at the agency of the Secretary-General and the conditions that shape his decision-making. It attempts to tease out the key factors that shape his effectiveness in this regard: his own personality, competence and leadership style; his relationship with the senior officials and the UN entities they manage; the advisory and decision-making systems he puts in place; his relationships with Member States, how he influences them and they him; and his evolving relationships with actors beyond the immediate UN ecosystem. It argues that the Secretary-General’s power is largely that of persuasion. The exercise of this power is a complex undertaking in today’s fast-changing global landscape, requiring a rare combination of communication, leadership and managerial skills on the part of the person occupying the job, as well as a recognition that the job is carried out not by one individual alone but by a senior leadership team with collective responsibility. The aim is to influence an increasingly diverse set of actors, from UN agencies to Member State governments to parliamentarians, civil society, private sector and citizens around the world. The UN’s legitimacy rests in part on the integrity and effectiveness of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat he oversees. The way in which he projects leadership over and steers the UN ship directly bears on his ability to play his increasingly complex role on the world stage.

Why study decision-making?

The value of looking specifically at decision-making is that it reveals the ways in which power is translated into action⁷. Understanding decision-making is central to understanding the behaviour of organizations⁸. Decision-making is the most common task of managers and executives and decisiveness perhaps the single more important quality in great leaders⁹. It is vital to effective governing and to the running of large corporations. Decisions taken at the very top of large organizations, whether public or private, are usually difficult, characterized by complexity, uncertainty, time pressures and hard trade-offs. In this, the UN is no different. But the UN is a very different ecosystem to the average government, never mind to large companies. In fact, there is not one United Nations but many. Authority and decision-making power are diffuse. Lines of accountability and control are tangled. Mandates and tasks overlap. Success usually has 193 parents and failure only one. Within this complex system, the Secretary-General is a lynchpin. He sits at the intersection of the many UNs – that of the Member States, of the UN system of agencies, funds and programmes, of the UN Secretariat, and of “we the peoples” all around the globe. Understanding his relationships with each of these UNs is key to understanding his decision-making power and informs the structure of this study.

These are not minor issues. The ad hoc and diffuse decision-making and management culture at the United Nations has more than once contributed to serious organizational lapses. It is at the heart of a slow erosion of trust between the Secretariat and the Member States that, in turn, undermines many of the UN’s most important activities. One of the UN’s worst crises of credibility and legitimacy – the oil-for-food scandal – came about in part because the senior leadership of the organization failed to take seriously its oversight, management and decision-making responsibilities leading to “a pervasive culture of responsibility avoidance” and a “basic confusion within the highest offices of the Secretariat”¹⁰. Another – the inadequate response to the mass killing of civilians by the Sri Lankan government in 2008-9 – was attributed to an institutional decision-making culture dominated by trade-offs at the expense of clear principle, with the result that “decisions were made in a manner that did not give rise to comprehensive ownership or responsibility for their impact”¹¹.

More recently, an independent review of the Secretariat response to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by French soldiers in the Central African Republic found a “leadership vacuum” and a culture in which information was “passed from desk to desk, inbox to inbox, across multiple UN offices, with no one willing to take responsibility”¹². Perhaps the most damaging stain of all – Rwanda – was also, at heart, an institutional failure where UN decision-makers lost sight of the human tragedy unfolding and, in so doing, failed to push for a robust response to the genocide, thereby playing into the hands of both the *génocidaires* themselves and the Member States with real leverage over the situation, who were disinclined to act and whom the UN essentially let off the hook¹³. In none of these cases were the Secretary-General or UN entities as culpable as popular opinion was led to believe. But the leadership and decision-making failures at the heart of UN action in each case obscured the principles and lives at stake and left a permanent stain on the Organization.

But nor are these simple issues. Leadership and decision-making in the UN context are extraordinarily complex. There is so much more – and perversely also so much less – to the job of Secretary-General than the public supposes. His responsibilities are vast but his authority is minimal. He is answerable for all the ills of the world but exerts direct control over almost nothing. He has no real power other than the power of persuasion. He can motive, cajole, inspire, and even shame others into action but he cannot coerce them. He “moves the world but he cannot direct it”¹⁴. There is almost nothing he can do by decree alone and yet he is expected to exercise considerable intellectual and operational leadership in an ever more complex world, shaping international policy and the delivery of UN services globally while also giving voice to the hopes and fears of people all over the globe. Governments do not want to be upstaged or publicly chided by him but they want him to have the imagination, courage, common sense and capacity to take

initiative in an emergency or when they are not able to act. The UN system is not designed in such a way that he can run it like a CEO but he is expected to steer it all the same.

Relatedly, there is much more to the complex decisions a Secretary-General takes than at first there might appear. Put simply, at the UN, as in most governments and deeply political environments, nothing is as it seems. The Secretariat is often an alibi for inaction by others and is always caught between aspiration and reality. It's "real functions and performance are often hidden behind mandates and reports that have little to do with its actual aims and activities. For example, the 'real' role of the Secretariat (and the Secretary-General) in some cases might be to take on an 'impossible' task (say a protracted civil war) for which Member States have no ready solution, keeping an issue alive as a subject of international attention, without being expected to find a decisive outcome. Or it might be to give powerful Member States a dignified exit from a messy intervention or through a Secretary-General's statement test a position those Member States themselves are unwilling to voice publicly. These actual roles are often never clearly articulated nor reported, leaving objective assessment difficult"¹⁵.

As such, judging decision-making in a highly political environment such as the UN is extremely difficult, since decision outcomes themselves are inherently political and thus may need to be judged by criteria that are not obvious. Decision-makers are subject to a complex array of pressures and incentives, which, like icebergs, are only partly visible above the water line. Most decisions are taken for reasons other than or in addition to their stated purpose. A "win" might not involve solving a problem but keeping important Member States satisfied or exerting influence on other actors in a causal chain that is impossible to discern. People become accustomed to operating in a murky world where many interests and agendas, known and unknown, are at play and where consensus-based decision-making is the norm. The supposed decision-making group may not actually be the place where decisions are truly taken but has value as a forum for generating buy-in for decisions and/or nurturing a collegial atmosphere amongst key players.

The decisions the Secretary-General takes involve multiple other balancing acts too: between the wishes of the Member States and the aspirations of the people around the world he tries to serve; between public advocacy and private diplomacy; between the pragmatism of getting things done and the norms and principles for which the UN stands. He must also navigate the contradictions built into his role: is he a leader or a manager? How can he be accountable for so much when he has authority over so little? Is he an impartial, honest broker or an actor with institutional interests? We will explore how the various holders of the office managed these tensions and more.

Can we compare the United Nations to other organizations?

These pathologies of the international decision-making landscape, and of the United Nations specifically, limit the utility of theoretical models of decision-making. But they do not excuse us from attempting to draw out lessons and insights that could help us shape that landscape and make best use of it, as we will try to do in Chapter Two. We are also limited by the fact that the United Nations is sui generis. It is difficult to meaningfully compare it to other organizations or to government, never mind to the private sector. As Chapter Three covers in more detail, the United Nations is not a monolith and its decision-making processes involve the interplay between at least three different UNs: the intergovernmental bodies, the entities that make up the UN system, and the larger realm of civil society within which the Organization operates. However, as this study tries to show, there are experiences from those other settings that are worthy of more attention. Throughout the study, references are made to lessons from executive decision-making in large companies, collective decision-making in organizations such as the European Union and cabinet decision-making and steering capacities in modern government. It would be easy to dismiss such comparisons but it would also be short-sighted, given the complexity of the Organization and of the Secretary-General's role. It will never be possible to import wholesale business or even government leadership and management practices into the UN ecosystem but it

will also be impossible for the Organization to continue to function without the benefit of some very important lessons from those settings. At stake is the UN's ability to respond promptly and effectively to the growing demands of an ever more complex international environment.

Overview

The study is divided into three main sections. Section I looks at the changing nature of political power and leadership. Chapter One analyses the changing global landscape and its implications for leadership at the international level. It argues that the world today is dominated by problems no country can solve alone and that it is more important than ever to have strong leadership at the United Nations. Even though the Organization is not the only source of global leadership today, it is unique and valuable in its convening and legitimizing power. Moreover, power itself has evolved and the power of persuasion has great potential in the digital age. The true art of UN leadership is to wield the power of persuasion effectively, shaping the decisions of Member States and other actors and, where relevant, managing to deliver UN mandates through a complex, centrifugal and unwieldy bureaucracy. The study argues that this task is not something for one individual alone but rather something that falls to the senior leadership team at the top of the United Nations.

In that connection, Chapter Two turns attention to the factors that shape decision-making by this leadership team. It argues that the Secretary-General should recognise the importance of collective responsibility for key decisions and put in place the necessary conditions to share the burden of consequential decision-making with his senior team. This kind of decision-making by UN leadership is a complicated interplay of many factors: the character and style of the Secretary-General, the processes and relationships that bind the senior team together (or don't), the institutional culture and structures of the bureaucracy that shape decision-making quite significantly (in particular the gatekeepers around senior decision-makers), the types of decision, the ways in which influence is exercised formally and informally, and the incentives for implementing decisions taken. This chapter blends theory from a wide range of literature with some initial observations about how these theories apply to a UN context.

Part II focuses more in depth on the UN context. Chapter Three explores the nature of the UN ecosystem and the many sources of the Secretary-General's authority. It shows that most decision-making at the UN is a complex interplay between the three UNs – that of Member States, the UN system, and broader civil society – and the different forms of authority that the Secretary-General brings to bear – formal, informal, political, moral and operational. The conclusion is that a Secretary-General can only navigate this terrain effectively if he makes full use of his limited tools for strategic leadership and grasps the complicated political terrain in which he operates.

Chapter Four turns to the eight individual Secretaries-General to date, capturing how well they rose to this challenge. They were different personalities, faced with different political climates, but their experiences reveal some common challenges: of pushing Member States just far enough but not too far; of getting the best from a centrifugal and complex bureaucracy; and of balancing ideas, action and relationships so as to deliver results at the negotiating table and in the field. Trygve Lie was ill-suited to the role in many respects but deserves some credit for asserting the right of the Secretary-General to act independently of the major powers. Dag Hammarskjöld was visionary, organized, controlling, principled and decisive but his political and institutional legacy might look different had he not died tragically in office. U Thant was less assuming but did not shy away from tough decisions. Waldheim largely hewed to the wishes of the big powers and did not seek a major political role. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was trusted by the major powers, politically savvy, patient, and unobtrusive. He was thus well placed to seize the opportunities presented by the thawing of the Cold War. Boutros-Ghali was not afraid to take unpopular decisions but failed to value persuasion or trust-building and paid the price by being denied a second term. Kofi Annan had an intuitive sense of how far he could push, both normatively and politically, but left office damaged by revelations about his approach to accountability. Decision-

making reforms taken at the end of his term brought the UN closer than it has ever been to true collective executive decision-making but these structures did not survive the ensuing decade intact. Ban Ki-Moon held office during a time of tectonic political and technological shifts that often reduced the UN to a supporting role but he successfully shepherded Member States to major agreements on climate and sustainable development. His leadership style was consciously low-key. The portraits confirm what the literature covered in Chapter Two led us to expect: that tone from the top matters, that leaders can and should set expectations to which the bureaucracy will respond, and that Member States, too, want to trust in the personal leadership of the Secretary-General even as they may occasionally undercut him in their own decision-making.

Chapter Five builds on the portraits by looking at the immediate orbit of the Secretary-General in more comparative depth over time. First it looks at his changing role and growing inbox. By any metric the demands of the role have increased exponentially. This constitutes a considerable leadership and management challenge and confirms the need for the Secretary-General to effectively manage his relationship with the UN bureaucracy, turning the vast machine into a source of support for his activities. The Secretary-General's control panel in this regard is his own executive office. The chapter looks at the history, functioning and structure of the office, in particular the evolving roles of Chef de Cabinet and Deputy Secretary-General. It concludes that the geography, work culture and priorities of the office are usually a reflection of the Secretary-General's own management style. The core task of the office is to do more than triage the many issues it confronts daily, getting out ahead of them and positioning the Secretary-General and the organization appropriately. A major component of this is structuring the relationship between the Secretary-General and the senior management team – the heads of the heavyweight departments and inner circle of agencies, funds and programs. The chapter examines the many factors that mitigate against this team functioning as such: the fact that senior appointments are politicized rather than based on merit, the institutional interests and incentive structures that pull these managers in separate directions, the fact that they compete for funds, the growing front office machinery that formalizes interaction between them, the self-censoring and risk-averse bureaucratic culture, and the sheer number of senior officials. It briefly notes that many of these dysfunctions are also reproduced in the field, undermining the effectiveness of the UN's work there and also the quality of analysis and advice that is filtered back up the decision-making chain.

Chapter Six picks up on earlier points about the importance of instituting collective responsibility for decision-making in such a complex, centrifugal environment. It acknowledges that, even where they considered it, most previous Secretaries-General gave up on the idea of cabinet leadership in the UN Secretariat, stymied by the political nature of senior appointments and the sprawling structure of the Organization. However, the chapter argues that the cross-cutting and complex nature of today's problems, which do not fit neatly into existing bureaucratic silos, make modern management practices a necessity, not a luxury. This is confirmed by a slew of independent reviews of some of the Organization's darkest moments, which point at a flawed decision-making culture and basic managerial lapses as having contributed in no small part to the UN failure. The chapter looks at several recent attempts by the Secretary-General to put in place cabinet-style mechanisms, beginning with the Senior Management Group and ending with the Policy Committee. It concludes that the Policy Committee was the closest the UN has come to serious, structured decision-making with accountability for implementation and a built in mechanism for ensuring multiple advocacy. It further concludes that the Committee, while flawed and cumbersome, worked well as long as it was perceived as the primary channel for decision-making, driven and owned by the Secretary-General himself, and managed in an impartial way by the Secretary-General's office. When ownership and engagement from the top appeared to fade, long-standing habits of forum-shopping reappeared and process discipline unraveled. The chapter concludes that the UN Secretariat has such strong forces and incentives driving it apart, only top-level commitment to structured decision-making will ensure such practices are sustained.

Chapter Seven takes a wider lens on a similar set of issues, looking at the Secretary-General's relationship with the Chief Executives of all UN agencies, funds and programmes, and the potential of the Chief Executives Board to serve as a cabinet. It concludes that, as a body of legal equals, and in light of the limits of peer leadership in the United Nations, the CEB has little potential as a decision-making mechanism in the standard sense. It is a place where an effective Secretary-General can exercise considerable influence and persuasion but – absent major structural changes, which appear unlikely although some discussions are taking place in the context of the new global development agenda – it is likely to remain a place to get business blessed, rather than done.

Widening the aperture further, Chapter Eight looks at the relationship between the Secretary-General and Member States. Although they are no longer the only players capable of delivering solutions to shared global problems, Member States remain at the heart of the Organization. But they no longer trust UN leadership to run the organization effectively and UN leaders no longer trust them to use it responsibly. Restoring this trust is vital. This chapter argues that an effective Secretary-General can and will shape Member State decision-making, expanding their appetite for and trust in his ideas and leadership. This is a complex task, given the many voices with which Member States speak in the different UN organs and the complex relationship they have with the Secretariat, itself a principal organ. The chapter looks briefly at decision-making dynamics within the Security Council and the General Assembly and at the potential for the Secretary-General to shape the outcomes of these bodies, through both formal and informal means. The key conclusion is that the Secretary-General could be more strategic and assertive in his relationship with both bodies but, to that end, he would need to be better advised and able to pick and time his battles wisely. This chapter concludes with a look at two specific problems that materially undermine effective leadership and decision-making by the Secretary-General. Both straddle the intergovernmental and institutional parts of the machinery – the first and second UNs – and have further eroded the trust between them. The first is the serious disconnect between substantive decision-making and the process for securing resources to implement decisions. This disconnect begins in capitals, is reproduced in the intergovernmental decision-making architecture, and then mirrored further in the divisions within the Secretariat between policy and budget decisions. At the intergovernmental level, this means that budget decisions are overly politicized. Inside the Secretariat, substantive and budget tracks rarely intersect with the result that policy decisions are taken on the basis of wishful thinking and effective strategic planning and management practices are supplanted by a culture of workarounds and making do. A second disconnect is the dynamic whereby Member States protect their prerogatives to set the principal “policy orientation” for the Organization but fail to use the process as an effective tool for prioritizing the work of the UN system. As a result, managerially meaningless priorities are set biennially and rarely change, undermining any opportunity for dialogue at the strategic level between the Secretary-General and the membership about evolving needs and opportunities.

Part III provides some concluding thoughts about the tensions and challenges inherent in the Secretary-General's role and makes recommendations for addressing these through more effective decision-making processes at the centre. Chapter Nine looks at ten balancing acts that every Secretary General performs in the course of his tenure. These include balancing stated versus actual goals; 193 Member States and seven billion people; the pressures from strong Member States with the needs of the weak; the mismatch between accountability and authority; the challenge of leading and managing at the same time; the tensions between serving as a global honest broker while also leading an institution with interests at stake; serving as advocate in chief while also being the world's top diplomat; balancing pragmatism and principle; asking for permission versus asking for forgiveness; and, finally instituting collective responsibility in a very irresponsibly designed UN system.

Having laid out all the factors that condition decision-making by the Secretary-General, from the global to the institutional to the personal, the study then turns in Chapter Ten to more prosaic points about the conditions that need to be met to ensure strong leadership by an incoming

Secretary-General in the face of contemporary challenges and political and institutional realities. Several recommendations pertain to people. They include recognizing and catering for the impact of the tone from the top; paying more attention to the top management structure of the Organization; making senior appointments based on merit and expecting the senior leadership team to function as such; reducing the number of direct reports to the Secretary-General and putting in place clearer accountability in top headquarters and field positions; and, finally, being more judicious in how senior time and attention are allocated. In other words, learning to say no.

The remaining recommendations focus on process. They include the need to resurrect and protect a single, clear channel for taking major policy and management decisions; instituting collective responsibility as a clear principle governing the UN senior leadership team; ensuring multiple advocacy and subsidiarity in decision-making so that the voices of key stakeholders are heard and the time of key decision-makers is used on the right issues; streamlining the decision-making landscape so that it is not littered with competing committees; putting in place extremely simple and clear procedures for crisis decision-making; ensuring that the Secretary-General's own office is strong and strategic enough to shape decision-making, adjudicate issues, advise the Secretary-General and serve as a link across the pillars without disempowering the line departments; resurrect a genuine capacity for long-range strategic thinking; taking more ownership of and care in monitoring implementation of decisions; realigning substantive, management and budgetary decisions and insisting that senior managers take ownership or are well versed in all of them; paying more attention to the relationship with Member States and to the tactics of engaging with them on key decisions; and, finally, injecting a strategic communications dimension into consequential decision making as a matter of routine, not least in light of the changing global landscape described in the opening chapter.

These improvements are no silver bullet. Serious reform of the United Nations would go well beyond the issue of Secretary-General decision-making. It would involve a fundamental overhaul of intergovernmental oversight, financing and bureaucratic structures. But improvements to the decision-making processes at the heart of the Organization are something a Secretary-General can control and can do immediately. An early study on the role of heads of international organizations posited that their leadership depended particularly on how well they were able to handle relationships with three UN constituencies: top officials within the institution, Member States and the international system¹⁶. This study bears out that theory. It concludes that, while there is a lot about the decision-making landscape that the Secretary-General cannot change, there is also a lot that he can influence and achieve as long as he recognizes the nature of his own power and how to wield it most effectively. It also concludes that, while the Secretary-General's leadership and management roles are often viewed as distinct, they are, in fact, intimately linked¹⁷.

The stark mismatch between responsibility and authority, and between expectations and reality, can make the job of Secretary-General seem like "the most impossible" in the world, as Trygve Lie so memorably described it to Dag Hammarskjöld. But "although the office has little real power, it provides very wide possibilities for exercising influence"¹⁸. This is not a one-man (or one woman) job. Leadership at the UN is carried out not by the Secretary-General alone but by the team of senior advisers and officials with which he surrounds himself. For Member States – and indeed "we the peoples" – to get a return on the resources and trust they place in the United Nations, they need to understand that personal and institutional capacity shape a Secretary-General's tenure as much as the political context. They need to recognize the importance of senior appointments and of how the senior team functions. They need to care about the decision-making machinery and structures that the Secretary-General puts in place. These things matter to the quality of leadership they can expect. In an increasingly complex world where ever more is demanded of the United Nations, the ninth Secretary-General will need to be a highly effective decision-maker with a deep understanding about the nature of his or her power. Personal and institutional capacity will need to blend to produce timely decisions in situations of deep uncertainty, pressure and risk. Hence this study.

Chapter 1. “Power Itself isn’t What it Used to Be”: the Changing Nature of Leadership

Problems without passports: the changing global landscape

In 2016, the members of the United Nations will choose their ninth Secretary-General. The new Secretary-General will take the helm of an Organization that has seen the world change almost beyond recognition in the 70 years since it was founded. The change is quantitative but also qualitative. The number of Member States has nearly quadrupled and the global population has nearly trebled. The budget of the UN is two thousand times what it was in 1946¹⁹. Two superpowers have given way to a crowded field of global and regional powers, none of whom has the will or capacity to impose stability. Governments remain at the heart of international affairs but they are no longer exclusive actors. A host of new non-state actors has taken the stage, often wielding more leverage over global issues than governments. Computer processing power has doubled every two years and there are now more cell-phones in the world than there are people²⁰. Women did not have the right to vote in two-thirds of the founding Member States. As of this year, they can vote in all 193²¹. Advances in technology, science and communications are redefining our lives, opening up infinite possibilities but also new risks. People, markets, and ideas are deeply integrated. Citizens are playing a more active role in governance and policy-making, at least in most democracies. The pace of change has increased dramatically. Time seems to have sped up. Risk is more contagious and unpredictable. We live in a world dominated by what a former UN Secretary-General called “problems without passports”²².

These changes have profoundly altered relationships between and within UN Member States. The relative importance of economic, social, military and political factors in those relationships has evolved. Geopolitical tensions may have risen but even states that are politically at odds are deeply economically intertwined. Issues previously considered the domestic purview of states have become global, resulting in a marked diminution in sovereignty. Borders have come to mean less and less, even as the international system remains heavily state-based. Warfare is being redefined. Domestically states have ceded significant power to private sector and civil society actors, changing the ways they govern in the process. The relationship between governments and their citizens has changed. People are more informed, empowered (at least digitally) and educated than ever. They are also dramatically more urban and mobile, putting enormous pressure on infrastructure, energy, resources and the environment. The people left behind by globalization are increasingly concentrated in fragile states grappling with a toxic mix of violent extremism, transnational crime, conflict, poverty and environmental stresses. Many are victims of proxy wars fought in their countries by regional and global powers. The recent surge of migrants and refugees flooding to Europe has served as a stark reminder of the consequences of not addressing these acute needs.

All over the world, the twin promise and perils of globalization have caused rising popular disaffection with formal public institutions and leaders. The era of global austerity and financial crisis has shaken popular belief in the power of traditional institutions to solve problems. There has been a marked erosion in respect for international law, norms and institutions. Powerful countries are less persuaded than they were in 1945 about the rationale for voluntarily limiting their power. Middle powers are voicing their sense of disenfranchisement from established institutions and weaker countries increasingly question whether those institutions protect their interests effectively. Member States are becoming more transactional in their relationship with international institutions. There is an emerging sense that protecting our global commons – water, air, food, land, health and even communications – can only be done collectively but that we lack the necessary leadership and institutions. These changes are having a profound impact on international collective action and burden-sharing, making them vastly more difficult at a time when they are needed more than ever before.

Governance without governments: the impact on international cooperation and collective action

The international decision-making landscape has not kept pace with these trends. The issues are more complex, interconnected and unpredictable in their effects. It can be difficult to disaggregate them into manageable sub-sets or to build political coalitions for action. For instance, to address climate change requires an understanding of its interconnections with economic considerations, energy policy, natural resources, governance and politics. It means being able to galvanize the private sector, civil society and ordinary citizens. Pandemics are considered by the insurance industry as the top threat to human survival but preventing and responding to them, and indeed addressing health crises in general, requires understanding not just disease but also demographic, climatic and social dynamics. It means staying on top of advances in science and technology and the dynamics of the pharmaceutical industry. Resolving conflict is not simply a question of reaching agreements on ceasefires and power-sharing but requires an understanding of the transnational flows of finance, technology, ideology, and weapons, not to mention more sophisticated analysis of the drivers of violent extremism. New global agendas are being adopted in areas such as sustainable development, climate change, and disaster risk. These agendas recognize at a rhetorical level the deep interconnectedness of the challenges we face (the “what”) but they do not provide solutions for the “how”.

Many of our tools are proving hopelessly inadequate to these tasks. The world has “never been more integrated but less governed”²³. Our bureaucratic structures divide the world in ways that obscure our understanding of the interconnected mega-trends driving change in the world today²⁴. For instance, the response to the Ebola crisis in West Africa in 2014-15 showed how difficult it remains for the international system to break out of existing mind-sets and silos. What began as a health crisis soon evolved into a massive humanitarian, political and development crisis in the affected regions but the international response was hampered by an inability of the actors in these different silos to figure out what mechanisms to use in response²⁵. Similarly, conflict management tools such as peacekeeping are still largely country-specific even as the nature of warfare evolves into a transnational phenomenon. Peace operations in countries such as Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali struggle to bring stability in part because the sources of instability lie across international borders, in the form of meddling neighbours, illegal drug-trafficking supply chains, flows of weapons, terrorism and violent extremist ideology. State-to-state negotiations on climate change omit many of the actors with the most power to bring about reductions in emissions. The development system remains premised on outdated notions about the nature, size and flows of development aid.

This problem is recognised but adapting our collective action toolbox will take time. The bar is very high for structural reform to multilateral institutions because powerful interests are at play. But time is not on our side. The information age has dramatically altered people’s expectations. The pace of decision-making has sped up. Social media and the 24-hour news cycle have shortened time horizons, increased the time pressures on decision-makers and exacerbated the so-called “tragedy of horizon” in political decision-making²⁶. World leaders are expected to pronounce immediately and accurately on complex global events. Creating the space for strategic decision-making has become more difficult than ever. Policy-makers are not in agreement as to what the priorities are. Global agendas such as the Sustainable Development Goals embrace a notion of interconnected challenges but complicate attempts to prioritise or more forward selectively, contributing to a collective paralysis.

These challenges place a very high premium on international leadership and decision-making, on the ability to identify emerging challenges and rapidly galvanize an adequate international response that cuts across traditional silos. For the ninth UN Secretary-General to play a meaningful role, he will need to have the personal qualities required for this kind of leadership and the machinery underneath him that will allow him to think strategically, act decisively and to

communicate broadly. Absent prospects for imminent structural reform, the people and systems at the heart of the UN become critically important in the near-term.

Not only are the issues more complex, so is the field of actors. The number and variety of actors involved in international affairs has grown. The ‘international community’ can no longer be thought of as consisting merely of states and intergovernmental organizations. Many other actors have leverage. Many other actors are defining the issues, problems and opportunities. Private money dwarfs public. Individuals have power that states could only dream of when the UN was founded. Civil society organisations are key governance partners. Parliamentarians are playing a larger role on global issues. Even amongst states, the number of influential players has grown. Regional and emerging powers have become more assertive but are not necessarily willing to play by the same rules and values that prevailed during the long period of western dominance, in particular while the formal allocation of power (e.g. in the Security Council or the Bretton Woods institutions) fails to reflect power realities today. State-to-state discussions are clearly insufficient to solve most issues as they exclude many important players. With changes in the geopolitical landscape, states are also finding it harder to reach agreement. The international institutions at their disposal are decentralized and divided in different sectors. The digital revolution and globalization have eroded traditional hierarchy. In this complex and ambiguous environment, “power itself isn’t what it used to be”²⁷.

Already, twenty years ago, scholars characterised the efforts of the international community to manage shared problems as “governance without government”, lacking any central decision-making authority²⁸. One wonders how many more years will pass before speculation begins about a future of international governance without “governments”. The ninth UN Secretary-General takes the helm at a time when governments are still the main players and when their national interests are clearly still the basis for decision-making. This is certainly the case within the confines of the United Nations, one of the remaining bastions of Member State control. But foreign ministries no longer have a monopoly on foreign policy making at the national level and governments are no longer the only players necessary to manage global problems at the international level. These developments change the nature of the leadership that the Secretary-General may need to exercise in fundamental ways.

The changing nature of leadership

Any discussion of leadership must deal with the question of how a leader gets the members of a group or organization to act and move in a particular direction. So-called distributed leadership is a reality of modern organizations but tone and direction is still set from the top²⁹. The power to set and enforce direction comes in different forms, from the hard power of coercion (“might makes right”) to the material ability to reward people, to the softer power of association and shared connections (“guilt by association”; “peer pressure”). There is also sheer expert power based on knowledge; and, finally, the power of information and ideas³⁰. This last form of power – the power of ideas, persuasion and influence – has greater potential and weight in a world when the traditional levers of power are less effective, where new actors have taken the stage, where people can mobilize and take action without waiting for governments and where ideas can spread instantaneously. The power of persuasion has become as important as the power of the purse or the sword. But effective persuasion is not just skilful salesmanship. It “involves careful preparation, the proper framing of arguments, the presentation of vivid supporting evidence, and the effort to find the correct emotional match with your audience”³¹. It involves a blend of personal and institutional capacity – the people at the top and the systems by which they decide.

This changes the very nature of leadership – who can exercise it, where it comes from and what it looks like. We often focus on the structural conditions that prevent resolution of today’s complex problems but leadership, human agency and ideas are just as important³². The greater levels of complexity and uncertainty and acrimony that have crept into multilateral negotiations of late and the fact that national leaders find themselves increasingly constrained in addressing the

most pressing global challenges, make effective leadership at the international level an absolute must³³. Indeed, the scope for leadership is, in some respects, much greater than in the days of bipolar Cold War constraints and, in the fluid and ambiguous world of today, “leaders involved in foreign policy making can have more influence on what governments do”³⁴. But very few countries seem prepared to show real global leadership – a problem often referred to as the “G Zero” world where nobody wants to take charge³⁵. This opens up real possibilities for leadership from the next Secretary-General. But what kind of leadership?

As will emerge repeatedly in this volume, leadership in international organizations is “not based on the ability to give orders but rather on the ability to convince member states to endorse proposals and to motivate staff to implement requests”³⁶. The true art of UN leadership is to shape the decisions of Member States so that they can be implemented. Increasingly, this art involves outreach to many different actors beyond governments. It involves personal qualities that will emerge over the course of this study, including courage, vision, integrity and perseverance.

There is an intellectual dimension to the art of UN leadership. The ability to generate new ideas “can create a sense of legitimacy and of authority that the UN, lacking in conventional means of correction and rewards, otherwise does not have access to”³⁷. Powerful ideas can alter the diplomatic calculation in capitals, raising the political costs of inaction. The UN has always been an important source of ideas for collective action, including concepts such as human rights, sustainable development, and peacekeeping. Indeed, some observers feel that it is the realm of such ideas that the UN has come closest to changing the world³⁸. To achieve this today, the Secretary-General needs to navigate an external environment that has become vastly more complex and crowded, in terms of the agenda and the actors involved, than anything faced by earlier occupants of the office. He needs to be a trusted source of ideas and a charismatic leader at a time when ideas and leadership are in short supply. He needs to be able to reach beyond governments and to create a context in which collective action appears possible in the face of seemingly insurmountable global challenges. This requires the ability to transcend the silos that traditionally carve up the way we see and interact with the world, to transcend Member States without losing their support, and to inspire a diverse range of actors to drive in the same direction.

There is also a more practical dimension. Good ideas must ultimately result in action. Where that action is undertaken by the United Nations, the Secretary-General has to be able to deliver results through an enormously complex bureaucratic machine. He needs to manage his relationship with that machine accordingly, to oversee and understand it effectively. This is a major leadership and management challenge. As will be covered in detail in subsequent chapters, the system grew haphazardly in response to changing needs and demands over the course of 70 years. Institutional structure adapted but did not truly keep pace with the expansion in scope and complexity of the demands on the Organization³⁹. Moreover, because of their structure and their lack of sovereign power, international organizations are “among the hardest bureaucracies to manage” and characterized by consensus-based decision-making whereby “staff have to be motivated to follow directions”⁴⁰.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the UN. It is deeply hierarchical in culture but not in terms of meaningful authority. Across the UN, staff at all levels have their own political connections and are motivated not by decree but by their belief in what they do, often under trying conditions. With limited power to hire and fire, the Secretary-General needs instead to inspire. To earn and sustain the trust of the UN Member States, he needs to earn and sustain the trust of the machinery. But this is not trust is neither a given nor a constant; it is earned in the first instance through inspiring leadership but it is sustained through strong management. It requires him to delegate while remaining vigilant about many of the details. It is not a luxury but rather a necessary condition to managing the increasingly complex and fragmented system that needs to continue to adapt to changing geopolitical, technological and other conditions. This study will argue that robust decision-making structures are crucial to the effective exercise of a Secretary-General’s dilute power and to gaining results from the deeply complex UN machinery.

Finally, there is a clear normative dimension to UN leadership. It is not enough to shape decisions according to transient political interests and pressures. The Secretary-General is expected to uphold certain norms, values and principles in the process. Put another way, “effective UN leaders create space and validity” for the UN Charter, international norms and the idea of international service “amidst competing national and regional political prerogatives ... they gain results for peace, for human rights, for development and social justice”⁴¹. He will inevitably face conflicting political pressures and an overwhelming number of crises while needing to articulate the long-term vision and fundamental principles on which the legitimacy of the UN is based. He also needs to earn and sustain public trust, to be seen as a reliable partner and a safe pair of hands not just by 193 Member States but by 7 billion people. This requires the ability to understand and speak to the concerns of people in terms that resonate broadly.

In other words, the ninth Secretary-General will be expected to exercise leadership across a broader range of issue areas than any of his or her predecessors, managing a system of UN entities that is more complex than at any point in history and influencing a more diverse array of external actors than ever to work towards common goals. He or she will need to have the communication skills to move multiple audiences, the leadership and negotiation skills to innovate and create political space, and the management skills to build a UN team that delivers international agreements and collective action in technically complex and politically challenging areas. These challenges require: “an ability to navigate the complex external environment in a way that leads to the right results, and an ability to manage the administration so that member states are convinced that the resources they provide are being used properly”⁴².

This should not be reduced to simplistic questions about whether the Secretary-General is more “secretary” or “general”. In truth, he must be both. And many other things besides: a norm entrepreneur, the global crisis manager of last resort, a competent manager of huge operations in the field, an activist, an administrator, a leader of the UN system, a giver and a taker of orders, a secular pope, a superb storyteller, a master at the art of persuasion and an embodiment of “we the peoples”. Navigating these many roles effectively takes different skills than it did in the past and different relationships with the many parts of the UN ecosystem – Member States, the Secretariat, the agencies, funds and programmes – and with the public.

Chapter 2. “The Fog of Peace”: Understanding Political Decision-Making

Sir Humphrey: If you want to be really sure that the Minister doesn't accept it, you must say the decision is "courageous".

Bernard: And that's worse than "controversial"?

Sir Humphrey: Oh, yes! "Controversial" only means "this will lose you votes". "Courageous" means "this will lose you the election"!⁴³

Studying decision-making is a useful way to examine how power translates into action. There is an enormous body of academic and business literature on the science of decision-making. Many theories have been put forward to explain the different factors and approaches. Some models assume it is a process of rational deliberation, while others argue that key decisions are most often the result of bargaining among diverse political interests. Some theories focus on the psychology of individual decision-makers while others underline the defining influence of the organizational cultures within which decision-makers operate. These models are not mutually exclusive. Nor are any of them applicable in their entirety to the “politics, power and pathologies” of an international organization such as the United Nations⁴⁴. However, they each shed light on important aspects of decision-making that shape the way in which a Secretary-General should think about his role: what individual traits top decision-makers bring to bear, how the environment in which they operate shapes the choices before them, whether and how their grasp of the issues influences the outcome, how adequate and important the machinery available to decision-makers is, how power is wielded and how decisions ultimately translate into reality.

The leader: setting tone and direction from the top

“It is necessary to get a lot of men together, for the show of the thing, otherwise the world will not believe. That is the meaning of committees. But the real work must always be done by one or two men” – Anthony Trollope⁴⁵

Philosophers and social scientists have debated for centuries whether or not individual leaders matter or whether they are too constrained by their environment to exercise much influence⁴⁶. This study starts from the premise that the personality of the leader will affect the decision-making environment in multiple ways and that the quality of global governance depends as much on individual leadership as it does on the content of agreements or the effectiveness of the international machinery⁴⁷. This is consistent with the points made by many of those interviewed for this study. They argued that the tone from the very top of an organization was the single most important factor in determining its direction and setting its values. Citing individual experiences with changes in Foreign Minister, head of government or UN Secretary-General, they emphasized that a leader’s own style, competence and character are still more influential than any political and bureaucratic constraints⁴⁸. The portraits of Secretaries-General in the next chapter appear to bear this observation out. It is striking how different they were and how differently they grappled with the complexities of the job.

It is worth understanding, therefore, what personal attributes bear most on a leader’s ability to lead a complex organization and to take good decisions. Decision-making is inherently subjective and different people will arrive at different decisions under same circumstances. These differences are the focus of psychological approaches in the literature, which look at how decision-making is affected by unconscious biases, conscious beliefs, self-confidence, courage, risk-tolerance, and cognitive limitations. Among the most basic questions: what kind of character, personality and charisma matter most? What mental skills, integrity and intellect? What moral courage? How important is personal intuition, the ability to relate to people and to manage them? And what of political communications skills?⁴⁹ In addition, there are wide variations in leadership style including, for instance, work habits, how the decision-maker likes to receive information, how he makes up his mind, and how willing he is to tolerate conflict and disagreement⁵⁰.

All of these attributes will bear on the leadership and decision-making style. They might determine the decision-making processes the leader prefers and the issues that will command attention. They might shape his sense of the possible and how actively he involves himself in the issues. Leaders set expectations based on their judgements about what is possible or not and these perceptions about what constraints exist greatly affect the advice the leader ultimately receives. They might influence whom she or he appoints as his senior advisers (an under-confident leader might choose to appoint weak advisers who do not threaten his or her authority, for instance). There are well known individual cognitive limits that affect how the leader filters and interprets the information he or she is given. The ability of every individual to listen and digest information will vary, as will the lens they apply to that information, which is heavily influenced by their own personal and cultural background, personal values and political leanings. As was once said about US Presidents, “the degree and quality of a President’s emotional involvement are powerful influences on how he defines the issue itself, how much attention he pays to it, which facts and persons he sees as relevant to its resolution, and, finally, what principles and purposes he associates with the issue”⁵¹. People hear what they want to hear, often falling into the “confirmation bias” trap whereby they interpret what they hear in ways that confirm their preconceptions.

So as to inject some rigour into psychological studies of leadership, Hermann has developed a ‘leadership trait analysis’ to identify the seven psychological traits that have an effect on the quality of foreign policy decision-making by leaders: 1) need for power; 2) distrust; 3) conceptual complexity; 4) self-confidence; 5) belief in ability to control events; 6) task (versus relationship) orientation; and 7) in-group bias⁵². From this analysis she offers different models of decision-maker. The ‘expansionist’ challenges constraints and is more problem- than relationship-focussed. The ‘influential’ respects constraints, is closed to information and more focused on relationships than the task. ‘Opportunistic’ leaders are open to information, focussed on the problem and respectful of constraints. We will return to these categories in Chapter Four. The portraits of the Secretaries-General appear to confirm that those who scored highest in a leadership trait analysis are those with the reputation for having been particularly effective⁵³. This appears to confirm the value of isolating and prioritizing certain attributes when selecting leaders of organizations such as the UN. Several bear singling out in this chapter because they seem especially important for a leader whose remit is massive and whose power is illusory. Some of the traits below are not fully captured in the leadership trait analysis but have emerged from this study as equally crucial.

The first trait worth singling out is courage. Physical courage is easily understood and highly valued. Moral and political courage are less easily quantified or recognized but are absolutely vital to the exercise of leadership of a norm-based organization. The courage to take tough decisions in the service of what is right and to stand up for those decisions in the face of contrary pressures is arguably critical to leadership of any complex organization, public or private, but “the UN is an organization where courage in leadership, in particular moral courage, is a necessity to safeguard the essence of the organization, to uphold its authority and to promote the realization of its objectives. At the same time, much in the Organization’s operating environment and culture mitigates against the exercise of courage in leadership”⁵⁴. Decision-making at this level is enormously complex and full of risk. Easier decisions are typically taken lower down the chain of command. When the Secretary-General takes a decision, the stakes are high, the issues complex and the pressure intense. Most decisions will be unpopular with someone. It should go without saying that personal courage is a prerequisite of the job. And yet not every previous incumbent has demonstrated this quality.

Closely related to courage is intelligence, both emotional and intellectual. Courageous decision-making must be underpinned by insight and strategic vision that is aware of the risks but can also see the opportunities⁵⁵. Achieving such insight and vision in today’s complex landscape requires a high degree of political and intellectual acumen. Leaders with a high ability to cope with conceptual complexity tend to seek information and are open to alternatives. They are more

likely to be able to identify opportunities amidst complexity and to formulate a vision that others will be willing to follow: “envisioning exciting possibilities and enlisting others in a shared view of the future, is the attribute that most distinguishes leaders from non-leaders”⁵⁶. Leaders who do not deal well with complexity tend to fixate on the issues they can grasp (often those easy to measure or see) and to close off contradictory or difficult information. Compensating for an intellectually weak leader places enormous strain on the structures and staff in the leader’s immediate orbit. The effects of a leader who fails to grasp the issues were evident in the Reagan White House, where “it was impossible to know” who was in charge, where decision-making was opaque and where “you didn’t always get clean and crisp decisions. You assumed a lot ... you had to”⁵⁷. One observer often wondered “who’s in charge here? I could never understand where power was in that White House; it kept moving. I’d see men in suits huddled in a hall twenty paces from the Oval Office, and I’d think, there it is, that’s where they’re making the decisions. But the next day they were gone and the hall was empty”⁵⁸. In an organization with centrifugal tendencies, such as the UN, such a problem would be less easily masked and overcome. A leader who fails to grasp or does not engage on the complexity of the issues cannot effectively navigate the many balancing acts the job entails or seize the opportunities that present themselves, often fleetingly.

A third, related trait is the leader’s belief in his or her ability to control events. Strong such belief is correlated with a controlling approach to decision-making and an unwillingness to delegate⁵⁹. On the other hand, insufficient confidence in this regard can lead to indecisiveness or feelings of impotence, creating a leadership vacuum and the risk of bureaucratic interests driving decision outcomes. This distinction can be particularly important in diffuse organisations that lack a single centre of political gravity and where persuasion is as important as more traditional forms of power. For instance, it comes through clearly in much of the coverage about the different leadership styles of the last three chairs of the US Federal Reserve – Alan Greenspan, Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen – where Greenspan’s “maestro” style of leadership gave way to “the Fed norm of trying to be the human embodiment of an Excel spreadsheet: gray, data-driven, personality-less, passion-free decision makers”⁶⁰. While passion-free leadership may be appropriate for a Fed single-mindedly holding down interest rates, it may be less appropriate for an international organization facing the kinds of complex, interconnected challenges and barriers to collective action that are likely to confront an incoming Secretary-General of the UN.

No account of decision-making by the Secretary-General is complete without portraits of the actual individuals who have done the job. Those portraits, contained in Chapter Four, will rely heavily on the insights offered in this section, looking at the extent to which the different Secretaries-General exhibited the traits mentioned above and how those traits contributed to their effectiveness as decision-makers and leaders. It will show that they varied widely in their self-confidence and belief in their ability to shape the global agenda. And that this self-confidence alone noticeably affected their apparent power or powerlessness. It will show that the increasing complexity of the issues on the UN agenda and the equally complex international machinery that must try to respond, have made it almost *sine qua non* that a Secretary-General possess the intellectual capacity to grasp complexity and to take difficult decisions.

For all that the personality of the leader matters greatly, leadership in the modern age is not carried out by individuals alone⁶¹. It is rare for one individual to take decisions entirely in isolation. They are rarely the only person within what the literature calls the “decision unit”. This is usually composed of the senior team or closest advisers. Most corporations have a top executive team that typically consists of the CEO and his or her direct reports. The existence of decision units is a largely positive thing, given that human beings are unlikely to be able to spot and safeguard against their own errors in judgment. But the value of collective decision-making is not always clear to the leaders themselves. It is to this issue that we now turn.

The group: the value of collective responsibility

“Bye the bye, there is one thing we haven’t agreed upon, which is, what are we to say? Is it better to make our corn dearer, or cheaper, or to make the price steady? I don’t care which: but we had better all tell the same story”⁶²

Consequential decisions at the highest levels of business and government almost always involve several decision-makers and advisers. Decisions reached this way tend to be better and more lasting. At a very basic level, this is because a group of advisers can compensate for the individual limitations of any leader. They can bring not only their personal strengths and perspectives to bear but also their functional insights from different parts of the organization. Putting in place clear group decision-making procedures is thus a safeguard against “good leaders making bad decisions” because it prevents the most important decisions being overly skewed by individual biases. The business literature is nearly unanimous on this fact: “for important decisions, we need a deliberate, structured way to identify likely sources of bias—those red flag conditions—and we need to strengthen the group decision-making process”⁶³. Moreover, better decisions will be made if all alternatives and options are openly discussed. Participants in the decision making process are more likely to support the final outcome even if it’s not the one they want if they believe their ideas and thoughts were truly considered. This is not to say that formal process need become an enemy of timely or flexible decision-making. But clear procedures for taking decisions are an important safeguard for diversity of thought and input. This is particularly so for complex organizations.

In addition to these managerial reasons, there are also strong political reasons for putting place group-decision-making structures in governmental and intergovernmental settings. Collective ownership of decisions guards against political pressures and greatly enhances the chances of implementation. The principle of collective responsibility in government developed in eighteenth century England. It was initially a means for the ministers to stand up to King George III, counteracting his tendency to divide and rule by attempting to exert collective influence upon him. The ministers began to operate according to the principles of unity and solidarity, submitting unified advice to the monarch without any indication of dissent and, ultimately developing the collective power to contemplate policies they knew he opposed, such as the emancipation of the Catholics⁶⁴. The modern UK cabinet system supported by a cabinet office with clear decision-making procedures emerged in the early part of the twentieth century, when World War I required faster and better coordinated decisions to be made across government. Today’s UK cabinet has twenty-one members and meets weekly. It is not hard to see how important a similarly united front from senior UN leadership might be for pushing Member States and others towards action.

Most governments and international organizations now have some form of collective decision making at the executive level. Governments that use the parliamentary system formally adhere to the principle, whereby members of the cabinet must publicly support all governmental decisions made in cabinet, even if they do not privately agree with them. It is widely felt that this approach leads to speedier and better decisions, although only if there is a minimum of collective unity within the cabinet. It is premised on the understanding that ministers do not stray into each-other’s areas of competence. It can also be argued that ministerial unanimity has become “a practical device which prevent[s] fragmentation of publicly-expressed opinion by ministers unlikely to be fully conversant with all aspects and ramifications of the full range of public policy”⁶⁵. In other words, the principle has become more valuable as the range of issues confronting the average government or international organization has become more complex.

The European Commission also operates according to this principle, with the “College” of Commissioners taking decisions collectively. The Commissioners do not have any individual decision-making powers, except when they are authorised by the Commission to take measures in their own name in their area of responsibility (so-called “empowerment procedure”). In such cases, they assume the political and legal responsibility on behalf of the Commission. Otherwise,

collective decision-making is thought to ensure that decisions are of high quality, since all Commissioners have been consulted, that the Commission remains independent and free of partisan pressures, and that political responsibility is shared by all Commissioners even when decisions have to be voted upon⁶⁶. It also ensures that Commissioners are equally accountable for decisions and “once a decision is taken, every Member of the College is responsible for respecting, promoting and defending it. A Commission decision is needed to amend a Commission decision”⁶⁷.

The principle of shared political responsibility for the most consequential decisions should hold great appeal for a UN Secretary-General whose actual authority over senior UN officials is weak and variable. The closest the UN has come to putting in place similar understandings and practices is the Policy Committee, which will be covered in depth in Chapter Six. It reveals the difficulties involved in creating and sustaining disciplined collective decision-making over time, not least given the many disincentives built into the governance, funding and politics of the UN machine. It further reveals that, only with concerted effort and ownership from the top of the organization, do such practices happen. This is not unique to the UN. In no organisation does the practice of collective responsibility happen by itself. It comes about only with conscious managerial effort to put in place and protect the necessary structures and discipline. The leader and top officials involved need to recognize its value. This is never a given.

The importance of the group in leadership decision-making is often overlooked, not only in the literature (emphatically including the literature about the Secretary-General) but by leaders themselves. The business literature reveals that senior executives often overlook the importance of their top team’s inputs and tend to focus more on their individual roles. The same is true of heads of state and government. British Prime Ministers, for instance, have varied widely in the extent to which they have relied on their cabinets. While Thatcher did so consistently, Major did so less and less over time as divisions within his government grew and Blair was often accused of sidelining his cabinet and centralizing decision-making at Number 10⁶⁸. This reminds us that, even in the country that gave birth to the principle of collective responsibility, the individual leader can choose to make full use of it or merely go through the motions. The principle of collective decision-making is thus reliant on the people involved.

Failure to recognize the importance of collective decision-making can have serious consequences. It can result in failure by top leadership to assign value to or give proper thought to putting in place procedures for top managers to pull together. It is often overlooked when senior appointments are made. And, once those appointments are made, leaders too often expect the senior team to pull together without giving conscious thought to bringing this about. This is a pity because who is in the decision-making group and how the group operates “matters tremendously”⁶⁹.

There is a substantial body of literature on the characteristics of group decision-making and the effects of group behaviours on decision-making outcomes. Group dynamics, group size, the role of the leader within the group, and the procedures the group adopts for taking decisions all have an impact on the outcome. The most well-known phenomenon is group-think, whereby groups reach premature and poorly thought out decisions because, knowingly or unknowingly, they discourage dissent and debate⁷⁰. Scholars agree that groups that close themselves off from a wide variety of inputs or scrutiny tend to perform less well than those that are open to new information and to dissent⁷¹. But they don’t necessarily agree on the solutions. Janis recommends “vigilant” decision-making with extensive information-gathering and analysis but others argue that the real solutions lie in “greater leader strength, more centralization of authority, greater rigidity, more willingness to take risks, less legalism and more optimism”⁷². Conscious effort is clearly needed, especially in consensus-oriented cultures such as the UN, to avoid the group-think trap.

One clear variable in that respect is the role the leader plays within the group, how he is regarded by the group and the “relative experience and relationship between the executive and his advisors”⁷³. One question is whether or not the leader is actively interested in the matter at hand and/or whether he exercise strong leadership within the group: “lack of leadership can be highly problematic, as it leaves room for both un-ending in-fighting between various factions in the group and for little oversight over the implementation of group orders”⁷⁴. Inter-personal dynamics have a bearing on how much the group self-censors and whether the leader actively solicits dissenting views and is willing to revise initial views in response to discussions⁷⁵. This requires the leader to be comfortable with dissent and possibly rancor, and to be self-confident enough to manage differences amongst his or her senior team and to be willing to make a judgement. It is no small leadership feat to ensure frank but collegial discussions in political environments where institutional considerations frequently pit the participants against each-other. A group that is “frequently impaired by divisive fights over its rules and procedures [or] incessant jockeying for position or members who spend much of their time trying to pull down one or more of their colleagues” is unlikely to be effective⁷⁶. Immediate group structures, dynamics between other group members and the quality of the teamwork in the group also have a major effect⁷⁷. As David Rothkopf observes a propos foreign policy creation in the US government, it is a “collaborative art form ... a fact that has been lost on many presidents who have viewed their cabinets as a series of individual slots to be filled and then could not understand why coordination became impossible, rivalries emerged and ineffectiveness (and worse) resulted”⁷⁸.

The size and stated purpose of the decision-making group matter too. In 1958, Cyril Parkinson semi-humorously conjectured that cabinets and other government bodies lose effectiveness once they are larger than about 20 people. He called this the “co-efficient of inefficiency”. This theory has been tested recently and found to be surprisingly strong, showing that opinion formation within groups becomes almost impossible once the group exceeds twenty individuals⁷⁹. In government, the size of the cabinet can vary enormously. The current range in 193 Member States is from 5 to 54⁸⁰. There are many other determinants of a successful cabinet, most stemming from the political cohesion, vision, leadership and other characteristics of the government itself⁸¹.

The ability of the chair, be he prime minister, Secretary-General or CEO, to manage the group and deftly handle the psychology of persuasion is also key, not least since “no leader can hope to persuade, regularly and single-handedly, all the members of the group. The most influential leaders are those who know how to arrange the group conditions to allow the principle of social proof to work in their favour”. Clearly, one factor in the workability of the group is its size. Given the pattern in the UN of slowly expanding membership of the top decision-making bodies so that all issues and the officials responsible for them are seen to have a seat at the table, the importance of group size should be recognized.

The purpose of the group and how well it is understood by the members, and by the organization as a whole, can also have a significant bearing on the effectiveness of decision-making because “decisions about who is on what committee, what committee makes what decision, who recommends, who implements, how they do it and what is required to start or stop an action can have a profound impact on events”⁸².

This is not to say that every decision needs to be taken in the same format. The business literature recognizes that senior executives need different configurations of people for different types of decisions. Many senior executives use informal gatherings or trusted kitchen cabinets to take key decisions. Even in a more formal group of peers, some people and functions will always carry more weight than others. Executive teams are, in effect, legislatures, with each member representing a significant constituency within the organization. Its members are typically asked to take off their functional hats and to view the organization holistically but they also bring important functional perspectives to bear. This marriage of horizontal corporate responsibility with vertical, functional responsibility is particularly complex in governmental settings where the top echelon of

officials is often composed of political appointees. The UN is no different in this respect. The senior leadership is largely composed of individuals whose careers and loyalties are not bound to the UN in the long-term. Moreover, their functional loyalties – to whatever agency, department or issue they represent – can often pull them in a different direction than corporate loyalty would suggest. All the more reason, then, to put in place rigorous decision-making procedures that protect the Organization from these centrifugal pressures and enable the Secretary-General to exercise maximum possible authority and influence. As we will see in subsequent chapters, this logic has not always prevailed in practice.

Even in less politically complex environments, lack of clarity as to the role of the group can give rise to problems. For instance, problems arise when the participants in the formal executive team are given to believe that they are being asked to take a decision when, in fact, they are only being asked to advise or offer views. Team members who are repeatedly presented with “done deals” grow disempowered and disaffected, feeling that they are being used as rubber stamps for decisions taken elsewhere. The solution is not necessarily to insist on using the formal executive team for all decisions but to be clear in advance what the expectations are⁸³. This includes clarity as to whose role it is to recommend a course of action on a key decision, who must agree to the recommendation before it can move forward, who will perform the actions necessary for implementation, whose input is needed to determine the proposal’s feasibility and who actually decides, bringing the decision-making process to closure and committing the organization to implementing it⁸⁴. The literature argues that only one person should “have the D” since tug-of-wars result when multiple people believe themselves to be in charge. It also advises against assigning too many people the right to agree (and therefore veto) or to have input, since not all will make meaningful contributions. In subsequent chapters we will examine how easily these principles and lessons can be applied to a UN environment. Many of them are difficult to apply in an organization where the decision-making responsibility is already shared between Member States and UN officials and where, within the Secretariat, the inclination is to disperse it further. Chapter Four will show how different Secretaries-General grappled with this challenge while Chapter Six will look at specific attempts to put in place collective decision-making mechanisms.

The social space: institutional culture and structures

“Sir Humphrey Appleby: Minister, the traditional allocation of executive responsibilities has always been so determined as to liberate the Ministerial incumbent from the administrative minutiae by devolving the managerial functions to those whose experience and qualifications have better formed them for the performance of such humble offices, thereby releasing their political overlords for the more onerous duties and profound deliberations that are the inevitable concomitant of their exalted position.

James Hacker: Now, whatever made you think I wouldn't want to hear that?

Sir Humphrey Appleby: Well, I thought it might upset you.

James Hacker: How could it? I didn't understand a single word. Humphrey, for God's sake, for once in your life put it into plain English.

*Sir Humphrey Appleby: If you insist. You are *not* here to run this Department.*

James Hacker: I beg your pardon.

*Sir Humphrey Appleby: You are *not* here to run this Department.*

James Hacker: I think I am. The people think I am, too.

Sir Humphrey Appleby: With respect, Minister, you are... they are wrong

James Hacker: And who does run this Department?

Sir Humphrey Appleby: I do”.

A central premise of this study – and something any fan of ‘*Yes Minister*’ already knows – is that the institutional culture and bureaucratic structures supporting decision-making have much more of a bearing on the content and outcome than is commonly understood. Theories of organizational process support this conclusion, arguing that decisions are limited not only by the cognitive constraints of the individual leader or the dynamics within the decision-making group

but also by the routines and culture of the organization within which the decisions are being taken. Decisions of consequence are taken in an institutional environment and the people taking those decisions “collect information and deliberate in ways that are in accordance with the norms, rules and procedures set down prior to any one particular decision-making event”⁸⁵. Structures and procedures, once created, “dramatically affect the course of decision-making”, shaping and mediating it in both positive and negative ways⁸⁶. Peoples’ behaviour is conditioned by the rules of the group and the process channels in place often “privilege or hinder the influence of certain actors”. Moreover, those who accurately understand how a structure operates are in a much better position to make it work to their advantage than those who do not⁸⁷. This is perhaps more true of a deeply political bureaucracy such as the United Nations than almost any other environment.

Organizational culture has been shown time and again to contribute directly to the quality of decision-making. This is true of the private sector as much as the public sector. It is thought, for instance, that a dysfunctional management culture in General Motors – which once controlled half of the American car market – had “direct and disastrous consequences for the quality of decision-making” with the result that the company was forced to file for bankruptcy and to take a government handout in 2009, while Ford, which faced exactly the same external challenges, avoided the same fate. Instead of open and candid communication within the executive team, there was the “G.M nod”, whereby “everyone nods in agreement on a proposed plan of action, but then leaves the room with no intention to follow through”. This was compounded by “reluctance to deliver bad news up the management chain” and “lack of communication among different slices of an overstuffed bureaucracy”⁸⁸. In Japan, an independent investigation of the flawed preparation for and response to the Fukushima Daiichi disaster found that it was a largely man-made problem attributable to “reflexive obedience; reluctance to question authority; and devotion to ‘sticking with the program’”⁸⁹.

These points are resonant of many of the interviews conducted for this study. The culture of consensus-based decision-making is strong in international organizations at both intergovernmental and internal levels and the UN is no exception. Unlike formal votes, consensus-based decisions conceal differences of power and influence amongst the decision-makers. They allow everyone involved to buy in to the outcome even if their views did not prevail. They obscure any conflict or trade-offs that arise in the bargaining process and allow the decision-makers to avoid admitting defeat. It has been described as “organized hypocrisy”⁹⁰. The risk that the organizational culture of the United Nations poses to the exercise of leadership has been articulated by many of the Secretaries-General, none more clearly than Annan who lamented the “damaged culture, which is seen as limiting creativity, enterprise, innovation and indeed leadership itself”⁹¹.

To counter the insidious effects of self-censorship and consensus-based decision-making, it is important for a leader to have a deep understanding of the organization he runs. This includes the social space in general and the specific players whose goals and actions are crucial in defining decision outcomes. These players are not only the decision-makers themselves but also include the stakeholders, who stand to benefit or suffer as a consequence of the decision and who can be expected to attempt to influence the decision-making process if they can. Then there are the decision-makers themselves. Decision-makers are often subject to the pull of contradictory pressures and to factors such as hierarchy, the institutional hats they wear and the views of their various stakeholders and constituencies. There are also the decision-implementers, usually not the same people as the decision-makers but who have it in their power to undermine the decision if they do not agree with it and have not been brought on board. Finally, there is the wider community who may be affected by the decision and whose support can be critical. This theory is particularly useful in an intergovernmental setting where many different actors, constituencies and interests are at play⁹². In a UN context, it means having a deep understanding of the motives and agendas of Member States, UN entities, UN staff, the wider civil society and indeed others as well. As the issues on the international agenda have become more complex, interconnected and entwined in domestic affairs, the number of interests at stake in each major decision has grown⁹³.

For the Secretary-General, even within his immediate orbit there will be many divergent interests at stake. These interests will tend to map closely to the structure of the bureaucracy and the different bureaucratic interests that come into play. In any bureaucracy, organizational divisions and structure have a major influence on decision-making. They determine how leaders think about issues, what kinds of recommendations are made and the balance between different sets of interests. The principle of the division of labour is considered a basic tenet of effective organizational functioning: “the simplest way to create a sense of order is to put ideas, people, and data into separate spatial, social, and mental boxes.”⁹⁴ Relatedly, for all its negative connotations, bureaucracy remains an important way to organize human activity so that it is informed, consistent, and predictable and so that expertise is brought to bear and institutional memory retained⁹⁵. Unfortunately, these principles also have a dark side, especially in large organizations, such as the United Nations, which are apt to be divided and sub-divided into numerous different departments. Such divisions may facilitate productivity but can stifle communication, collaboration and innovation; prevent information being shared outside the silos⁹⁶; cause people to lose sight of the bigger picture; lead to entrenched institutional interests being put ahead of those of the organization as a whole; and, most importantly from the perspective of this volume, fatally undermine decision-making by senior leadership.

This problem is not unique to the United Nations nor to the public sector⁹⁷. But there is considerable evidence of the silo effect in the UN Secretariat. Indeed, it has recently been identified as the number one risk to the effective functioning of the organization⁹⁸. An independent review of the UN’s peacebuilding work noted recently that “the silos established by the Charter in dividing responsibilities between the three principal intergovernmental Organs are directly and unhelpfully mirrored in the distribution of responsibilities between the different UN entities. They communicate with each other in different ways and at various levels, but there is general recognition that deep fragmentation persists, as each entity focuses on its own specific mandates at the expense of over-all coherence, added to the absence of a more forceful culture of coordination from the top”⁹⁹. This recognition that strong leadership at the top is necessary to bring such a centrifugal system together is not, in fact, all that new. As we will see, successive waves of reform reports have identified this need over the years.

Organizational divisions do more than separate people, interests and information. They also determine how senior decision-makers think about the decisions before them, significantly influencing how the issue is framed and understood. Before decision-makers can act, they “first must come to create a definition and understanding of the situation, and that understanding is mediated by how the institution is organized to think. ...How organizations categorize and carve up the world has a profound impact on how policymakers see the world”¹⁰⁰. At its most simplistic, the part of the organization with the hammer sees every problem as a nail. It is not unheard of for the Secretary-General to receive competing recommendations from the most vested parts of the bureaucracy for precisely the solutions that the proposing department or agency happens to be best placed to supply. The problem has been most acutely felt when the Organization is asked to plan and deploy a peace operation. No matter what the needs on the ground, the Secretary-General finds himself deciding between two options – a civilian political mission (always proposed by the Department of Political Affairs) or a peacekeeping mission with troops (always proposed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations)¹⁰¹. This problem has become so acute in recent years that Security Council members have begun to push back, demanding better options¹⁰². The ninth Secretary-General will almost certainly have to wrest better analysis and proposals out of the bureaucracy than his or her predecessors have been able to.

Absent strong strategic direction from the top, the UN bureaucracy inevitably reverts to a bargaining mean. Many scholars of foreign policy decision-making in government have focused on the “pushing and tugging” amongst various agencies that often means decision outcomes are determined by inter-agency institutional or resource considerations as opposed to the merits of the issue¹⁰³. The process of decision-making becomes a bargaining process among different parts of

the bureaucracy¹⁰⁴. The decision-maker is therefore reliant on a machinery with vested interest in the decision and significant influence over how the decision is framed and understood. This is common in governments where “ministries compete for resources, are often suspicious of a joint policymaking process and unwilling to share expertise or support goals of other ministries”¹⁰⁵. It is certainly also true of the UN, a system has almost as many divergent interests as the membership. Every time the Secretary-General takes a consequential decision, there are winners and losers within the system. In some cases, there are real trade-offs to be made, for instance between human rights advocacy and humanitarian access to needy populations or between robust military operations against spoilers and playing the honest broker at the peace table. In other cases, the balance is between differing bureaucratic interests. There are significant transaction costs to this situation; enormous energy and capital must be spent simply getting the bureaucracy in line behind a decision or cajoling it to implement a decision that has been taken but is not perceived as in an actor’s interest. Putting in place and using fair and transparent decision-making procedures for such decisions is key.

Even when overt manipulation does not take place, the very structure of the bureaucracy can flavour how decisions are framed and analyzed. The fragmentation of the UN bureaucracy into a large number of entities with responsibility for different thematic issues has had the effect of crowding the decision-making field with officials who see everything through the lens of their issue (e.g. peacebuilding; peacekeeping; responsibility to protect; children and armed conflict; development; human rights). This often leads to duplication, misunderstandings and enormous energy wasted in negotiating a shared framing of the issue before solutions can be discussed. It is compounded by the tendency in the UN to distinguish between substantive and management functions, with the result that the senior officials responsible for the budget and human resources do not report directly to the Secretary-General and are rarely at the table when major policy questions are discussed. This would be unheard of in any corporation or government. Clear and predictable decision-making procedures would not address these pathologies entirely but they would do a great deal to minimise their harmful effects, as we will see later on.

Even basic facts and analysis can be – and often are – distorted by bureaucratic machinations. Given that the Secretary-General’s power to influence events is largely about the power of facts and ideas, it is sobering that so much of the decision-making within the house is based on inadequate amounts of both. This is not only a UN problem. The infamous Donald Rumsfeld (inspired by D.H. Lawrence) distinction between “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns” is a valuable reminder that even the most consequential political decisions are rarely taken with the benefit of full information¹⁰⁶. But, where facts are known, or at least knowable, it is surprisingly common for senior UN leadership to feel inadequately served¹⁰⁷. The lack of data-driven decision-making in the UN is increasingly difficult to justify in the era of big data. The study of available data (90% of the data in the world has been created in the last two years) is an opportunity for better decision-making if the UN finds ways to manage large amounts of information, to rigorously analyse it and to effectively frame and synthesise it for decision-makers. This is already happening in sectors where metrics can be applied to UN operations, such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. It has been a subject of extensive discussion in the negotiations on the Sustainable Development Goals and how they will be measured and monitored. A new UN website brings together most of the statistical data generated across the system¹⁰⁸. In spite of these efforts, however, data is still too fragmented to support policy-making and, too often, decisions are being taken without information that exists in the UN system but is not available to decision-makers when and in the form they need it.

But the data is not everything and making it available is not enough to ensure its effective use. The right capacity and, sometimes, courage is also needed to translate information into action, often actions that others will need to take on the basis of nudging from the Secretary-General. This freights decisions about what constitutes authoritative and actionable information in an era of social media and information-overload¹⁰⁹. The question is whether the Secretary-General’s ability to nudge or shame states into action will evolve as such information becomes easier to acquire and

verify. In some cases, questions will arise as to whether new information-gathering assets (e.g. unmanned aerial vehicles in peacekeeping operations or social media reports in social protests) or the resulting information incur additional or greater obligations to act and accountability for not doing so (e.g. in the case of forewarning about an attack).

The information that underpins the kinds of decisions the Secretary-General takes is rarely simple or quantifiable. Much of it is open to interpretation and deeply political. Substantive mastery of the issue is only part of the equation. Equally important is intuitive knowledge of “how power is being exercised under the surface within and around the organization” and what the political traffic will bear¹¹⁰. The Secretary-General himself needs to have an antenna for such things and he needs to be supported with analysis from his office and the bureaucracy that can combine facts and intuition in a manner that answers his key questions¹¹¹. This content and how it is framed can make all the difference to the outcome.

But at the UN, as in many bureaucratic environments where information is one of the most important and jealously-guarded currencies and where many substantive matters are subordinate to maintaining good relations with the Member States, the culture can be self-censoring and risk-averse. “Evasion and understatement” become a force of habit¹¹². Officials risk being overly concerned with avoiding treading on Member State prerogatives and with averting future accusations of error by deflecting responsibility in advance. They court more professional risk by speaking up than they do by remaining silent. Imagination and dissent are strongly discouraged, if not overtly then by the culture. The temptation is strong to obfuscate or elide, sacrificing clear recommendations or clear accountability for action as a form of insurance against possible future negative repercussions. Wishful thinking can creep in before decision-makers are even presented with the options. Many things are left unsaid because they are felt to be too sensitive, especially anything that exposes Member States or risks affecting the UN’s relationship with them. Policy differences are papered over because exposing them feels risky or uncomfortable. Both leaders and gatekeepers play an enormous role in setting the tone and culture, determining to what extent these kinds of factors alter decision-making.

There are also many forces beyond the control of the decision-makers that have an enormous bearing on how and what they decide but that are often overlooked in hindsight. Competing demands on their attention, levels of stress, time constraints and political pressures can significantly affect both the process and the outcomes. Overwork, decision fatigue and the desire to make a problem go away as quickly as possible are common features of the decision-making environment. Recent failure can also weigh significantly on subsequent decision-making, as can recent experience more generally (“fighting the last war”). Urgency, stress, uncertainty and risk severely constrain the ability of decision-makers to assess information and make decisions effectively. Decision-makers too easily make mistakes such as taking cognitive short cuts or leaping to assumptions¹¹³, and rely too heavily on imperfect analogies¹¹⁴. Poorly managed office environments in which senior decision-makers’ time and attention is not well allocated can also have a deleterious effect on leadership and decision-making.

Examples abound of poor choices made under these conditions, not only in the UN but everywhere. At the level of Secretary-General, most decisions are taken under time pressure, stress and ambiguity. Most entail serious trade-offs and hard choices. Most are taken in highly fluid situations, meaning that new information arises and the alternatives on the table change even as they are under consideration. The stakes are frequently very high, as is the level of uncertainty. Most decisions are not one-off but rather part of a sequence of decisions, affected by the decisions being taken by others and taken at the same time as major decisions are being taken about other issues. This interplay of actors and issues is often overlooked when decisions are analysed afterwards, causing impartial or imbalanced lessons to be learned.

The gatekeepers: the role of front offices

Leaders usually navigate the dynamics described above by putting in place gatekeeper systems that coordinate all the players involved, filter the information and advice and support their decision-making. The gatekeepers or the innermost circle around the leader, usually his immediate staff and office, serve as a buffer between the leader and the rest of the organization and often also as a kind of control panel to manage the flow of decisions, to anticipate emerging issues and to ensure that the time of the leader is used as effectively as possible.

The idea of providing a head of state or government with a staff to give him advice and to help him drive government policy-making took hold in the early part of the twentieth century. The UK Cabinet Office was formed in 1916. In the US, Franklin D Roosevelt secured the approval of Congress in 1939 to create an office to support him¹¹⁵. By contrast, Thomas Jefferson had only one messenger and one secretary, both of whose salaries he paid from his own pocket! In Canada, EOSG-type functions are spread across a Privy Council Office of about 1,000, which coordinates Cabinet policy-making and a Prime Minister's Office, which is a more partisan political unit with a staff of about 125 (the former is "policy-oriented but politically-sensitive" whereas the latter is "politically-oriented but policy-sensitive"¹¹⁶). Other similar structures supporting heads of government include the Chancellor's office and Chancellery in Germany, the Departments of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia and New Zealand and the Cabinet Secretariat in India.

There is an emerging field of study on cabinet offices that recognizes how important these functions are to a head of government's "steering capacity" i.e. the ability to set priorities, coordinate, and follow through¹¹⁷. They control the flow of information and access to the leader and manage the ways in which decisions are presented. An effective cabinet or front office will manage the process so that it facilitates the expression of diverging views, resolves what can be resolved at lower levels, shields the leadership from issues they don't need to deal with and crystalizes the points that require top-level discussion. Their tasks typically include developing the agenda, screening policy proposals and performing quality control (including for legal or financial ramifications and stakeholder view points); supporting coordination between ministers; overseeing implementation and carrying out political liaison with the legislature¹¹⁸.

The size and composition of cabinet offices varies somewhat. In many cases, the offices are relatively small – with anything from 50 to 200 people directly supporting the leader – and composed almost entirely of politically appointed staff rather than members of the professional civil service¹¹⁹. The Australian Prime Minister's office has approximately 50 staff¹²⁰. Canada's has 600 staff whereas Norway's has 60¹²¹. The UK Cabinet office now has a staff of approximately 2,000¹²² of whom approximately 180 are in the Prime Minister's own office at No. 10 Downing Street (the rest of the Cabinet office is in Whitehall)¹²³. The large majority are members of the civil service. On paper, the Prime Minister's office sits within the Cabinet office but it tends to operate quite separately¹²⁴. The Executive Office of the US President, usually referred to as "the White House", is similar in size to the UK Cabinet office although its exact staffing and budget are difficult to ascertain because many people are "detailed" from other federal departments. By one estimate there are up to 2,500 people in "policy-making positions" in the White House with a budget close to \$4 million¹²⁵. The National Security Council alone has approximately 400 staff¹²⁶.

The functions are very similar across governments. Most cabinet office support the head of government in defining and delivering the government's objectives, driving policy across government (usually by supporting collective Cabinet decision-making), and ensuring that the civil service delivers on government objectives. But many of them have taken on other functions over time, reflecting the personal priorities of different leaders. The facilitation of Cabinet decision-making was traditionally the most important part of the UK Cabinet Office's function and it remains so, although the office has taken on many other functions over time and also contains miscellaneous units that "do not sit well with other departments". Since 1939, the White

House staff has grown enormously with each President organizing the office and adding new units and tasks to reflect their priorities¹²⁷. Both the White House and the Cabinet Office include offices that handle relations with the legislature, communications, policy-making, support to the national security decision-making, legal counsel. In recent times, no matter the political system, there has been a trend towards centralization of power into the office of the head of government and a greater role by the head of government in driving policy-making. This can be attributed to the fact that the issues facing a modern government are often cross-cutting ones that span organizational boundaries, requiring stronger coordination at the centre¹²⁸. This puts pressure on the traditional structures of government. In the UN, the roles described above are played by the approximately 200-strong Executive Office of the Secretary-General and, to a lesser extent, the front offices of the main senior officials. These offices perform several key functions. They manage the time and attention of senior officials, support them in making and implementing specific policy recommendations and help them maintain effective relationships with Member States. We will return to the specific role of EOSG in Chapter 5.

The ability of cabinet offices and front offices to perform their function hinges on their being perceived as a locus of authority for the leader and as an honest broker in ensuring due process, quality control and fairness. How they perform this role can greatly affect collective decision-making, especially in cases where they “limit the spread of information and access within the group”¹²⁹. The control of information is a significant source of power in a place like the UN where “information is a resource that symbolizes status, enhances authority and shapes careers”¹³⁰. This can mean great latitude for those in possession of crucial information to distort or manipulate how it is conveyed to the decision-maker. Indeed, the “potential to bias information is maximal in the gatekeeper role”¹³¹. Gatekeepers also formalize interactions between the senior leaders, sometimes introducing more emphasis on institutional considerations than on corporate or political priorities. These practices can distort the decision-making landscape and require concerted action on the part of the leadership to overcome, including management attention to structures, process and people. This has begun to change with the advent of e-mail and the easier access to the top from all parts of the house but, as yet, the UN remains a place where the gatekeepers wield considerable power.

Gatekeepers do more than control of information and access. They frequently mirror the personal and political strengths of the leader, rather than necessarily compensating for them¹³². Staff energy tends to be devoted to the issues and areas on which the leader is comfortable. There is a great deal of power in the role, especially when information is uncertain and complex or there are diverging views across the organization. Even in quite rigid bureaucracies, the role gatekeepers play is typically heavily influenced by personal leadership style. Some leaders prefer very formal, hierarchical systems whereas others prefer looser, less hierarchical systems. Some are very proactive whereas others react to what the bureaucracy serves up. The literature suggests that the less hands-on leaders tend to “want what comes up through the bureaucracy to be culled and organized before it gets to him” and often becomes “dependent on how others define and represent problems”¹³³. It also suggests that those who distrust the bureaucracy tend to centralize authority within their own offices (as both Hammarskjöld and Boutros-Ghali did) whereas others are more willing to rely on what emerges from the bureaucracy. Some have specifically tasked their own offices to play an honest broker role (as Kofi Annan ultimately did). An honest broker system requires an official in the leader’s immediate office to be willing to manage the decision-making process on his behalf, to advise him on the relative merits of different approaches and to navigate the bargaining process between bureaucratic interests while avoiding compromise outcomes or the papering over of the key issues. Others have preferred advisory systems that prioritise consensus but, the literature points out, this approach “virtually guarantees that the proposal with the broadest approach will win – and in some cases, perhaps in many cases, it will win over what is the best proposal”¹³⁴.

The decision: crisis, strategic and everything in between

“Diplomacy is about surviving until the next century - politics is about surviving until Friday afternoon”¹³⁵.

It is worth pointing out that the factors identified above will vary in importance depending in the type of decisions being taken. ‘Prospect theory’ argues that decision-makers have a tendency to be more risk-averse when taking decisions in crisis situations and several studies have found that groups function quite differently when taking crisis decisions than under more normal circumstances¹³⁶. Although not all of them are crisis decisions per se, most of the decisions taken by the Secretary-General and his office are necessarily short-term and reactive. The operational and immediate dominate time and attention, while the longer-term perspective is too easy to neglect. The time and capacity for strategic thinking have to be deliberately protected from the sheer pace and study of day-to-day decision-making and it can be extremely difficult to distinguish between the urgent and the important. This is not unique to the UN. Governments, too, “are measured by what they do, not how they think”¹³⁷. So much so, in fact, that British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home is famously reported to have said that foreign policy was made up of “one damn thing after another”.

In some respects, crisis decision-making really lays bare the potential but also the limits of the Secretary-General’s authority and ability to effect change, whether out in the real world or in the bureaucracy. This is because, when it comes to crisis, successive Secretaries-General have been most willing to stick their necks out and often – but not always – Member States have been willing to give him space to take initiative. As we will see in Chapter Four, for most of the Cold War, the Secretary-General and his office undertook all the important political work themselves, including decision-making on crisis response. It is perhaps no coincidence that some of what are considered the UN’s finest hours came in those years when the Secretary-General personally engaged in creative crisis problem-solving. Hammarskjöld’s role in the invention of peacekeeping is a fine example. Annan’s diplomacy on the 1999 crisis in East Timor is another. However, with the growth in the peace and security machinery over the past two decades, a large bureaucracy is now involved and this has introduced a host of new challenges in the decision-making arena. Most decisions are pushed down to the bureaucracy but occasionally a crisis will reach such magnitude or strategic importance that the Secretary-General and his office will assume what is now called “executive leadership”. For instance, Deputy Secretary-General Fréchette led task forces on Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2002. The current Deputy Secretary-General chairs a Senior Action Group on countries of major concern, especially when human rights violations are likely or underway. But these mechanisms have encountered many of the same problems that will be described elsewhere in this volume. The structure supporting decision-making has become unwieldy and is frequently an impediment to effectiveness. As one long-time observer concludes: “the fact that the decision making space is occupied both by the Secretary-General and a large bureaucracy and 193 member states ... creates a sprawling gap between the manifestation of a crisis and the time needed for a response”¹³⁸.

Meanwhile, strategic decision-making suffers from the opposite problem, namely too few players and too little space. Most heads of government and international organizations want strategic policy advice and capacity close at hand. They recognize the growing call for strategic leadership on interconnected issues. The challenge is to create the capacity and protect the space for foresight and longer-term into decision-making without detracting from the speed, confidentiality and decisiveness necessary for the immediate term. Capacity is needed to keep an eye on the big picture, and to develop fresh, forward thinking on issues, particularly those not on the immediate radar or that don’t fit neatly within bureaucratic boundaries. The advisers who perform this function need to be sufficiently close to the leader and to have access to him or her so that they know his thinking. At the same time, they cannot be drawn into day-to-day fire-fighting. It is a challenging balancing act to be detached enough yet informed enough to contribute to the debate and empowered to provide a challenge function on important questions. Providing the

leader with thoughtful, big picture advice is cited in many studies and interviewees as one of the most important functions of his or her support staff. In light of that, it is surprising how few people get assigned to these roles and how often they struggle to make a difference. Dedicated units exist in many governments but they tend to flounder when the leader doesn't use them or value them¹³⁹.

There is excellent analysis available on the conditions necessary for such units to function effectively, including from many governments which have established such units¹⁴⁰. They can only be useful if they are close to the leader and know his thinking, are perceived to be operating on his behalf and are well informed enough and empowered to contribute fresh thinking on the issues of the day. Their role in reaching across the silos and challenging the policy assumptions and recommendations emerging from the rest of the house must be well understood and supported from the top. Otherwise the rest of the bureaucracy, which doesn't enjoy being challenged, will freeze them out as interlopers and gadflies¹⁴¹. Protecting such units from the lure and suck of the day-to-day work is important but too often comes at the expense of their effectiveness, since being excluded from key discussions and information flow renders them largely ineffective. In some governments, policy planning and speechwriting are assigned to the same unit. This has the value of ensuring that policy thinking has a meaningful outlet and of giving the policy planners a right to information and a seat at the table, since it is in the wider interest for speeches to be well informed.

These challenges are evident in spades at the UN, where Member States jealously guard their prerogatives to set the strategic direction, even if they fail to perform this function in practice¹⁴². Most real action and decision-making within the Secretariat is tactical and deferential, or at least referential, to Member States. Some UN senior leaders have tried to put in place policy and strategic planning capacities. But this is not a simple proposition at the UN, where such attempts have often been blocked by Member States. The USG for Disarmament Affairs, for instance, was rebuffed by Member States when she tried to establish a small such cell in her department by redeploying existing staff: "I was told by one member state: 'You don't do any strategic planning, we do it. You just execute it'"¹⁴³. Repeated attempts by the Secretary-General to establish strategic planning and analysis capacity in his office have been blocked or significantly constrained by Member States¹⁴⁴. Any such capacities that have been established have been extremely small – rarely more than a handful of people. We will look in more depth at the experience of these attempts in Chapter Five..

The process: the anatomy of influence

"If you had to identify, in one word, the reason the human race has not achieved, and never will achieve, its full potential, that word would be 'meetings'". – Dave Barry

*"I regard the interdepartmental committee as the last refuge of the desperate bureaucrat. When you can't find any argument against something you don't want, you set up an interdepartmental committee to strangle it. Slowly."*¹⁴⁵

The process of arriving at decisions is often the aspect of decision-making theory that garners most attention. Economists have dominated the field with their assumption that most decision-making conforms to a rational choice model in which individual decision-makers have access to all the pertinent information and select the best possible option to achieve their goal¹⁴⁶. This model assumes that the interests at stake are clear, that there is time to consider the issues, that the goal is shared or that a clear, disciplined, linear process takes place giving rise to a final choice. Most scholars use this model as their departure point but many offer modifications that take into account the messiness of reality. These theories recognise many of the points made above such as, for instance, that humans are prone to error and to blocking out information that doesn't agree with what they already believe to be accurate. They don't and can't know everything. The pressures of circumstance limit the ability to choose and people are often

muddling through in increments rather than consciously taking significant decisions. They are usually operating in an environment in which multiple other actors are acting and every decision is connected to other decisions. Very few consequential decisions are based on full information, a clear ranking of goals or an exhaustive assessment of all the alternative options. As a result, most decision-makers end up taking decisions that “satisfice” or are good enough in the short term, without an exhaustive analysis of all information and options¹⁴⁷.

If reality is messy, political decision-making is messier still, especially at the international level. Decision-makers operating in the UN environment typically do so in a “fog of peace”¹⁴⁸. Information is partial and deeply political, there is never enough time, the interests at stake are not fully knowable or understood. Most importantly, decision outcomes should not even be judged according to rational choice criteria. They should instead be understood through the lens offered in the seminal 1973 study of decision-making within international organizations by Cox and Jacobsen, who saw international organizations as distinctive political systems where “the legal or formal character and the content of the decision is less important than the balance of forces it expresses”¹⁴⁹. In other words, decision-making in these settings is a complex process of exercising influence and the outcomes are a reflection of these different influences rather than a “rational choice” between thoroughly considered alternatives solely by those with the formal, legal power to decide. This idea of influence as a form of power in international decision-making is at the heart of this study for it is at the heart of the Secretary-General’s role.

According to Cox and Jacobsen, influence can be exercised in a variety of ways. The formal initiators of a decision, usually the Member States, are not always the real initiators. For example, “international officials [can] prepare draft resolutions that are then submitted by members of national delegations”¹⁵⁰. The ability to veto a decision can hinge not only on the legal power of an actor but its control of political or financial resources and willingness and ability to block initiatives: “the term is not used exclusively in the formal sense of one having a legal power to veto, but in a practical, functional sense to denote one having the power to prevent a decision by whatever means he may require”. Another means of influence is what the authors term ‘control’ and it includes actors whose stature or role require that their views are accommodated even if they don’t formally intervene: “here are some actors whose known or surmised views may have to be taken into account because of their control of resources or their formal authority, or for some other reason”. Finally, there are “brokers” who “serve as go-betweens among the participants and as consensus builders”.

Within the complex UN ecosystem, the Secretary-General frequently plays the initiator and broker roles. Occasionally he or his senior officials also serve as controllers or even vetoers of decisions. His institutional position at the pinnacle of the Secretariat, and his “steady involvement with the decisional process in the other organs”¹⁵¹ allow him to take political and administrative initiatives of his own and to exercise considerable formal and informal influence over the decisions taken in the inter-governmental bodies. He has global agenda-setting authority that emerges from the way he chooses to conduct his diplomatic and public contacts, his interactions with the mass media, his reports to the principal organs, and his high-profile speeches. He spends much of his day practicing the fine art of persuasion in a wide variety of settings – formal and informal, bureaucratic and intergovernmental, internal and external. He also has operational responsibilities in areas that matter enormously to Member States (albeit in varying degrees).

The result: translating power into action

“Desmond was puzzled. He thought a decision was a decision. I explained that a decision is a decision only if it is the decision you wanted. Otherwise, of course, it is merely a temporary setback”¹⁵².

Decisions are not only about selecting the appropriate course of action but also mobilizing and motivating people to implement it. Decisions go unimplemented for a wide variety of reasons, from neglect to outright sabotage. The literature on organizational behaviour advises that effective implementation of decisions is most likely when there is convergence between the vision, the available resources and the capacity to implement the decision¹⁵³. The ‘congruence model’ argues that the task itself, the individuals involved, the formal organizational arrangements and the informal dynamics interact with each-other and that: “the different parts of an organization can fit well together and function effectively, or fit poorly and lead to problems, dysfunctions, or performance below potential”¹⁵⁴. We will see below in the chapter on the Policy Committee that one response to this has been a narrowing of the scope of decision-making at the top of the UN, with large policy questions often left unaddressed or to fate, while institutional questions dominate decision-making discussions. As a result, the Policy Committee has – on paper – an 85% implementation rate over time but this statistic obscures a troubling trend in the nature of those decisions. More broadly, the formal structures at the UN – from the policy-making organs at intergovernmental level to the administrative rules and regulations that govern the lives of Secretariat officials – are thought to be out of synch with changing organizational needs and geopolitical realities. The structures of accountability no longer mirror the structures of power, if they ever did.

This makes for a problematic decision-making environment and poor chances of implementation. Indeed, implementation of decision is perhaps the single biggest weakness in the decision-making landscape within the UN at present and a particularly thorny challenge in a system where responsibility and accountability are so poorly aligned. An internal evaluation of the main decision-making bodies (which didn’t even dare call them “decision-making” bodies) noted the “lack of incentives for implementing decisions of coordinating bodies”¹⁵⁵. Many interviewees also commented on the difficulty of ensuring implementation and the damaging effect of a growing body of unimplemented decisions remaining on the books. The next Secretary-General will need to see the value of and invest in an overhaul of the decision-making structures within the house so that he or she is getting the most out of the system in this complex, fast-paced and geopolitically difficult age. Successive Secretaries-General took office with great intentions in this regard but often gave up in the face of political and bureaucratic resistance to change.

Conclusion

Leadership and decision-making are the subjects of exhaustive analysis across many academic and business fields. This chapter represented a selective and no doubt superficial attempt to draw from that vast field, identifying just a few theories and insights that might help us examine decision-making in a UN setting. In the subsequent chapters, we will look more closely at the workings of the UN itself in order to blend the generic perspectives from the literature with the messy realities of life within the institution.

PART II: THE UNITED NATIONS ECOSYSTEM

**[This Section is still in draft form and is not included in the Excerpt
submitted in compliance with the sabbatical programme]**

Confidential Draft

PART III. CONCLUSION

Chapter 9. “He Moves the World but Cannot Direct it”: Reflections on Effective Secretary-General Decision-Making in a Changing Global Landscape

*It is a central paradox of international relations that we live in the most
interdependent world ever, yet global institutions seem to be at their weakest*⁶⁸⁹.

The world has changed and leadership at the international level is more needed than ever

This study began by arguing that the world has changed profoundly since the founding of the United Nations. It is fast-changing, deeply interconnected and dominated by problems that no country can solve alone. This places a high premium on strong institutions and strong leadership at the international level. Building strong institutions takes time but strong leadership can be put in place immediately. This leadership will not be about coercion but rather the ability to generate ideas and to motivate a diverse array of actors to work together towards common, principled solutions to shared problems. The United Nations is not the only source of that leadership but it is a crucial one. It is important, therefore, to understand what conditions give rise to effective leadership from the UN. This study argues that two things must come together: good people and good systems. These two things in turn produce good decision-making. But this is not as simple as it sounds.

Glib references to the “Secretary or General?” question do not do justice to the complexity of the job. Answerable for all the ills of the world, the Secretary-General exerts direct control over almost nothing. On the other hand, he possesses a power that, in the digital age, is mightier than any sword: the power to sway public opinion. He is expected to comment quickly, accurately and appropriately on a staggering array of issues. He operates in an extremely complex governance landscape with responsibility for an unprecedented array of interconnected issues. The ninth Secretary-General will take the helm of an Organization whose Member States are at best lost and at worst deeply divided on issues of existential importance to the future of the world. He will have to broker the implementation of recent global agreements on development and climate change as well as solutions to the largest level of human displacement since the end of World War II. He will be expected to bring an end to the misery in Syria, South Sudan, Yemen, Burundi and elsewhere. He will simultaneously be expected to run an Organization that executes risky and complex operations in increasingly dangerous and hard-to-reach parts of the globe, and that delivers critical services and coordinates major global initiatives across a massive range of sectors, from climate to health to security. It is the second largest deployer of troops in the world with 41 peace operations worldwide, a budget of approximately \$10 billion, and a staff of over 40,000⁶⁹⁰

In other words, the ninth Secretary-General will need the persuasion skills to move a more complex world and the managerial skills to direct a more complex UN than ever before. The strain on the top of the Organization is immense; it no longer suffices for issues to be handled within the silos of the bureaucracy. The need for executive direction and management is undoubtedly at an all-time high. It must be understood and approached as a job for a senior team, not for one individual, however talented. The Secretary-General will need a steering capacity to support him, in the form of a highly effective immediate office and clear decision-making procedures that bind his politically appointed and centrifugally inclined senior leadership team into a clear direction. This is not easily achieved.

The United Nations is a poorly understood institution. It is, in fact, an ecosystem composed of multiple UNs: that of Member States, that of UN entities and that of civil society and the wider world. It serves multiple purposes and agendas, not all of which are clearly acknowledged or understood. The Secretary-General embodies all of these UNs and is a lynchpin where they come together. His credibility and effectiveness rest in part on a better understanding of the nature of his power and the conditions that shape his performance. This study argues that those conditions stem as much from the people and systems at the heart of the Organization as they do from the formal structure or the larger political climate. It

unpacks this argument by looking closely at decision-making: the people who make the decisions (or not) and the systems in place to help them do so.

It has become clear over the course of this study that every consequential decision that the Secretary-General takes involves effectively navigating a series of tensions and contradictions. Some of these tensions stem from the basic ambiguity, and occasionally downright ambivalence, with respect to what governments want from the Secretary-General, an ambiguity that has existed from the outset but that has evolved over time as the role itself has evolved. Some stem from the ambiguous nature of his authority over the UN system, something that has acquired new significance as the UN has evolved into massive operational actors with tentacles across the globe and across many different sectors of activity. And some stem from a persistent failure to invest in clear leadership and disciplined decision-making structures within the Secretariat itself. We will briefly examine some of the main balancing acts that the Secretary-General must perform before turning to more specific management and decision-making questions.

1. Stated versus actual goals

Any assessment of decision-making at the United Nations must, first of all, start by recognizing that nothing is as it seems. Decisions in this highly political environment are typically taken for reasons other than or in addition to their stated purpose. They are the products of intense bargaining between different interests and serve multiple purposes and audiences. The real objective of might not be to solve a problem but to give the perception of action, to keep an issue alive, to avoid a crisis or to satisfy an important constituency. Member States collude in this arrangement, often content to let “the UN” shoulder an impossible responsibility or take the blame for an unsolved problem. The Secretary-General lives daily with this gap between appearances and reality. Kofi Annan joked that SG stood for “scapegoat”. A Secretary-General must live with this pathology, always seeking to strike a balance between the credibility and legitimacy of the institution in the long term and serving the interests of Member States in the short-term. No Secretary-General has made it through his time in office without feeling let down by Member States in this respect. As the world becomes more complex and the relationship between the UN and its Member States more transactional, this challenge will continue.

Within the house, the challenge this poses is one of operating on multiple levels. Assessments and discussions about what ought to be done should not be conflated with tactical discussions about what the political market will bear, what Member States will accept or what it will take to move them in a particular direction. And yet, too often, the UN mistakes the latter for the former, as we saw on Rwanda, Sri Lanka and in other instances. People become inured to elephants in every room and to speaking in code. They limit their decisions to the options they think the Council or powerful players want to see, as has happened with respect to planning missions in Somalia, Burundi and elsewhere. The goal becomes to keep Member States happy rather than to solve the problem. Avoiding deaths becomes secondary to avoiding a demarche. The space for honest exchange dwindles and unnecessary levels of self-censorship creep in to the decision-making culture. The Secretary-General has pledged often to tell the Security Council what it needs to know, rather than what it wants to hear. As we saw in Chapter Eight, Council dynamics are largely P5-dominated but the Secretariat can and does shape the debate in significant ways. One interviewee commented that “the Council can’t be better than the Secretariat”. So the Secretariat has to do better. It has to be more sophisticated in its consideration of the issues, better able to distinguish in its decision-making between the strategic and the tactical. Doing so successfully will require a change to the culture and mechanisms within the house for honest discussions of options that are separate from tactical discussions about how to engage the Membership.

2. 193 bosses but speaking for 7 billion

The Secretary-General has 193 bosses but, in some respects, speaks for 7 billion people. This tension has always been at the heart of his role: the idea that he works for the good of “we the peoples” but must do so primarily by influencing the Member States to whom he reports and who exercise tight control over his budget, appointments and indeed every move. For all the enormous changes that have taken place in the world over the past 70 years, the United Nations remains fundamentally an Organization of and for

Member States. They select the SG, pass the legislation and pay the bills. But there is a strong and growing expectation on the part of the “third UN” and the general public, one that has been shared to varying degrees by the incumbents, that the Secretary-General serves as the voice of “the peoples” and as the custodian of the principles enshrined in the Charter, even when governments are trampling all over those same principles or, at the very least, disagreeing on their interpretation. The public wants a Secretary-General who is a “fearless, wise, outspoken, articulate champion of peace, justice, law, human rights and reason”⁶⁹¹. They want him to speak truth to power. This expectation is likely to grow in the age of social media. The power of persuasion is magnified.

In order to live up to these changing expectations, the Secretary-General will need a lot of things that the Secretariat has to adapt to provide. He will need better analysis and information about how his decisions will play in the “real world”. His analytical reach will need to be far greater than the realm of diplomats and foreign ministries alone. Understanding the tangled web of economic, financial, political, social and other ties between countries and the even more tangled, opaque interests driving non-state actors requires a much greater breadth of analysis than the heavily diplomatic and political tilt in the UN allows for. He will need evidence and ideas that can compel action by others. He will require a deep understanding of the changing avenues for influence. State-to-state negotiations are no longer the only mechanism for discussing and addressing global problems. Strategic communications and gauging global perceptions will become as central to decision-making as the political questions that are the traditional bread-and-butter of UN conversations. The Secretary-General needs to prioritise dialogue with a much broader array of actors, and not as an afterthought. No Secretary-General can do this without making effective use of the institution.

3. *The strong and the weak*

Every Secretary-General has struggled with the tension between serving as an instrument of the great powers and as the voice of the lesser powers. This is the area where the courage and integrity of the incumbents has been tested acutely⁶⁹². Hammarskjöld gave eloquent voice to the struggle when he refused to bow to Soviet pressure that he resign, noting that “it is not the Soviet Union or indeed any other big Powers who need the United Nations for their protection. It is all the others. In this sense, the Organization is first of all their Organization and I deeply believe in the wisdom with which they will be able to use it and guide it. I shall remain in my post during the term of my office as a servant of the Organization in the interests of all those other nations, as long as they wish me to do so. In this context, the representative of the Soviet Union spoke of courage. It is very easy to resign; it is not so easy to stay on. It is very easy to bow to the wish of a big power. It is another matter to resist”⁶⁹³.

Each Secretary-General faced this test in a different way. Trygve Lie felt he pushed as far as he could but ultimately had to accept big power interference, including in senior appointments. Hammarskjöld won admirers for his adherence to principle but might have been forced to resign after all, had he not died in office. U Thant saw himself as the voice of the developing world, newly emerging onto the world stage, and was willing to stand up to the permanent members – such as the US on Vietnam – but he presided over the UN at a time when it was less and less involved in the first order issues of the day and thus less useful to the smaller powers buffeted by Cold War tensions and proxy wars. It was perhaps only thanks to his humble personal style that he navigated this challenge as well as he did. Waldheim’s tenure was the nadir of this trend and his deference to the wishes of powerful states was unapologetic, although he was not able to prevent the US from losing faith in the Organization. Perez de Cuellar and, to an even greater extent, Kofi Annan grappled with the world in a moment of unipolarity, when the main challenge was to keep the US on side but to recognize that the goal of doing so was precisely to protect the interests of the weak. As Annan noted, “the Secretary-General’s particular concerns should be to protect the weak against the strong, yet he must understand that it is often only by winning and preserving the confidence of the strong that he can hope to do that”⁶⁹⁴. This challenge is much more daunting in the multipolar world of today when so many are strong but none strong enough to play a sole global leadership role.

4. Accountability without authority

Fourth, there is the perverse fact that the Secretary-General has almost unparalleled global agenda-shaping authority and is now manager of the world's second largest deployer of troops but less administrative authority than most big city mayors. He has accountability without commensurate authority. In fact, he has less power of the purse or appointment than some of the heads of UN agencies, and a great deal less than any CEO or government minister. When Mark Malloch Brown transitioned from his position as Administrator of UNDP to Secretary-General's chef de cabinet, he was shocked to find that the Secretary-General had less power than he had enjoyed as Administrator⁶⁹⁵. Many senior officials who join the organization from outside express similar dismay upon discovering the limits of their power. The Secretary-General has the rhetorical power to raise important issues but no ability to pass legislation, commit troops or directly determine the decisions of governments. He is barely able to shift items within the UN budget or to reallocate staff to different priority tasks. This state of affairs has led several observers to describe the Organization as "over-administered and under-managed"⁶⁹⁶. As mentioned above, Member States micromanage the budget and human resources as a substitute for political control. But in so doing they expose the Organization and the Secretary-General to unintended political risk because they expect an administratively powerless Secretary-General to effectively manage a multi-billion dollar organization with operations all over the globe.

While many of the solutions to this problem lie beyond the scope of this study, it is important to recall how central to effective, competent management robust decision-making structures are. The oil-for-food scandal was a wake-up call but subsequent efforts to secure more administrative power for the Secretary-General foundered in the GA on the rocks of G77 reluctance to relinquish oversight. Efforts were also made to implement disciplined cabinet-level decision-making in the form of the Policy Committee and Management Committee. Unfortunately, as has been a pattern at the UN and in many large organizations, absent sustained commitment from the top, these mechanisms lost their lustre over time. There was a proliferation of alternative avenues for securing decisions. The Secretary-General may wish to resurrect clear and streamlined decision-making procedures as a first step towards bringing authority and accountability back into alignment. This is something that lies entirely with his power.

5. Leading and managing at the same time

Relatedly, the balance between the Secretary-General's political and managerial power has shifted over time. While the need for a political Secretary-General was discussed in San Francisco, the Charter ultimately asks for a "chief administrative officer" and the early Secretaries-General seem to have enjoyed much more administrative leeway than recent incumbents. Instead, their energies were spent on carving out political space. In the seventy years of the Organization's existence, Member States have periodically revisited these questions, often prompted by the Secretaries-General themselves pleading for more administrative power and flexibility. As recently as 2005, the representative from Algeria noted, "You have one side basically saying that the secretary general should be empowered and should have all flexibility as a kind of C.E.O. and the other side saying that it is not ready to give up the prerogative of the General Assembly and would like to keep a close eye on the work of the secretary general"⁶⁹⁷. The administrative power of the Secretary-General has shrunk over time (it would be hard to imagine present-day Secretaries-General making the wholesale administrative changes to the structure that early incumbents did). Meanwhile, the political power for which early Secretaries-General fought so hard is now often taken for granted, at least as long as the Secretary-General doesn't overstep. It can be difficult, however, for the incumbent to balance the two sets of responsibilities.

A perception has taken hold that attention to the managerial role can be at expense of the political role and vice versa⁶⁹⁸. Many proposals have been made over the years for how to address this, most focussing recently on the idea of a Deputy Secretary-General who would relieve the Secretary-General of the management burden. This model was tried in the last year or so of Annan's term and a version of it has been tried more recently with a strong Chef de Cabinet who performs the function. However, simply delegating the administrative responsibilities does not address some of the more complex problems. If anything the UN already goes too far in divorcing policy and substance from administration and

management. As a result, decisions in one area often undermine or fail to align with decisions in the other. This is one of the many ways in which the internal workings of the Secretariat mirror dysfunctions at the intergovernmental level. But this problem could be resolved more easily than some. It may be time to reconsider the idea mooted in 2006 for a ‘chief operating officer’ in addition to a substantive Deputy Secretary-General and a Chef de Cabinet.

6. *Honest broker or interested actor?*

Member States remain ambivalent about “whether the Secretary-General should be able to give orders as well as take them”⁶⁹⁹. Consequently, there can occasionally arise real substantive and political contradictions between the Secretary-General’s role as an independent honest broker in world affairs and his growing managerial responsibilities – and the institutional interests those can entail – for peacekeeping, electoral assistance, development programming, humanitarian assistance and other operational functions, especially those undertaken with a specific mandate from an intergovernmental body. This is nowhere more acutely felt than in peacekeeping, where difficulties have arisen with respect to reconciling impartial mediation roles or neutral humanitarian assistance with very partial and robust use of force mandates, as in DRC. It is not unusual for different parts of the UN in the same country – and often within the same peace operation – to be working at cross-purposes, not because they are uncoordinated (although that is frequently also the case) but because they are receiving contradictory instructions from the intergovernmental bodies or donors to whom they are accountable. For instance, in Somalia, the political arm of the UN presence was expressly charged with supporting the fledgling government while humanitarians and development actors were under pressure from donors not to work with the government due to its role in the ongoing crisis. In such situations, it becomes very difficult for the Secretary-General to direct or manage the UN’s work. These dilemmas and the hard choices and trade-offs they impose upon UN officials require a forum for airing and resolving differences in trust and with full disclosure. Papering over differences, reducing them to questions of tactics or deciding not to decide has damaged the UN’s credibility in Sri Lanka, Rwanda and elsewhere.

7. *Advocate in chief or diplomat in chief?*

Seventh, there is the perennially sensitive balance between public activism and private diplomacy. Governments do not want to be upstaged or publicly chided by the Secretary-General but they want him to have the imagination, courage, common sense and capacity to take initiative in an emergency or when they are not able to act. As a former head of peacekeeping notes, “the lower the profile of the secretary general, the greater the risk that he will be seen as irrelevant; but the higher the public profile, the greater the risk that he will be seen as inconsistent and that expectations will not be met after having been unduly raised. Every secretary general has to grapple with that dilemma, and the diversity of styles is just another illustration of the conflicting signals sent by the international community: a secretary general is expected to lead the way, but he will be quickly reminded of his limitations when disagreement occurs”⁷⁰⁰. This contradiction has been deeply felt by all of the incumbents, with Pérez de Cuéllar noting that: “the Secretary-General is the servant of an organization of governments in which, if he is to serve them well, he dares not be their captive”⁷⁰¹. Not all Secretaries-General have been successful in staying on the right side of the powerful Member States while also leaving their mark. To some, Hammarskjöld is “the single, notable instance of a man whose powers were extended and fulfilled in the UN ambience, which more commonly acts as a swift reductive”⁷⁰². Pressures on the Secretary-General to be seen to be speaking out will only grow in the future, reducing the space for quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy that can occasionally be more effective. Some interviewees felt that the balance of late has disproportionately prioritized public diplomacy or “public hand-wringing” when more effective pressure might have been wielded quietly, for instance on Burundi and Syria, but others might argue that, in the digital age, the pressure to speak and act publicly is unavoidable. Independent investigations of UN decision-making in these instances – whether on Rwanda, Sri Lanka, sexual abuse in the CAR – time and again point to the weak management and decision-making structures at the centre as having contributed to poor decisions about the balance between staying quiet and shouting from the rooftops. The institution cannot afford not to take action on these recommendations.

8. *Balancing pragmatism and principle*

Eighth, the Secretary-General must balance pragmatism and principle, the short-term pressure for action and longer-term institutional and normative imperatives. Not every decision necessarily involves this trade-off but, as the preceding chapter on Rwanda demonstrated, some of the UN's darkest moments have come when the absence of guiding principles has led to policies that lurch from one priority to another, often based primarily upon urgent, short-term concerns rather than on a coherent, long-term strategy⁷⁰³. The mindset and culture of the bureaucracy encourage tactical over strategic thinking. Decision-makers too easily limit their options to what they think can be done rather than what ought to be done. It is vital for the Secretary-General in such cases to have a very clear moral compass and a sense of the principles at stake. Hammarskjöld has received high marks from many analysts in this regard. But moral clarity rarely exists in the chaos of crisis decision-making and sometimes when moral clarity does exist, Member States may not thank the Secretary-General for reminding them: "UN leaders are pulled in many different directions and have to deal with situations riddled with ambiguity and contradictions. Moreover, taking a firm position with clear sense of purpose is politically hazardous and can restrict room to manoeuvre. The tendency therefore can be to play it safe, avoid setting longer priorities and decide what to do according to day-to-day pressures and events as they arise"⁷⁰⁴. In a few instances, the Secretary-General has been confronted with the most extreme example of this tension, where Member States, even permanent Council members, flagrantly violate Charter principles, e.g. by undertaking military interventions without Security Council authorization (NATO in Kosovo in 1999; the US-led coalition in Iraq in 2003; some would argue Russia more recently in Ukraine). If we are moving into a period when the principles for which the UN stands are not universally accepted and more states have the power to act without regard for those principles, then we can expect turbulence ahead of the kind we have already seen on Ukraine and Syria. There may be a great premium on the next Secretary-General's ability to bring Member States to a shared view of collective action that responds to complex global challenges, preserves the core principles of the Charter, confirms their universality and accommodates the new, rich landscape of actors. The Secretary-General needs mechanisms to help him keep principles in the mix and to play the long game. The system will need to generate better analysis and options for the Secretary-General to navigate this challenge, to influence the global agenda and to exert moral suasion.

9. *Asking permission versus asking for forgiveness*

Ninth, every Secretary-General has faced decisions about where to draw the line between independence of action and deference to Member States, about when to seek permission before acting and when to act first and seek forgiveness later. The assertiveness and political latitude of a Secretary-General are often less about the rules than about subtle entrepreneurship. Over the past 10-20 years, there has been noticeable erosion in the amount of latitude the Secretary-General and Secretariat staff feel they have. The risk is that this becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as both staff and delegates forget or never experience an assertive Secretariat that acts like a principal Organ of the Organization. This has been remarked upon by long-time UN observers returning after a period of absence⁷⁰⁵. The next Secretary-General will face the challenge of redrawing the line between permission and forgiveness, of reasserting the Secretariat's prerogatives and right to act independently. To that end, he will need advisers with an antenna for when and how to exercise this subtle force. The nature of that entrepreneurship is changing as the world changes. Power and leadership aren't what they used to be. The pace of decision-making has sped up and trust in traditional institutions has eroded. Many actors crowd the stage. The power of ideas is more important than ever and will become more so. The evolving avenues for influence and persuasion that are available to the Secretary-General in the information age place a higher premium on having and keeping a public profile. The digital age represents an enormous opportunity for the Secretary-General to break out of the long-standing constraints and culture of self-censorship.

10. Collective responsibility in an irresponsibly designed system

Good governance begets good management. But the leadership of the UN cannot afford to wait for better governance. Both the governance and the management of the UN system are themselves riddled with contradictory elements. The Secretary-General's operational responsibilities have grown as the UN has become more complex in its tasks and broad-reaching in its substantive responsibilities. But his administrative power has eroded. As such, he is forced to manage the system on the basis of persuasion. Decisions that involve the system need to be taken in ways that maximise chances of implementation. They need to be seen as fair and consultative. He needs to understand the incentives and pressures felt by each of his senior officials. He needs to sense who the internal spoilers and bureaucratic losers will be and bring them along so they don't back-channel to Member States. Clear internal decision-making mechanisms are a necessity, not a luxury or an irritant. He also needs a senior leadership structure around him that can manage the workload and the decision-making effectively. There is a need for clarity as to "who has the D" on what issue. Internal reform and change is harder than external diplomacy. Many Secretaries-General start off keen to overhaul the system but then gradually give up. But winning over and getting the best out of the bureaucracy is worth the effort. In this interconnected age, the Secretary-General can ill-afford a senior leadership team that does not pull in the same direction and support him in his endeavours.

It is important to the effective functioning of the Secretariat and to smoother relations between the Secretary-General and the wider system to reintroduce process discipline into decision-making. Reducing confusion and duplication in the decision-making landscape will enhance clarity and accountability. But this requires sustained senior engagement and a willingness to impose and enforce process-discipline. Such discipline does not come naturally to the UN bureaucracy. But the current sense in the Secretariat that decision-making is "totally broken" and the widespread confusion with respect to where and how key decisions are taken is likely to become quite damaging over time to morale and effectiveness. There has been a pattern of creating new committees (usually without abolishing any existing bodies) and hoping that they will represent the silver bullet. However, each committee has a life span of 5-10 years before the inevitable happens: membership expands, participation level drops, priority issues migrate back to the corridors, decisions stop being taken or, if taken, stop being implemented. Getting decision-making right will be, in the first instance, about making people and processes work.

Decision-making: people and process

Decision-making is crucial to effective leadership. It translates power into action. And it is, above all, a deeply human process involving diverse personalities, group dynamics, culture, lines of authority and communication and other very human factors. It starts, naturally, at the very top. The competence and personality of the leader, and the tone and expectations he sets, are as important as any political or bureaucratic constraints. Indeed, the bureaucracy tends to serve up what the senior official appears to want. Studies of effective decision-making by world leaders point to certain personal attributes that are particularly important. These include intellectual depth, self-confidence, ability to build relationships, commitment to principle and the ability to communicate effectively. This latter attribute has taken on enormous importance in the digital age.

The eight people who have served as Secretary-General to date were very different personalities, faced with very different political climates. They were all human beings, none of them perfect. But their experiences reveal some common challenges to consequential decision-making by the Secretary-General: the challenges of pushing Member States without running afoul of the most powerful amongst them; of overseeing and getting the best from an increasingly centrifugal and creaky bureaucracy headed by political appointees of varying levels of competence and loyalty to the UN; and of balancing ideas, action and relationships so as to deliver results at the negotiating table and in the field.

Trygve Lie was thrust into the role and was temperamentally and intellectually ill-suited to it in many respects. He deserves some credit for asserting the right of the Secretary-General to act independently of the major powers but loses points for his failure to protect the independence of UN staff in the face of McCarthyism. He made an effort to assemble a quality team of senior advisers but was stymied by the Member States' insistence on certain appointments and did not use his weekly meetings with the senior team for serious decision-making. His decision-making style was impulsive and often backfired and his own office very disorganized. He possessed neither the intellectual capacity nor the sensitivity to context required to perform his functions to their fullest potential, although he was very committed to UN ideals. Already in Lie's day some of the factors that would bedevil his successors' attempts to exercise real leadership over the UN system were emerging: a self-censoring bureaucracy, Member State interference in senior appointments (including the Soviet rotation of its senior-most official and the consequent exclusion of that person from any meaningful decision-making conversations), undue political pressure on senior officials, and a rapid spawning of UN agencies, funds and programmes that gave rise to concerns even then about how to coordinate them all.

Dag Hammarskjöld was far more visionary, organized, controlling, principled and decisive than his predecessor and it is no coincidence that his tenure is remembered as a high point in UN leadership. He restructured the Secretariat to function more effectively, personally pioneered important UN activities such as peacekeeping, and successfully nurtured the independent role of the Secretary-General and the international civil servant. He was extraordinarily astute in identifying opportunities for action and being able to articulate the fundamental principles at stake. He was not afraid to take decisions and personally involved himself in most of the important issues that arose. Granted, he served at a time when the UN agenda, membership, staffing and atmosphere were dominated by Americans and Europeans and he thus had more leeway in some respects than his successors would. But he is thought by some to have overstepped, politically, militarily and administratively. It is not clear how high a price he or the Organization might have paid for this had he lived.

U Thant had a modest personal style but did not shy away from inserting himself into major political issues where he thought he might be able to make a difference. He deserves more credit for his role on the Cuban missile crisis. He was roundly criticized for his role in withdrawing UNEF but it is worth remarking on his willingness to take action when he felt that action was required. He also made changes to the structure of the Secretariat that would be difficult to pull off today and he successfully navigated the evolution of the UN from a Western-dominated body to one more representative of the world, with many new Member States and also staff members from developing countries. Unlike his two predecessors, he remained largely on speaking terms with the superpowers, although his relationship with Washington deteriorated over his attempts to intercede on Vietnam. Unlike Hammarskjöld, he delegated many important decisions to others. He successfully defended the right of the Secretary-General to some leeway in senior appointments.

Waldheim was the first Secretary-General to campaign for the post and he was less independent-minded than his predecessors once in the job. The personality of the organization had changed enormously with the addition of so many new members and there was a consequent decline in American investment and faith in the institution. A more activist Secretary-General might have found ways to navigate this terrain more effectively but Waldheim largely hewed to the wishes of the big powers and did not seek a major political role. He avoided big decisions and tended to dwell on the minutiae, especially those relating to optics and protocol. He was excessively focused on credit and recognition. Real political work, such as it was, continued to be done within the SG's office while the rest of the Secretariat remained largely focused on conference servicing. Waldheim relied on a handful of advisers to take key decisions and did not make use of the larger Secretariat leadership team. His tenure is widely considered a low point in the history of the Organization.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's tenure coincided with the thawing of the Cold War and, in his second term, the opening up of many peacemaking opportunities. He was well placed to seize them: trusted by the major powers, politically savvy, patient, unobtrusive, adept and not driven by the need for credit and recognition. He had a methodical approach to decision-making and considered every angle, investing no ego in the decisions and thus being willing to change his mind when necessary. He relied heavily on an inner circle of staff and centralized political work in his office, leaving little to the departments. His contact with heads of department was infrequent. In terms of senior appointments, he was no more successful than his predecessors in resisting P5 pressure for the key positions and was unwilling to bring the bureaucracy under control. He also felt deep frustration at his inability to coordinate the wider UN system of agencies, funds and programmes.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali's tenure sheds light on the harsh realities of the Secretary-General's delicate role and the risks of being right on the issues but failing to manage the important relationships. His intellectual leadership was second to none but he expected good ideas to take hold without nurturing buy-in through careful lobbying and outreach. He was faced with the particularly uncertain period following the end of the Cold War, in which US leadership was vital but not always consistent. However, perhaps because he did not know the UN well before taking office, he failed to navigate that relationship effectively and equally failed to manage his relationship with the bureaucracy in such a way that it stood behind him. He was not afraid to take unpopular decisions but did not place a high value on persuasion or trust-building. He trusted very few people and his office operated quite separately from the rest of the bureaucracy (this was a factor in the buck-passing on Rwanda in 1994). There was no pretence of cabinet-style meetings and power and information were extremely centralized in his office. He was the most reform-minded Secretary-General since Dag Hammarskjöld but focused on structure rather than personnel, putting place the departmental structure that largely survives to this day. Boutros-Ghali was the first Secretary-General to propose to the General Assembly that UN presences in the field become integrated but the idea was defeated by a wary General Assembly.

Kofi Annan was in personality quite the opposite of his predecessor: mild-mannered to a fault and keenly aware of the importance of people and relationships to his job. As the first insider to be elevated to Secretary-General, Annan understood the system and the Secretary-General's relationship with Member States as well as any of his predecessors. But he also turned out to have personal qualities that suited the context and time particularly well. He benefited enormously, especially in his first term, from having only one superpower to keep happy. Moreover, having been anointed by that superpower, he enjoyed its support for most of his tenure. This, combined with his in-depth knowledge of the institution, his ability to grasp the issues, his intuitive sense of how far he could go and his willingness to surround himself with talented people, led to what is widely regarded as one of the most successful Secretary-Generalships in the history of the Organization. This is not to overlook the flaws in Annan's leadership and decision-making style, many of which were painfully revealed in the oil-for-food scandal. Accountability was weak and it was not always clear where decisions were taken, why and by whom. These flaws might have been even more damaging under different circumstances. Decision-making reforms taken at the end of his term brought the UN closer than it has ever been to true collective executive decision-making.

Ban Ki-Moon held office during a time of tectonic political and technological shifts that often reduced the UN to a supporting role but he successfully shepherded Member States to major agreements on climate and sustainable development. His leadership style was consciously low-key.

The portraits confirm what the literature on decision-making led us to expect: that tone from the top matters, that leaders can and should set expectations to which the bureaucracy will respond, and that Member States, too, want to trust in the personal leadership of the Secretary-General even as they may occasionally undercut him in their own decision-making. Individuals can and do set the tone. But leadership in complex organizations is inevitably carried out by the team of people around the top executive. Consequential decision-making in such organizations is necessarily a collaborative art form. In recognition of this, most business, governments and international organizations have some form of collective decision-making at the executive level, through which people take on corporate responsibility for the running of the organization in addition to their specific functional responsibilities. This guards

against individual bias and insulates against undue political pressure. It is widely thought to result in better decision-making. Such decision-making has to be supported by workable systems, a culture of teamwork and top quality senior appointments.

The principle of shared political responsibility for the most consequential decisions should hold great appeal for a Secretary-General whose actual authority over his senior team is weak but attempts to institute meaningful collective decision-making in the UN have foundered. This is not surprising given the way decision-making responsibility is shared amongst Member States and UN officials. But the diffuse decision-making and management culture at the United Nations has more than once contributed to serious organizational lapses and a new Secretary-General may want to place a higher premium on meaningful executive, collective decision-making in future. Indeed, putting in place such arrangements would undoubtedly go some way to restoring the trust that has been lost between Member States and the Secretariat. Pressure will inevitably be exerted on a new Secretary-General to make visible, structural changes. Such changes are necessary and long overdue in certain parts of the bureaucracy. But structural change is disruptive and takes time. More immediate results will be felt in the Secretariat if the senior leadership can collaborate more effectively across the bureaucratic silos. This will require leadership attention to the institutional culture and bureaucratic structures supporting decision-making in the Secretariat.

Chapter Ten

Recommendations for effective decision-making in the UN context

Having examined the factors that condition decision-making by the Secretary-General, this study can now suggest several key conditions that need to be met for strong leadership by an incoming Secretary-General in the face of contemporary challenges and political realities. The manifold challenges of the Secretary-General's job require him to organize his relationships with his senior officials and the UN bureaucracy effectively. Most Secretaries-General have tried to reform the structures or systems of the Secretariat with that in mind, albeit with mixed results. During the Cold War, they were apt eventually to give up and to centralise most of the important decision-making within their own office. That doesn't work in the modern era. The world is dominated by problems that no-one can solve alone. Many of them end up in the Secretary-General's in-box. They are complex and interconnected, requiring a combination of specialist knowledge and strategic vision. The pressures and uncertainties of the position are rising. The operational responsibilities are vast. Strong strategic leadership and a robust centre are needed to transcend the bureaucratic stovepipes but specialist advice from those very stovepipes is also vital and must be harnessed through orderly decision-making procedures. Some attempts have been made in recent years to introduce these practices but they have not been strong enough to withstand some of the fundamental cultural and structural pressures in play.

The Secretary-General has a limited range of tools at his disposal for strategic leadership, in particular given his lack of control over budgets and personnel. The United Nations is a personality-driven and naturally centrifugal organization. But some of the Organization's darkest moments have come about in part because of lapses in management and decision-making. The next Secretary-General must place more value on a strong Executive Office that can perform an honest broker role in decision-making and on a system for collective, executive decision-making that will bind his senior leadership team to his strategic direction. He should also place value on strategic thinking and structure his office so that all decision-making is not reactive and short-term. He will have to manage a delicate relationship with Member States who are floundering in the face of complex global challenges, schizophrenic and transactional in what they ask of the United Nations and impossible to please much of the time. These difficulties do not excuse him from exerting leadership. Indeed, they make it more important. They also mean he needs to be extremely sure of his choices and of the support of his senior leadership team. As this study has suggested, the key factors fall into two broad categories: the people and the process (the politics permeates both issues completely but varies by issue and is thus not given specific treatment here).

People: the tone at the top

- **Ultimately, the person at the top sets the tone and expectations to which the system responds.** The Secretary-General's own leadership style and personal preferences substantially determine the decision-making environment. His comfort with frank debate and the give-and-take of ideas; how much he wants to get personally involved in the big decisions; whether he prefers face-to-face discussions or written memos; his appetite for big policy questions; his commitment to the principles and ideals of the UN Charter and the independence of the Secretariat as a principal organ; all these and more become the demand signals to which his office and the bureaucracy respond. This study has tried to make the case for an intelligent and competent Secretary-General with the right leadership, principles, communication and management skills to handle the most impossible job in the world. It is a Faustian bargain to appoint weak leadership to an Organization that is so critically needed and in which such enormous resources, trust and hope are invested. This is entirely in the hands of Member States but there should be no illusions about the consequences for the world of this decision.

- In the Secretary-General's immediate orbit, it is time to seriously **consider the top management structure**, which has barely changed in seventy years with the exception of the addition in 2007 of the Deputy Secretary-General position. Different models have been tried since then for the division of labour between the Deputy Secretary-General and the Chef de Cabinet. None has proved fully capable of absorbing the enormous responsibilities that now fall on the office. It may be time to revisit recommendations for a chief operating officer and/or a second Deputy-Secretary-General. It is not by happenstance that these recommendations have been made repeatedly over the years. Serving Secretaries-General have rarely been amenable to additional layers at the very top but there are many observers who would argue that the time may have come.
- **Senior appointments must be based on merit, not politics, and with an eye to teamwork.** The study has also attempted to show that the job is not something one person does alone. Much greater attention is needed to the quality of senior appointments, which have become too important to leave to chance and politics. Ideally, Member States will give the next Secretary-General more free reign in appointments but they should also raise their expectations. The top management layer of the Organization should be made up of world class experts in their fields, who embody the principle of impartiality and can function as team. There are currently many things working against them pulling together as a team: their sheer number, the interests and incentive structures by which they operate, and the institutional culture. Some of these are within the Secretary-General's immediate control, most notably what kind of expectations he sets for them. The imperatives of running a large line department or agency with its own distinct culture, parochial interests, funding streams, politics and governance will always colour the advice that a senior manager provides to the Secretary-General. This cannot be wished away. But effective leadership and decision-making procedures will maximise trust between the Secretary-General and his department heads and reduce the risk that senior officials take instructions from other sources, sabotage his decisions or fail to see their own departmental objectives within the larger context.
- **Fewer direct reports and clearer accountability at the top (including in the field)** are also ideas that have been raised repeatedly, including by Secretaries-General themselves. The number of senior officials with direct reporting lines to the Secretary-General now far exceeds what modern management practices advise. This is a drain on decision-making and blurs accountability in dangerous ways. There are multiple senior officials responsible for UN peace operations, or for addressing problems of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel, or for children caught up in armed conflict, or for sustainable development. It may be time to revisit ideas for clustering like departments and assigning a clear coordination role to one official in each area, with clear expectations as to what that means (representing the perspectives, not monopolising). In the medium-term, the bureaucracy needs to be formally restructured and streamlined so as to minimise duplication, confusion and rivalry, beginning with a rationalization of the architecture on the peace and security side. Similar arrangements should be considered in the field, where the dysfunction of headquarters is reproduced and even magnified. However, even pending structural changes, a new working culture at the top is not impossible to bring about through better appointments and better management of the underlying dynamics of this unique organization.
- The **ability to say no** is crucial. In the face of overwhelming demands on the Secretary-General and the mushrooming global agenda, it can be difficult to make the most strategic and effective use of the Secretary-General and indeed the UN. It takes discipline and more than a little courage to resist the tyranny of the in-box and the endless suck of marginal issues and events. For a Secretary-General to do so, it takes confidence in the advice he has been given as there he inevitably disappoint. But it is more important than ever to allocate time and capacity to the issues that most warrant. One value of a clearer collective decision-making arrangement is that senior officials will be protected from the pressures of certain constituencies and more able to say no.

Process: Multiple advocacy and collective responsibility

- **Decision-making is broken; a return to structured decision-making is essential.** The clearest message from the interviews conducted for this study is that the processes for taking major policy and management decisions in the Organization need to be overhauled. There was a near-unanimous view that the decision pathways are not clear, that there are too many meetings but too few decision-making opportunities, and that friction, misunderstandings and poor decisions result. It is a common feature of government that decision-making bodies lose power and effectiveness over time, especially as they grow in size. This is not unique to the UN but it is important to recognise the moment at hand – where new leadership can take a fresh look at the set-up, do away with committees that no longer serve a clear purpose, and put in place new arrangements that meet today's needs. The Secretary-General operates in environment of rising complexity, pressure and uncertainty. The issues he faces are no longer easily delegated to one part of the bureaucracy to deal with alone. To be effective, he has to benefit from an orderly flow of information that includes the perspectives of relevant actors and that reaches him in a timely fashion.
- **Collective responsibility should be instituted as a clear principle.** A Secretary-General should have the right to expect – and Member States should demand – that his senior team will be able to remove their functional hats to take the strategic, corporate view and to take collective ownership of the big issues and decisions they face. The principle of shared political responsibility for the most consequential decisions should hold great appeal for the UN Secretary-General, whose authority over his top executives is relatively weak. Personal or institutional rivalries or frictions undermine decision-making, and waste the Secretary-General's time. Decisions reached collectively are not only better but also more likely to be kept free of political pressures and to be “owned” by the senior officials, who have considerable power otherwise to sabotage them. Senior officials should be held accountable for good faith participation in collective, executive decision-making. In light of past experience with the limits of peer leadership in the system, there is a clear need for the central decision-making structure to be anchored in and staffed by EOSG.
- **The Secretary-General should insist on a system for multiple advocacy.** Secretary-General decision-making should always benefit from full information concerning the available options and a practice of ‘multiple advocacy’ where the preferences of relevant actors are clearly known. Departmental equities should be considered in but not drive decision outcomes. In a consensus culture, the temptation will be to create an expectation – and a system – that stifles minority or unpopular views, and that allows group-think and self-censorship. This would be short-sighted. The Secretary-General needs a system in which clear decisions, not consensus, are the goal.
- **Subsidiarity.** This system for clear decision-making will necessitate doing away with the proliferation of overlapping meetings and instead putting in place a cabinet-style structure with clear subsidiary bodies feeding into it. For instance, a clear, cascading series of committees as in some national governments could be put in place so the right decisions are taken at the right time by the right level in the hierarchy⁷⁰⁶. This system of subsidiarity would allow heads of line departments to take as many decisions as possible in their areas of responsibility and hold them clearly accountable for them. Only important issues would rise to the level of Secretary-General.
- **No more labels.** A clear lesson of past UN practice – dating back to the 1992 Agenda for Peace – is that there are costs to organizing ourselves thematically, especially in light of how our understandings have evolved over time. From labels such as ‘peacebuilding’ emerge structures, offices, and committees that then compete for a share of the issues or for the right to chair meetings. Best would be a central decision-making architecture that is not limited in this way. UN principals are overwhelmed by too many meetings, often on the same issues but in different formats. There is a place for thematic committees but not as a substitute for a central decision-making architecture that funnels strategic questions up to the Secretary-General without prejudice to the label we happen to assign the question.

- **Crisis decision-making has to be simple, quick and routine.** Not everything is a crisis but when an emergency of real magnitude crops up, there is a desperate need for routinized decision-making, clarity and accountability. It is telling that the Secretariat currently does not have clear crisis response policies in place governing who will do what, when and how. Worse, in fact, there are several different sets of policies, each offering a different prescription but none of which are truly adhered to when crisis actually erupts. As a result, crisis decision-making is ad hoc, chaotic and subject to extreme friction as roles are not clearly understood. The transaction costs and missed opportunities are evident to everyone involved and the appetite for clear crisis decision-making is strong. But to issue clear policy would be to abolish existing committees and policies, each of which has a bureaucratic champion, inevitably the part of the house that gets to be “in charge” or in the “lead (a very ill-defined concept) according to their favoured policy. A change of leadership is an opportune moment to revisit this question and to put in place simple and clear crisis response arrangements.
- **Many important decisions will still need to be taken in private** by the Secretary-General but support structures will still be needed to ensure that they are not, therefore, taken without full information and well-articulated options. Not every decision requires a meeting.
- **The Secretary-General’s own gatekeepers need to be strong enough to shape decision-making but not so overbearing as to substitute for expertise from the departments.** The role of EOSG should be to adjudicate *and* to advise. This means being the honest broker that is above departmental interests but well informed enough to ask the right questions. It means being the steward of the process – faithfully coordinating the advice coming from line departments – while also offering independent advice. To that end, EOSG should focus on the essentials of leadership by the Secretary-General and should avoid becoming so large as to pose a bureaucratic threat to line departments or so involved in the details that it micromanages them. It should also avoid becoming so inward-looking that it loses touch with the departments. Within EOSG, effective management of the Secretary-General’s time and attention is a top priority. Only the most important issues should reach the Secretary-General, with the right advice and options. The personal preferences of the Secretary-General will inevitably flavour what issues he focuses on but an effective EOSG will advise him clearly as to which issues and decisions warrant his attention and which do not. In that connection, a balance is needed between personal staffing functions and advisory and policy coordination functions. Substance and strategy should determine scheduling rather than the reverse.
- **EOSG as the link across the pillars.** It is clear that most consequential decisions now involve issues that cut across the pillars of the UN. There being no practical alternative to a clear division of labour down through the bureaucracy, EOSG needs to be the place where links are made across the issues and the formal structures. Rather than Regular cross-pollination should take place at the top combined with an effort to give more systematic feedback to the different pillars. This means taking a serious look at the structures within EOSG to be sure that they do not simply reproduce the compartmentalization of the bureaucracy. A premium should be placed on creating dialogue, however informal, across the functional areas. This is a management challenge in a very busy office but one worthy of time and attention so as to ensure that decisions are not taken without the full picture.
- **A capacity for long-range thinking has to be resurrected.** It is too easy for the Secretary-General, his office, and senior officials to become consumed by day-to-day business and the need to react swiftly to a constantly changing environment. EOSG should be the policy centre of gravity, giving strategic direction to the rest of the system, anticipating emerging issues and advising the Secretary-General about how to position the Organization. The lesson from governments and past UN experience is that strategic thinking will only happen if the Secretary-General himself insists upon it and a capacity is put in place. This function should be performed at

a sufficiently senior level by someone who has access to the Secretary-General and is well-informed enough but not pulled into the day-to-day operations of the office. It is important to distinguish between strategic planning (which entails the kind of allocation of resources to priorities that is the preserve of Member States) and policy planning (a radar function to anticipate and get ahead of problems). Policy planning is within the Secretary-General's power but will not happen unless policy planners are empowered, in the room, and integrated into the flow of information and decision-making appropriately. If kept at arm's length from the daily business of the office or not permitted to perform their challenge function, they will be of no value. One solution might be to merge a policy capacity with speechwriting, as in many governments.

- A key function of EOSG should be to serve as **guardians of the decisions already taken** by the Secretary-General, monitoring implementation and nudging when it falters. Failure to occasionally review and follow up on past decisions sends the wrong message. EOSG has to be willing occasionally to enforce or adjudicate if roadblocks arise in implementation. These functions should be shared by all EOSG staff, which sends a clear message about the ownership felt over the decisions and the importance attached to them.
- Find ways to **realign substance, management, and budget**. The disconnect at the intergovernmental level between policy and budget decisions makes it difficult for the Secretariat to realign them but with a stronger central decision-making architecture in place and the principle of collective responsibility clearly articulated, there should be an expectation that the senior leadership is well versed in and consulted on key administration and management questions.
- **More central attention to legislative affairs.** Good management is very difficult without good governance. The next Secretary-General needs to reset the relationship with Member States, restoring their trust and confidence in the UN. To that end, it may be time for the Secretary-General to structure his relationships with the UN Membership differently. Thought should be given to a legislative affairs function within EOSG. Nobody recommends returning to the Boutros-Ghali model of controlling all interaction with the Security Council through one senior official. But at present the Secretary-General receives advice about Member States from too many quarters (DPA regional divisions; SCAD; DGACM; DPKO; PBSO) with none able to provide the full picture. One value in this approach might be to allow for decision-making discussions in which substantive, normative and political considerations are disaggregated more effectively than is common right now. In other words, the substance of the issue would be separate from the tactics of engaging the membership, the question of what ought to be done would not so easily be conflated with potentially limited diagnoses of what Member States will permit. This has been a problem in the past, e.g. Sri Lanka.
- **Strategic communications.** In an era where public opinion is so important, the injection of a communications dimension into key decision-making will be crucial. In past decades, a strategic communications function existed in EOSG but more recently this has been reduced to speechwriting. It is probably time to revisit this question, possibly merging the speech-writing and policy planning capacities as a start.

Conclusion

In conclusion, given the overwhelming complexity of the UN as an Organization and of the issues on its docket, the incoming Secretary-General may wish to consider the idea of putting in place formal cabinet-style arrangements to share the burden and responsibility of leadership of this massively complex Organization. Effective UN leadership is quite simply no longer the job of one person; it requires a strong management team around the SG operating according to principles of collective responsibility, multiple advocacy, clear accountability and subsidiarity. Even short of formal cabinet arrangements, there is an emphatic need for strong leadership at the top supported by clear decision-making procedures that bind the politically appointed and centrifugally inclined senior leadership team into a clear direction. To keep

competing institutional prerogatives and perspectives under control, we need to move away from decision-making that is fragmented according to issue. We need to better integrate resource considerations into decision-making, bringing substantive and management issues back together. All of this requires a much stronger centre, with the Secretary-General's office performing an honest broker role in the decision-making process, with clear subsidiary bodies to avoid problems of peer leadership and conflict among co-equals. This would allow the Secretary-General to make the most of what are, quite frankly, very limited tools for strategic leadership. None of this will mean much if Member States do not choose to use the UN responsibly. This begins with selecting and trusting effective leadership at the top. It also includes a willingness to look at the corrosive disconnect between budget and mandates, which disempowers UN leadership and distorts decision-making. The opportunity to make these kinds of changes only comes around once a decade.

Confidential Draft

Annex 1: The UN Charter Chapter XV: the Secretariat

Article 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.


Article 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.
2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.
2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.
3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

Annex2: Org Chart of UN System



Annex 3: Samples of cabinet meeting notes over the years





Fig X. Meeting note from the very first meeting Dag Hammarskjöld had as Secretary-General, 13 April 1953 (Source: UN Archives)

UNITED NATIONS  NATIONS UNIES
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed
A: Chef de Cabinet

THROUGH: S/C DE:

FROM: Robert L. Schiffer
DE:

SUBJECT: Summary of USG/ASG meeting with the Secretary-General
OBJET: 14 March 1979

DATE: _____
REFERENCE: _____

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary-General opened the meeting by reporting on the following international developments:

(a) The Middle East

A dramatic change had occurred in the Middle East, but the major question now was what would follow the Egypt/Israeli Treaty. He was well aware of the effort made by the three governments at Camp David, but was uncertain now what the second act would be, particularly in view of the rejection of the Camp David accords by others involved in the Middle East situation. It was, in any event, premature to give any detailed reaction. He would be seeing the United States Representative and then would know more than he did at present.

(b) Namibia

Here again, there was an impasse. Both sides had accepted recent proposals that had been put forward, but then had come up with totally different interpretations of them. He mentioned the pending proximity talks, and some of the suggestions that had come from the Front-Line States, and said he would remain available to be of assistance as needed.

(c) Cyprus

Serious problems still existed. A meeting had been proposed, but he felt it was essential that there first be a basis for discussion and agreement.

(d) China - Viet Nam

Any resolution acceptable to both was out of the question at present.

/.....

Note for the Secretary-General

4. I have decided to establish a task force to review the points to be raised at the USG/ASG meeting on 13 January 1982

1. Announcement of appointments.

Mr. Kenneth Dadzie has been assigned as a Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Special Missions, effective 1 February 1982.

Mr. Jean Ripert: Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation, effective 1 February 1982.

Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed: Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs in Southeast Asia.

Mr. M'Hamed Essaafi: Chef de Cabinet

Mr. James Jonah: Assistant Secretary-General for Field Operational and External Support Activities.

Ms. Leila Doss: Assistant Secretary-General for Personnel Services.

Mr. Robert Muller: Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Secretariat Services for Economic and Social Matters.

2. I have given instructions to the effect that the 34th floor and above are to be occupied by the Offices of the Secretary-General and those departments dealing with political matters. The Office of Legal Affairs, which is an office of the Secretary-General, is already on the 34th floor, and the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs is on the 35th.

Those offices dealing with administrative matters will be located on the floors serviced by the middle bank of elevators, where they will be more easily accessible to staff working in all areas of the building.

I request the Under-Secretary-General for Administration, Finance and Management to co-ordinate this transfer of offices with the departments concerned so that it may be implemented at the earliest possible date. The full co-operation of all concerned is requested.

3. With regard to the implementation of the commitments made yesterday in my statement to the staff, the Under-Secretary-General for Administration, Finance and Management, in co-ordination with the Assistant Secretaries-General for Personnel Services and Financial Services, will be in touch with other departments concerned with a view to setting up the necessary machinery to follow these up.

Annex 4: Breakdown of Policy Committee Decisions

GEOGRAPHIC ITEMS DISCUSSED SINCE 2005

1. Afghanistan: 2005 (Aug) 2006 (Jan; Jul; Oct); 2007 (May; Nov); 2008 (Oct); 2009 (Mar); 2010 (Jan; Feb); 2011 (Feb); 2012 (Feb)
2. Burundi: May 2006; Nov 2008; Nov 2010
3. CAR: Feb 2009
4. Chad: Jun 2006; Oct 2006; Apr 2008; May 2009; Oct 2010
5. Chad / CAR: Jan 2007
6. Central Asia: Oct 2007
7. Colombia: Feb 2006; Jul 2010
8. Cote d'Ivoire: 2006 (Feb; May; Dec); 2007 (May) 2008 (Apr); 2009 (Jul); 2010 (May); 2011 (June)
9. DRC: 2005 (Dec); 2006 (Sep; Dec); 2007 (Mar); 2009 (Jun; May; Nov); 2010 (May; Sept)
10. Egypt: May 2011
11. Ethiopia/Eritrea: Nov 2005; Jun 2006
12. Guinea: Jul 2007; May 2008; Mar 2010; Feb 2011
13. Guinea-Bissau: May 2009
14. Haiti: Aug 2005; Jul 2006; Nov 2008; Jun 2009; Nov 2011
15. Iraq: 2005 (May; Dec); 2006 (Mar; Jun; Dec); 2007 (Jan; Apr; Jul; Nov); 2008 (Jan); 2009 (Sep); 2010 (Apr); 2011 (Feb)
16. Iran: Mar 2007; May 2009; Jan 2010; Jul 2011
17. Kenya: Feb 2008
18. Korean Peninsula: Mar 2006; May 2007
19. Kosovo: Feb 2007
20. Kyrgyzstan: Nov 2010
21. Lebanon: May 2005; Jan 2007
22. Lebanon/Middle East: Aug 2005
23. Liberia: Oct 2005
24. Libya: Feb 2012
25. Madagascar: Apr 2010
26. Middle East: Jan 2007
27. Myanmar: Jun 2005; Sep 2006; Apr 2007
28. Niger: Apr 2010
29. Nepal: 2005 (May; Aug); 2006 (Feb; Sep; Nov); 2007 (March; Oct) 2010 (Dec)
30. Northern Uganda: Feb 2006; Jun 2006; Apr 2007
31. OPT: Feb 2009
32. Pakistan: Mar 2009; Jul 2009; Nov 2009; Jul 2010; Oct 2011
33. Sierra Leone: Nov 2007; Mar 2008
34. Sudan/Darfur: May 2005; Mar 2006; Apr 2006; Jun 2006; Oct 2006; Jan 2007; Sep 2007; Feb 2008
35. Sudan: Jun 2005; Jan 2006; Dec 2007; Nov 2008; Jul 2009; Mar 2010; Apr 2011
36. Somalia: 2005 (Nov); 2006 (Jul; Nov); 2007 (Jan; May; Jul; Oct); 2008 (Mar; Nov); 2009 (May)
37. Sri Lanka: Oct 2006; Apr 2007; Nov 2007; Mar 2009; Jun 2009; Mar 2010
38. Timor Leste: Mar 2006
39. Tunisia: May 2011
40. Yemen: Oct 2009
41. Zimbabwe: Aug 2005; Feb 2006; Oct 2007; Feb 2009; Oct 2010

THEMATIC ITEMS DISCUSSED SINCE 2005

1. Accountability within the Secretariat: Apr 2008
2. AU/UN Relationship: Mar 2006; Sep 2006
3. Biodiversity: Sep 2010
4. Budget Process: Sep 2008
5. Capacity Requirements for RC Offices in Crisis/PB: Dec 2009
6. Climate Change: Feb 2006; Feb 2007; Nov 2007
7. Conflict Related Sexual Violence: Dec 2010
8. Constitution Building: Nov 2006
9. Counter Terrorism: May 2005; June 2005; Apr 2006; May 2010
10. Daily Security Council Briefings: Feb 2006
11. Delivering on Recovery and Peace Dividends: Jul 2008
12. Democracy: Nov 2007; Jul 2009; Dec 2011
13. Disaster Risk Reduction: Apr 2007; Apr 2008; May 2009
14. Discrimination: Mar 2012
15. Durable Solutions: Oct 2011
16. Employment Generation in Post-Conflict Situations: May 2008
17. Employment Generation and Reintegration: Nov 2006
18. Energy and Sustainable Development: Apr 2007
19. Fair & Clear Procedures Sanctions regimes: May 2006
20. Financing for Development: Sep 2008
21. Fourth UN Conference on LDCs: Feb 2011
22. Gender Architecture: Oct 2006
23. Good Offices & Mediation: Oct 2005
24. Global Food Challenges: Apr 2008
25. Global Health: Jun 2008
26. Human Rights Council: May 2006
27. Human Rights and Development: May 2008
28. Human Rights Due Diligence Policy: Jul 2011
29. Human Rights in Integrated Missions: Oct 2005
30. Integration: Jun 2008; May 2011
31. Integrated Missions: July 2005
32. Integrated Mission Planning Processes: Jun 2006
33. International Trade & Sustainable Development: Apr 2006; Apr 2008
34. International Migration: May 2007
35. Iraq Special Tribunal: July 2005
36. Lord's Resistance Army: Jun 2011
37. Management Reform: Apr 2006 - Feb 2007

38. Mediation Support: May 2007; Mar 2009; May 2010
39. Migration: Mar 2006
40. Millennium Development Goals: May 2007; Dec 2007; Jan 2010
41. NATO/UN Relations: Oct 2006
42. Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Jan 2008; Jan 2009
43. Note of Guidance to SRSs: Jan 2006
44. Operational Security: Feb 2008
45. Peacebuilding: Sep 2006
46. Peacebuilding Support Office: July 2005; May 2007
47. Policy Committee Procedural Matters: May 2005
48. Policy Committee Lessons Learned: Aug 2005
49. Post NPT Review Conference Strategy: Jun 2005
50. Responsibility to Protect: Oct 2007; 2008 Jun; Sep; Sep 2009; Mar 2010; Mar 2011
51. Review of DDR Arrangements: Nov 2010
52. Review of Electoral Assistance Arrangements: Jul 2010; Nov 2011
53. Review of Mine Action Arrangements: Jul 2010
54. Rule of Law: Nov 2006; Dec 2011
55. Security Sector Reform: Feb 2007; Jan 2011
56. Senior Appointments Policy: May 2006
57. Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding: May 2009
58. Secretary-General's vision: Apr 2008
59. Secretary-General's vision for 2008 & Beyond: Jan 2008
60. Special Circumstances in Non-Mission Settings: Jan 2012
61. Staff Security: Nov 2011
62. Standing Police Capacity: Apr 2006
63. Strategy & Forward Agenda: Sep 2005
64. Status of Women in the Secretariat: Oct 2006; Feb 2008; Dec 2009; Sep 2011
65. Strengthening the AIDS Response: Jun 2007; May 2008
66. Strengthening the Policy Committee Process: Oct 2006
67. South South Cooperation: Jul 2008
68. Support to Survivors and Affected Families: Feb 2010; Nov 2010
69. Summit Outcome Implementation: Sep 2005
70. The role of the UN in promoting responsibility in international arms transfers: Jun 2011
71. Trans-national organized crime and drug trafficking as threats to security and stability: Mar 2011
72. UN Assistance in Public Administration in post-conflict situations: Nov 2009
73. UN Communications: Jun 2008
74. UN Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government: Nov 2009
75. UN Salaries and Scales: Jan 2008
76. UN Strengthening and Reform: Apr 2010
77. UN's use of private security companies: May 2011
78. Violence against Women: Jun 2007; Feb 2010
79. Women's Participation in Peacebuilding: Sep 2010; Nov 2011
80. Youth: Mar 2012

Annex 6: Functions of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General

2.1 The Executive Office, headed by the Chef de Cabinet, assists the Secretary-General in the exercise of his responsibilities. In particular, the Executive Office:

- (a) Assists the Secretary-General in the establishment of general policy and in the exercise of executive direction in relation to the work of the Secretariat and of United Nations programmes and other entities within the Organization;
- (b) Assists the Secretary-General in his relations with the principal organs of the Organization;
- (c) Assists the Secretary-General in supervising and coordinating the work of the Organization, pursuant to his decisions and the relevant directives of the intergovernmental bodies concerned, relating to political missions, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building, as well as the economic, social, humanitarian and human rights areas, and administration and management;
- (d) Assists the Secretary-General in his capacity as Chairman of the Administrative Committee on Coordination and in his inter-agency coordination function in relation to the United Nations system of organizations;
- (e) Assists the Secretary-General in his contacts with Governments, delegations, non-governmental organizations, the press and the public;
- (f) Prepares speeches and statements for the Secretary-General, and prepares, or coordinates the preparation of, briefing material for his personal attention;
- (g) Deals with protocol, liaison and representation, organizes official ceremonies and similar functions and makes arrangements for official receptions and other functions hosted by the Secretary-General;
- (h) Provides the Secretary-General with administrative support, makes travel arrangements for the Secretary-General and his party on official missions and maintains the personal security of the Secretary-General and his family.

2.2 The Executive Office similarly assists the Deputy Secretary-General in the exercise of the responsibilities assigned to that Office⁷⁰⁷.

Acknowledgements

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⁴³ Yes Minister - Episode Six: The Right to Know

⁴⁴ Barnett, Michael N. and Martha Finnemore, *The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations*, International Organization 53, 4, Autumn 1999, pp. 699-732

⁴⁵ Trollope, Anthony. *The Claverings*. Chapter XXXII.

⁴⁶ Plato was on the side of those who downplayed the importance of the individual, making the case for an elaborate system to choose city state leaders so that any individual leader would be replaceable, whereas Thucydides attributed much of the outcome of the Peloponnesian War to individual Athenian leaders, particularly Pericles. In the nineteenth century, Karl Marx argued that, "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given, and transmitted from the past." Thomas Carlyle, on the other hand, argued that "The History of the world is but the Biography of great men." More recent theory can be found in [finish list]

⁴⁷ See 'Our Global Neighbourhood'. Report of the Commission on Global Governance

⁴⁸ Author interviews

⁴⁹ See: Bennister, Mark. *Prime Ministers in Power: Political Leadership in Britain and Australia*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012

⁵⁰ Margaret G. Hermann and Thomas Preston, 'Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements Author(s)', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Special Issue: Political Psychology and the Work of Alexander L. George (Mar., 1994), pp. 75-96

⁵¹ Barber, James David. *The Presidential Character*. Predicting Performance in the White House, Pearson Longman 2009, page 4.

⁵² Hermann, Margaret G. and Joa Hagan. *International Decision-Making: Leadership Matters*, Foreign Policy 110 (Spring 1998), pages 124. Kent Kille applied this analysis to seven of the last eight Secretaries-General in his study [title].

⁵³ Kille, Kent. *From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations*. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 26 July 2015.

⁵⁴ Hochschild, Fabrizio. *Leadership in the United Nations and the Challenge of Courage* (forthcoming), 2016.

⁵⁵ Hochschild, Fabrizio. *Leadership in the United Nations and the Challenge of Courage* (forthcoming), 2016.

⁵⁶ Kouzes, J.M., Posener, B., (2009), “To Lead, Create a Shared Vision”, *Harvard Business Review*, January 2009, p.20

⁵⁷ Leuchtenberg, William in *Salon*, December 2015, ‘Behind the Ronald Reagan myth: “No one had ever entered the White House so grossly ill informed”’, Excerpted from “The American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill Clinton” by William E. Leuchtenburg. Published by Oxford University Press. Copyright 2016 (http://www.salon.com/2015/12/28/behind_the_ronald_reagan_myth_no_one_had_ever_entered_the_white_house_so_grossly_ill_informed/)

⁵⁸ Noonan, Peggy. *What I Saw at the Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era*, Random House, 2003, page 148

⁵⁹ Hermann, 1999, 14

⁶⁰ See, for instance, *New York Times* magazine, ‘You’re not Supposed to Understand the Federal Reserve’, 25 October 2015 (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/magazine/youre-not-supposed-to-understand-the-federal-reserve.html?_r=0). Also *The Economist* blog (<http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/08/monetary-policy-1>)

⁶¹ “Leadership in the modern presidency is not carried out by the president alone, but rather by presidents with their associates. It depends therefore on both the president’s strengths and weaknesses and on the quality of the aides’ support”. (Cited in: Margaret G. Hermann and Thomas Preston, ‘Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements Author(s)’, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Special Issue: Political Psychology and the Work of Alexander L. George (Mar., 1994), pp. 76)

⁶² Lord Melbourne (Prime Minister) to his Cabinet in 1841, on the Corn Laws [Spencer Walpole *The Life of Lord John Russell*, 1889, vol 1, p369] Cited in: *The collective responsibility of Ministers - an outline of issues*, House of Commons Research Paper 04/82, 2004. (: <http://www.parliament.uk>)

⁶³ Why Good Leaders Make Bad Decisions, (<https://hbr.org/2009/02/why-good-leaders-make-bad-decisions>).

⁶⁴ This power was underpinned by the threat of collective resignation, which they followed through upon in 1746. See: *The collective responsibility of Ministers - an outline of issues*, House of Commons Research Paper 04/82, 2004. (: <http://www.parliament.uk>)

⁶⁵ *The collective responsibility of Ministers - an outline of issues*, House of Commons Research Paper 04/82, 2004. (<http://www.parliament.uk>)

⁶⁶ The College of Commissioners includes the President of the Commission, his seven Vice-Presidents, including the First Vice-President, and the High-Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy and 20 Commissioners in charge of portfolios. All Commissioners are equal in the decision-making process and equally accountable for these decisions. The President defines the policy direction, assigns portfolios to each of the Commissioners (e.g. internal market, regional policy, transport, environment, agriculture, trade, etc.) and can, at any time, change the attribution and or shape of the portfolios. The College decides on the strategic objectives and on this basis, draws up the annual work programme. The Vice-Presidents act on behalf of the President, deputising for him. They steer and coordinate the work in their area of responsibility bringing together several Commissioners. Vice-Presidents are entrusted with well-defined priority projects that can be adapted according to need, and as new projects develop. This ensures that the College works together in a close and flexible manner. Commissioners support Vice-Presidents in submitting proposals to the College which, in general, deliberates by consensus. The College may also take a vote. In this case, decisions are taken by simple majority. From: (http://ec.europa.eu/about/working-as-college/index_en.htm)

⁶⁷ *The Working Methods of the European Commission 2014-2019* (<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2014/EN/3-2014-9004-EN-F1-1.Pdf>)

⁶⁸ See Press Association. **"Blair cabinet took one decision in eight months"**. In: *The Guardian*, London, 29 May 2007 (<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/may/29/tonyblair.labour1>) and Bennister, Mark. *Prime Ministers in Power: Political Leadership in Britain and Australia*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. See also Clare Short’s resignation speech to the House of Commons on 12 May 2003: “the problem is the centralisation of power into the hands of the Prime Minister and an increasingly small number of advisers who make decisions in private without proper discussion. It is increasingly clear, I am afraid, that the Cabinet has become, in Bagehot’s phrase, a dignified part of the constitution—joining the Privy Council. There is no real collective responsibility because there is no collective; just diktats in favour of increasingly badly thought through policy initiatives that come from on high” (Cited in *The collective responsibility of Ministers - an outline of issues*, House of Commons Research Paper 04/82, 2004).

⁶⁹ Schafer, Mark. *Groupthink versus High Quality Decision Making in International Relations*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2010, p. 18

⁷⁰ Irving Janis is the father of this theory. He attributed the phenomenon largely to group cohesion and homogeneity (in the backgrounds and ideologies of the group members), the misguided pursuit of consensus and consequent self-censorship in the discussions, poor information-gathering and insulation from inputs, lack of impartial leadership, and lack of process discipline. Other scholars have argued that Janis overestimates the importance of group cohesion and that procedural weaknesses or weak leadership are more important factors (Flowers, McCauley, Peterson). Paul t’Hart has identified two different types of groupthink: over-optimism (groups that are overoptimistic about their effectiveness) and collective avoidance. He has also reminded us that groups often serve multiple purposes and cannot be evaluated on the basis only of problem-solving. Sometimes their value is more as a standing forum for avoiding political indecisiveness or paralysis or as a forum for creating and maintaining support for a decision, rather than being the place where the decision is taken (t’Hart 1988).

- ⁷¹ Schafer, Mark. *Groupthink versus High Quality Decision Making in International Relations*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2010, p. 21
- ⁷² Peterson, Randall et al, 1988, p.291
- ⁷³ Schafer, Mark. *Groupthink versus High Quality Decision Making in International Relations*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2010, p. 30-31
- ⁷⁴ Schafer, Mark. *Groupthink versus High Quality Decision Making in International Relations*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2010, p. 55
- ⁷⁵ Kelman et al. Tell it Like it is: Groupthink, Decisiveness and Decision-Making among US Federal Subcabinet Executives, Harvard Business School, August 2014 (hyperlink)
- ⁷⁶ Schafer, Mark. *Groupthink versus High Quality Decision Making in International Relations*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2010, p. 67
- ⁷⁷ Other factors include whether or not the leader has existing biases, how open or insulated the group is, whether or not gatekeepers exert disproportionate control over what information is available, whether or not the group values disagreement; how good the teamwork is; how self-aware the group is (or whether they harbour illusions of invulnerability) and the knowledge and experience of the leader and the members.
- ⁷⁸ Rothkopf, David. *Running the World. The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, 2005, p. 264
- ⁷⁹ cite 2008 article
- ⁸⁰ Klimek – this data is from 2007 and source is CIA
- ⁸¹ See Widner, Jennifer. Also Klimek. Lessons from UK Delivery Unit?
- ⁸² Rothkopf, David. *Running the World. The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, 2005, p. 15.
- ⁸³ Frisch, Robert. ‘Whos’ in the Room? How Great Leaders structure and manage the teams around them’
- ⁸⁴ Rogers, Paul and Marcia Blenko. Who Has the D? How Clear Decision Roles Enhance Organizational Performance. *Harvard Business Review*, 2005
- ⁸⁵ Schafer, Mark. *Groupthink versus High Quality Decision Making in International Relations*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2010, p. 30
- ⁸⁶ Schafer, Mark. *Groupthink versus High Quality Decision Making in International Relations*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2010, p. 67
- ⁸⁷ Pettigrew Andrew M. *The Politics of Organizational Decision-Making*, 2014, p.
- ⁸⁸ See: Wall Street Journal WSJ 6/5/14 and , <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/opinion/steven-rattner-gms-flawed-culture.html>
- ⁸⁹ Kurokawa Kiyoshi, Introduction. Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission cited in: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/world/asia/fukushima-nuclear-crisis-a-man-made-disaster-report-says.html?_r=0
- ⁹⁰ Steinberg, Richard H. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO From: *International Organization*, Volume 56, Number 2, Spring 2002 , pp. 339-374
- ⁹¹ A/60/692, “Investing in the United Nations: For a stronger Organization worldwide”, Report of the Secretary General, United Nations General Assembly, 7 March 2006, p.20
- ⁹² The theory is developed in: Frame, Davidson J.: *Framing Decisions: Decision-Making that Accounts for Irrationality, People and Constraints*, November 2012, Jossey-Bass
- ⁹³ Margaret G. Hermann and Thomas Preston, ‘Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements Author(s)’, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Special Issue: Political Psychology and the Work of Alexander L. George (Mar., 1994), pp. 75-96
- ⁹⁴ Tett, Gillian, *The Silo Effect: The Peril of Expertise and The Promise of Breaking Down Barriers*.
- ⁹⁵ The notion of a professional cadre of administrators has antecedents in ancient China, ancient Rome and the Byzantine empire. Some attribute the longevity of imperial China to its reliance on a meritocratically recruited bureaucracy whereas the eventual stagnation of ancient Rome was also laid partly at the feet of Diocletian, who created a very cumbersome administrative structure across the territory. Meanwhile, nobody needs reminding of the fact that Byzantium became synonymous with overly complex bureaucratic structures. By the 19th century, most industrializing countries had put in place bureaucracies to support government functioning. This in turn led to a wealth of literature considering the nature of bureaucracy. From John Stewart Mill who appreciated that bureaucratic functions were performed by individuals with experience, expertise and institutional memory but who cautioned, at the same time, that bureaucracies stifled the mind. Max Weber saw bureaucracies as a necessary and indeed the most efficient way to organize human activity but he, too, saw the risks that they would trap people in “an iron cage”. By the middle of the twentieth century, scholars such as Robert K Merton were warning about the “over-conformity” of bureaucracies and the tendencies of bureaucrats to place their own entrenched interests ahead of those of the organization as a whole. Cyril Parkinson has observed that bureaucracies tended to expand at a steady rate over time, even if their *raison d’être* was in decline. He was also the father of the maxim that work expands to fill the time allotted to it.
- ⁹⁶ Galinsky and Schweitzer, *Friend & Foe: When to Cooperate, When to Compete, and How to Succeed at Both*
- ⁹⁷ A recent study by Gillian Tett demonstrates how companies like UBS and Sony were undone by silos At UBS, the leadership “failed to ask the right questions” and thus did not see the risks of the financial crisis. At Sony, “the climate was so defensive that each department hugged data to itself, causing the company to miss the opportunities that arose with the digital age. It produced competing products and was overtaken by Apple and Samsung. In contrast, Facebook recognized the need for specialist departments but deliberately put in place ways – such as regular boot camps – to foster social ties across teams and a sense of affiliation across the entire company. The Cleveland Clinic was a partnership in which the financial

incentives rewarded collaboration. It now provides excellent, economically efficient healthcare. Tett, Gillian, *The Silo Effect: The Peril of Expertise and The Promise of Breaking Down Barriers*.

⁹⁸ “the overall structure of the Organization does not support the achievement of strategic and operational objectives in an efficient and effective manner. Lack of clarity as to organizational structure, responsibilities and objectives of different departments and offices leads to conflicting or redundant activities and, ultimately, loss of public and Member States’ trust” Enterprise Risk Management framework, September 2014

⁹⁹ 2015 Peacebuilding report

¹⁰⁰ Barnett Michael, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*

¹⁰¹ Insert quick background. Refer to Mali, etc

¹⁰² As happened recently on Burundi

¹⁰³ (e.g. Robert Jervis)

¹⁰⁴ This is the bureaucratic politics model, which emerged from the study of bureaucracies, and which, at its simplest, posits that “where you stand depends on where you sit”.

¹⁰⁵ EOCOSC Note from the Secretariat on ‘Strengthening innovation, prioritization, informed decision-making and the integration of policy development processes for enhanced impact’ (E/C.16/2015/4), January 2015.

¹⁰⁶ Rumsfeld used the reference twice, in February and April 2002, a propos US decision-making on Iraq (specifically what was known about Iraq’s possession or not of weapons of mass destruction). He was actually quoting D.H. Lawrence’s poem, “New Heaven and New Earth”: “Ha, I was a blaze leaping up! I was a tiger bursting into sunlight. I was greedy, I was mad for the unknown. I, new-risen, resurrected, starved from the tomb starved from a life of devouring always myself now here was I, new-awakened, with my hand stretching out and touching the unknown, the real unknown, the unknown unknown”.

¹⁰⁷ Author Interviews

¹⁰⁸ (<http://data.un.org>)

¹⁰⁹ The experiences of documenting and publishing (or not) casualty figures in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Syria respectively remind us of the pitfalls.

¹¹⁰ Hochschild

¹¹¹ Not just: what do we know? what needs to happen? what does the UN need to do? what does it need to ask others to do? what options do we have? what evidence do we have to support the alternative options? what capacity does the system have to implement? But also: what is the right thing to do? what do Member States expect? what will they do? whose interests will be affected and how will they react? what are the risks? who are the spoilers? What will it cost and who will pay?

¹¹² Goulding, Marrack. Peacemonger, 2003, p. 7.

¹¹³ Poliheuristic theory

¹¹⁴ Munich - - Rwanda – Mintz p. 104

¹¹⁵ Relyea, Harold C. (March 17, 2008). “The Executive Office of the President: An Historical Overview”

<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-606.pdf>

¹¹⁶ See: Atkinson, David and Emma Trusswell. Supporting Heads of Government. A comparison across six countries, Institute for Government, Working Paper, June 2011. Also: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privy_Council_Office_\(Canada\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privy_Council_Office_(Canada))

¹¹⁷ This field of study focuses on what the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (<http://www.bti-project.org/index/>) calls the “steering capacity,” or the ability to set priorities, coordinate, and follow through. Research focuses on the division of responsibility and in decision making procedures, the degree to which procedures provide adequate notice of expectations to ensure leaders are not caught off guard, mechanisms for assigning responsibility where the division of responsibility is unclear or disputed, rules about appointments and retrenchment that lessen competition for control of the centre while addressing the need for constituent service, efforts to build the capacity of ministers’ offices, etc. See Widener. Princeton. Also see, for example, Nick Manning and Gord Evans, “Helping Governments Keep Their Promises: Making Ministers and Governments More Reliable Through Improved Policy Management,” World Bank IDP-187 (April 2003).

<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/unpan/unpan013906.pdf>. The Africa Governance Initiative, SIGMA (an OECD initiative now closed), and the Inter-American Development Bank also contribute cases and insight on this topic. The Cabinet offices of Canada and New Zealand have also issued useful manuals detailing the principles and procedures of cabinet decision-making (get citations).

¹¹⁸ Widner; Gordon Evans

¹¹⁹ See: Atkinson, David and Emma Trusswell. Supporting Heads of Government. A comparison across six countries, Institute for Government, Working Paper, June 2011

(<http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Supporting%20Heads%20of%20Government.pdf>)

¹²⁰ Rhodes R.A.W., Anne Tiernan The Gatekeepers: Lessons from prime ministers’ chiefs of staff, Melbourne University Press, 2014

¹²¹ Widner, Jennifer. Governance in Practice: the role of cabinet offices in shaping policy implementation. Brownbag presentation at the UN [2010 or so].

¹²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabinet_Office

¹²³ https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60745/Cabinet-Office_0_0.pdf

¹²⁴ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldconst/30/3004.htm>

¹²⁵ See: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop> and also: Wikipedia:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Office_of_the_President

¹²⁶ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-tries-for-a-leaner-national-security-council/2015/06/22/22ef7e52-1909-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html

¹²⁷ Specific offices within the White House include the office of the Chief of Staff, the National Security Adviser (the NSC alone has a staff of about 200 – check), Domestic Policy, the National Economic Council, Cabinet Affairs, Legislative

- Affairs, Communications, Operations, Scheduling and Advance, Political Strategy and Outreach, Management and Administration, Information Technology, Digital Strategy, and the White House Counsel.
- ¹²⁸ House of Lords, Constitution Committee - Fourth Report, The Cabinet Office and the Centre of Government, Session 2009-10 (<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldconst/30/3004.htm>)
- ¹²⁹ Schafer, Mark. Groupthink versus High Quality Decision Making in International Relations, Columbia University Press, New York, 2010, p. 30-31
- ¹³⁰ Pettigrew, Andrew M. The Politics of Organizational Decision-Making, 2014, p. 235
- ¹³¹ Pettigrew, Andrew M. The Politics of Organizational Decision-Making, 2014, p. 235
- ¹³² White House transition paper (get full title), page 12.
<http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/resources/briefing/WH2001WHW.PDF>
- ¹³³ Margaret G. Hermann and Thomas Preston, 'Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements Author(s)', Political Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 1, Special Issue: Political Psychology and the Work of Alexander L. George (Mar., 1994), pp. 75-96
- ¹³⁴ Rothkopf, David. Running the World. The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, 2005, p. 458
- ¹³⁵ "Yes, Prime Minister: A Victory for Democracy (#1.6)" (1986)
- ¹³⁶ t'Hart 1990, Kranser 1972, Brecher 2008
- ¹³⁷ Evans, Alexander. Organizing for British National Strategy, International Affairs 90: 3, 2014, p. 511
- ¹³⁸ Puri, Hardeep. <http://www.ipsnews.net/2015/06/the-u-n-at-70-a-time-for-reflection-and-reform/>
- ¹³⁹ See: Atkinson, David and Emma Trusswell. Supporting Heads of Government. A comparison across six countries, Institute for Government, Working Paper, June 2011
(<http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Supporting%20Heads%20of%20Government.pdf>)
- ¹⁴⁰ The Government of Singapore has a Centre for Strategic Futures in the Prime Minister's office (which planned for twenty years for the death of Lee Kwan Yew, envisaging many different scenarios), a Policy Planning Unit in 10 Downing Street, a PPU in the State Department ... List more.
- ¹⁴¹ Drezner, Daniel W. (ed.) Avoiding trivia: the role of strategic planning in American foreign policy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2009).
- ¹⁴² The role of the CPC in establishing priorities is covered elsewhere in the volume
- ¹⁴³ Angela Kane quoted in Barbara Crossette, [Angela Kane Is Leaving the UN in a Political Shuffle](http://passblue.com/2015/03/02/angela-kane-is-leaving-the-un-in-a-political-shuffle/), Pass Blue, March 2, 2015 (<http://passblue.com/2015/03/02/angela-kane-is-leaving-the-un-in-a-political-shuffle/>)
- ¹⁴⁴ For instance, ORCI, EISAS, SPU (although this was accepted and established; it lasted for the better part of 2 decades before largely dissolving towards the end of Ban Ki-Moon's term. A smaller policy unit was also largely dissolved around the same time).
- ¹⁴⁵ Lynn, Jonathan and Antony Jay. The Complete Yes Minister, BBC Books, 1989, p. 39
- ¹⁴⁶ The process is usually thought to involve four main stages: 1) intelligence (collect the information and identify or "frame" the problem; 2) design (identify alternatives and select criteria); 3) choice (use the alternatives to select a course of action); and 4) implementation (put the decision into effect and allocate resources) (Mintz, page 17).
- ¹⁴⁷ This is the "bounded rationality" or cybernetic model of decision-making.
- ¹⁴⁸ Guehenno, Jean-Marie. The Fog of Peace, Brookings Institution Press, May 2015
- ¹⁴⁹ Cox and Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence (1973), page 3. The study broke decisions into seven major categories: representational (concerning membership in the organization and representation on internal bodies), symbolic (tests of how goals and opinions are aligned), boundary (concerning the organization's relations and division of labour with other organizations), programmatic (the strategic allocation of resources among different types of activity), rule-creating (defining the rules or norms bearing on matters within the substance scope of the organization), rule-supervisory (monitoring and applying those rules and norms), and operational (providing of services by the organization and/or use of its resources). They also classify the actors involved according to seven categories: 1. representatives of national governments (who may be appointed by various ministries), 2. representatives of national and international private associations (including interest groups and commercial enterprises), 3. the executive heads of organisations, 4. high officials and other members of the bureaucracy of each organisation, 5. individuals who serve in their own capacity, formally or informally, as advisers, 6. representatives of other international organisations, and 7. employees of the mass media.
- ¹⁵⁰ Cox and Jacobson 1973, 12
- ¹⁵¹ Gordenker 2005, 4; 76 cited in Kille, Kent. From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 27 July 2015.
- ¹⁵² Lynn, Jonathan and Antony Jay. The Complete Yes Minister, BBC Books, 1989, p. 300
- ¹⁵³ Mark Moore has articulated the challenge thus: "the strategic problem for public managers [is to] imagine and articulate a vision of public value that can command legitimacy and support, and is operationally doable in the domain for which you have responsibility" His theory is that functional organizations maximise the overlap between these three circles, whereas dysfunctional organizations do not have much convergence in the "strategic triangle". For the UN, this "strategic triangle" can easily be understood as including Member States and the mandates they provide (the authorizing environment), the organization's mission and values (the Charter, the central tenets of international law), and, thirdly, the Secretariat and wide UN system (capacity). Mark Moore, 'Creating Public Value.
- ¹⁵⁴ Nadler, Daniel A. and Michael L. Tushman, Frameworks for Organizational Behaviour in: Managing Organizations: Readings and Cases, Little, Brown and Co., 1980, p. 38.
- ¹⁵⁵ Thematic Evaluation of UN Coordinating Bodies, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, April 2009 (E.A.C.51/2009/6)
- ¹⁵⁶ Conor Cruise O'Brien and [Topolski]. United Nations: Sacred Drama, 1969, p. 299

- ¹⁵⁷ Inis Claude long ago coined the idea of two UNs and the third UN is a more recent addition by Weiss and Carayannis.
- ¹⁵⁸ Bode, Ingvild Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations: The People of the United Nations Routledge Research on the United Nations. Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge. 2015
- ¹⁵⁹ Bode, Ingvild Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations: The People of the United Nations Routledge Research on the United Nations. Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge. 2015
- ¹⁶⁰ Bennis, Phyllis. Calling the Shots. How Washington Dominates Today's UN, 1996, p. 47.
- ¹⁶¹ Childers, Erskine and Brian Urquhart, A World in Need of Leadership. Tomorrow's United Nations, 1990, Introduction. (http://www.daghammarskjold.se/wp-content/uploads/1990/08/90_1-2.pdf)
- ¹⁶² Finkelstein, Lawrence S. The Coordinative Function of the UN Secretary-General in: Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker (eds), The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General, 1993, p. 67
- ¹⁶³ Luck, Ed. Reforming the UN: Lessons from a History in Progress, International Relations Studies and the United Nations, Occasional Papers, 2003, No. 1 (<http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/373430132.pdf>)
- ¹⁶⁴ Rivlin, Benjamin. 1993, p. 5
- ¹⁶⁵ Mathiason, John. Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics, Kumarian Press, 2007.
- ¹⁶⁶ Hammarskjold, Dag. The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fct. Lecture Delivered to Congregation at Oxford University, 30 May 1961 (<http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/docs/internationalcivilservant.pdf>)
- ¹⁶⁷ Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, and Richard Jolly The Third UN
- ¹⁶⁸ These sources of authority are very well explained in Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics, Cornell University Press, 2004, chapters 1 and 2.
- ¹⁶⁹ Both quotes are from Tharoor, Shashi. 'The "Most Impossible Job" Job Description' in: Chesterman, Simon (ed). Secretary or General ? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, CUP, 2007, p. 35
- ¹⁷⁰ Cite Relevant study
- ¹⁷¹ The UN has 106,000 peacekeepers across a total of 11 million km2 in peacekeeping 16 operations. It also has XX civilians in peace operations (both peacekeeping and political missions). It is the second largest deployer of troops after the United States (<http://cpr.unu.edu/the-high-level-panel-and-the-prospects-for-reform-of-un-peace-operations.html>)
- ¹⁷² Author interviews
- ¹⁷³ Author interviews
- ¹⁷⁴ Urquhart, Hammarskjold, p 18
- ¹⁷⁵ Among the many excellent memoirs and biographies consulted were [list them]. Finally, Kille, Kent performed a leadership trait analysis based mostly on various public statements made by each SG. See: From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 26 July 2015.
- ¹⁷⁶ Kille, Kent. From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 26 July 2015.
- ¹⁷⁷ Kille, Kent. From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 26 July 2015.
- ¹⁷⁸ Mathiason, John. Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics, Kumarian Press, 2007. Chapter 2.
- ¹⁷⁹ Bode, Ingvild Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations: The People of the United Nations Routledge Research on the United Nations. Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge. 2015
- ¹⁸⁰ See for instance the press coverage about the relationship between Jim Kim, President of the World Bank, and the staff: Andrew Rice, Is Jim Kim Destroying the World Bank — or Saving it From Itself?. Foreign Policy (US), 29/04/2016.
- ¹⁸¹ Mathiason, John. Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics, Kumarian Press, 2007. Page 82
- ¹⁸² The role of Secretary-General has been analysed in great depth elsewhere and this paper won't repeat the excellent points made in the writings of Urquhart, Franck, Rivlin, Gordenker, Sutterlin, Traub, Chesterman and others
- ¹⁸³ Rivlin 1995, 84
- ¹⁸⁴ See: Character Sketch of Lie on <http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/trygvie-lie.asp>
- ¹⁸⁵ Kent, 2006. P.34-36.
- ¹⁸⁶ Mouat, p. 47.
- ¹⁸⁷ Meisler, Stanley. The United Nations. The First Fifty Years, p. 34
- ¹⁸⁸ Mouat pg. 20 fn 10
- ¹⁸⁹ Thant, p. 22
- ¹⁹⁰ Urquhart, p. 115
- ¹⁹¹ See: Character Sketch of Lie on <http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/trygvie-lie.asp>
- ¹⁹² From the UN Archives, 113th private meeting in the Secretary-General's office at Lake Success on Thursday, 22 April 1948.
- ¹⁹³ Ben Atkinson Wortley. The United Nations, the First Ten Years. Manchester University Press, 1974, page 95-96
- ¹⁹⁴ Urquhart, p. 104
- ¹⁹⁵ Myint-U, Thant. The Next Secretary-General, Secretariat Reform, And the Vexed Question of Senior Appointments (http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/sec_general_vexed_thant_min_u_apr11.pdf)
- ¹⁹⁶ The UN departments in Lie's time were thus as follows: 1) Security Council and Political Affairs (Russia) (Arkady Sobolev, then Constantin Zinchenko); 2) Economic Affairs (UK) (David Owen); 3) Social Affairs (France) (Henri Laugier); 4) Trusteeship and Information (Republic of China (Taiwan)) (Victor Hoo); 5) Legal (US) (Feller, until his suicide over the McCarthy saga); 6) Public Information; 7) Conference and General Services; 8) Administration and Financial Services (USA) (first John Hutson, then Price).
- ¹⁹⁷ Ben Atkinson Wortley. The United Nations, the First Ten Years. Manchester University Press, 1974, page 95-96
- ¹⁹⁸ Urquhart, p. 116 and 104.

- ¹⁹⁹ Schevchenko, Arkady N. *Breaking with Moscow*, Ballantine books, New York, 1985, p. 301
- ²⁰⁰ Schevchenko, Arkady N. *Breaking with Moscow*, Ballantine books, New York, 1985, p. 296
- ²⁰¹ Myint-U Thant and Amy Scott, *The UN Secretariat: A Brief History*, International Peace Academy, 2006 p. 26
- ²⁰² Myint-U, Thant. *The Next Secretary-General, Secretariat Reform, And the Vexed Question of Senior Appointments*
- ²⁰³ *Reflections*, *The New Yorker*, 25 September 1989, p. 63
- ²⁰⁴ Mathiason, John. *Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics*, Kumarian Press, 2007. Page 43.
- ²⁰⁵ Urquhart, Brian. *A Life in Peace and War*, 1987, p. 103.
- ²⁰⁶ Urquhart, Hammar skjöld, p. 77
- ²⁰⁷ Urquhart, Brian. *A Life in Peace and War*, 1987, p. 103.
- ²⁰⁸ From the UN Archives, private meeting in the Secretary-General's office, September 1952.
- ²⁰⁹ Urquhart, p. 116 and 104. And: Character Sketch of Lie on <http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/trygvie-lie.asp>
- ²¹⁰ Urquhart, Hammar skjöld, p. 51
- ²¹¹ Heller, Peter B., *The United Nations under Dag Hammar skjöld, 1953-1961*, p. 25
- ²¹² Hazzard, Shirley. *Breaking the Faith – I. Reflections*, *The New Yorker*, 25 September 1989, p. 78
- ²¹³ *Reflections*, *The New Yorker*, 25 September 1989, p. ...
- ²¹⁴ Urquhart, p. 108
- ²¹⁵ Described in Urquhart and also here: In the summer of 1946, we went to Geneva for the final conferences of the League of Nations and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the immense, American-led reconstruction operation that began to put the war-shattered world on its feet again. UNRRA was headed by Fiorello LaGuardia, the famously eccentric former mayor of New York City. In the ghastly Palais des Nations in Geneva, former home of the League of Nations, there is a small private elevator originally intended to take the president of the League of Nations Assembly to the podium of the Assembly Hall. On the way to the UNRRA meeting, Lie and LaGuardia, whose combined weight must have approached 500 pounds, both claimed this small and uncertain vehicle as their personal right. Neither would give way and, against all advice, they squeezed into it together. When the doors closed on the competitive statesmen, the elevator, instead of rising, descended slowly out of sight. In the stricken silence that followed, multilingual imprecations arose from the depths. Tweedledum and Tweedledee came to mind. A Swiss engineer was summoned, and the elevator was cranked up to its original position to release its disheveled cargo. The conference started late. (<http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/trygvie-lie.asp>)
- ²¹⁶ Chandran, Rahul. *Governance of the United Nations Development System*, 2015, para 8.
- ²¹⁷ Sharp, Walter. 'The Specialized Agencies and the UN: Progress Report I' in 'International Organization', 1947. Cited in Chandran, para 9.
- ²¹⁸ Luck, Ed. *Reforming the UN: Lessons from a History in Progress*, *International Relations Studies and the United Nations*, Occasional Papers, 2003, No. 1 (<http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/373430132.pdf>). P. 17.
- ²¹⁹ From the UN Archives, Secretary-General's private meeting, held in the Secretary-General's Conference Room, Palais de Chaillot, Friday 21 December 1951.
- ²²⁰ From the UN Archives, 113th private meeting in the Secretary-General's office at Lake Success on Thursday, 22 April 1948.
- ²²¹ From the UN Archives, Secretary-General's private meeting held in the Secretary-General's conference room at Headquarters on Monday, 13 April 1953
- ²²² Lipsey, Roger. Hammar skjöld. *A Life*, 2014. Page 117-8
- ²²³ As recalled by Wilhelm Wachtmeister in: Dag Hammar skjöld remembered. A collection of Personal Memories, Dag Hammar skjöld Foundation, December 2011, p. 84
- ²²⁴ Kyle, Keith. *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East*, I.B. Tauris, 2011
- ²²⁵ Franck, Thomas. *Nation against Nation*, 1985. p. 85.
- ²²⁶ Urquhart, Hammar skjöld, 1984, p. 12.
- ²²⁷ James, Alan. *The Secretary-General as an Independent Political Actor*, in *The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General* by Benjamin Rivlin, Leon Gordenker, p. 26.
- ²²⁸ Hazzard, Shirley. *Breaking the Faith – I. Reflections*, *The New Yorker*, 25 September 1989, p. 83
- ²²⁹ Chesterman (ed), p. 23.
- ²³⁰ Kille, Kent. *From Manager to Visionary*.
- ²³¹ Hammar skjöld's statement to the press upon landing at Idlewild airport to take up his new role, 9 April 1953. Cited in Mathiason, John. *Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics*, Kumarian Press, 2007. p. 49.
- ²³² Urquhart, p. 125
- ²³³ Mathiason, John. *Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics*, Kumarian Press, 2007. p. 50
- ²³⁴ Thant, p. 37
- ²³⁵ Mathiason, John. *Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics*, Kumarian Press, 2007. p. 52
- ²³⁶ Cordier comment in Mouat, p. 54
- ²³⁷ Rikhye in Mouat, p. 88
- ²³⁸ Urquhart, Brian E. *Ralph Bunche. An American Life*, 1993, p. 348.
- ²³⁹ Dag Hammar skjöld remembered. A collection of Personal Memories, Dag Hammar skjöld Foundation, December 2011, p. 35
- ²⁴⁰ Heller, Peter B., *The United Nations under Dag Hammar skjöld, 1953-1961*, p. 25
- ²⁴¹ ref 1954 circular – see BU biog
- ²⁴² Kyle, Keith. *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East*, I.B. Tauris, 2011
- ²⁴³ Hazzard, Shirley. *Breaking the Faith – I. Reflections*, *The New Yorker*, 25 September 1989, p. 81
- ²⁴⁴ Kennedy, Michael and Art Magennis. *Ireland, the United Nations and the Congo*, Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2014, Introduction.

- ²⁴⁵ Kille, Kent. From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 26 July 2015.
- ²⁴⁶ Lipsey, Roger. Hammarskjöld. A Life, 2014. Chapter 1.
- ²⁴⁷ Address to the Swedish Academy (20 December 1954)
- ²⁴⁸ As recalled by Wilhelm Wachtmeister in: Dag Hammarskjöld remembered. A collection of Personal Memories, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, December 2011, p. 83
- ²⁴⁹ Lipsey, Roger. Hammarskjöld. A Life, 2014. Page 250
- ²⁵⁰ As recalled by his Secretary, Hannah Platz, whom he referred to as “Milady” in: Dag Hammarskjöld remembered. A collection of Personal Memories, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, December 2011, p. 95
- ²⁵¹ Gordenker quoted in Mouat, p. 89
- ²⁵² Kille, Kent. From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 26 July 2015.
- ²⁵³ Daws & Sievers, p. 162
- ²⁵⁴ Thant, p. 31 on Dag. Urquhart on Lie.
- ²⁵⁵ Hammarskjöld statement on ONUC at end of General Debate, October 1960, from Public Papers of the Secretaries General of the United Nations. Volume 5, By Andrew W. Cordier, Dag Hammarskjöld, Wilder Foote, p. 203
- ²⁵⁶ As recalled by Wilhelm Wachtmeister in: Dag Hammarskjöld remembered. A collection of Personal Memories, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, December 2011, p. 84
- ²⁵⁷ Hochschild, Fabrizio ‘Leadership in the United Nations and the Challenge of Courage’ (publication forthcoming), 2016
- ²⁵⁸ Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 80
- ²⁵⁹ Schevchenko, Arkady N. Breaking with Moscow, Ballantine books, New York, 1985, p. 395
- ²⁶⁰ Thant, p. 27
- ²⁶¹ From Per Lind interview in UN Oral History project, (<http://www.unmultimedia.org/oralhistory/2011/10/lind-per/>)
- ²⁶² Lipsey, Roger. Hammarskjöld. A Life, 2014. Page 135.
- ²⁶³ As recalled by Wilhelm Wachtmeister in: Dag Hammarskjöld remembered. A collection of Personal Memories, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, December 2011, p. 84
- ²⁶⁴ Urquhart, Lipsey
- ²⁶⁵ Lipsey, Roger. Hammarskjöld. A Life, 2014. Page 137
- ²⁶⁶ Conor Cruise O’Brien cited in Hazzard, Shirley. Breaking the Faith – I. Reflections, The New Yorker, 25 September 1989
- ²⁶⁷ Myint-U, Thant. The Next Secretary-General, Secretariat Reform, And the Vexed Question of Senior Appointments
- ²⁶⁸ Dag Hammarskjöld to the General Assembly in November 1957, cited in Heller, Peter B., The United Nations under Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1961, p. 25
- ²⁶⁹ Pandit, Pearson & Belaunde. Described in Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 525.
- ²⁷⁰ Thant, p. 31
- ²⁷¹ Hammarskjöld Speech at University of Chicago Law School, May 1, 1960 (doc. SGI910) Cited in Childers & Urquhart, 1990.
- ²⁷² From the UN Archives: Notes from EOSG to the SG on Forthcoming ACC Meeting, 2 October 1956, para 5.
- ²⁷³ Dag Hammarskjöld press conference, 4 February 1960, (<http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/time1960.htm>)
- ²⁷⁴ Hazzard, Shirley. Breaking the Faith – I. Reflections, The New Yorker, 25 September 1989, p. 80
- ²⁷⁵ Gerbert, Andrew A Time of Hope. Conversations with Early Staffers of the UN, 2005(<http://www.sgquarterly.org/feature2005Oct-3.html>)
- ²⁷⁶ His selection came after the USSR dropped its insistence on a troika leadership and compromised with the U.S. on the number and authority of assistant secretaries (The U S wanted five, one each from the U.S., Russia, Latin America, Africa and Western Europe; the Soviet Union wanted Eastern Europe be included or Western Europe dropped and wanted each to be given virtual veto power). U Thant finally won the right to pick as many assistants as he saw fit, agreed to consult with them over policy, but would not be bound by the advice they gave.
- ²⁷⁷ Dorn, Walter. Unsung Mediator. U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2009. Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 2009). (http://walterdorn.net/pdf/CubanMissileCrisis-UnsungMediator_Dorn-Pauk_DiplHistory_Vol33No2_Apr2009.pdf)
- ²⁷⁸ From declassified internal US papers in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969-1972, GAO.
- ²⁷⁹ U Thant, View from the UN: the Memoirs of U Thant, p. 35
- ²⁸⁰ Yale Oral History Interview with: Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Perm Rep of Argentina during U Thant and Waldheim years (http://s3.amazonaws.com/downloads2.unmultimedia.org/public/dhl_oral_history/transcripts/OrtizdeRozas30Oct90TRANS.pdf)
- ²⁸¹ U Thant, View from the UN: the Memoirs of U Thant, p. 33
- ²⁸² On May 18, 1967, Egypt's Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad cabled U Thant and asked for the termination of UNEF stationed in the Gaza Strip, Sharm el-Sheikh and on the Sinai border since December 1956. Riad asked that the Force be withdrawn as soon as possible. A day later, without consulting Israel, U Thant agreed that Egypt had the right to demand that the Force be withdrawn. On May 19, 1967, the UN flag was taken down in Gaza, the Force ceased its operations and awaited its repatriation. See: UN Emergency Force (UNEF): Report of the Secretary-General on UNEF Withdrawal (June 26, 1967)
- ²⁸³ Rikhye in Mouat, p. 119
- ²⁸⁴ George Sherry cited in Mouat, p. 122.
- ²⁸⁵ James, Alan. The Secretary-General as an Independent Political Actor, in The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General : Making "the Most ...By Benjamin Rivlin, Leon Gordenker, p. 27.
- ²⁸⁶ Urquhart, Brian E. Ralph Bunche. An American Life, 1993, p. 348.

- 287 U Thant, View from the UN: the Memoirs of U Thant, p. 31
- 288 The London Observer, cited in U Thant, View from the UN: the Memoirs of U Thant, p. 6
- 289 Time Magazine, November 10, 1961, Neutralist with Moral Fiber. The UN's Acting Secretary-General U Thant. (<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/150/32779.html>)
- 290 Urquhart, Brian E. Ralph Bunche. An American Life, 1993, p. 348.
- 291 Thant, p. 50
- 292 U Thant cited in Thant, p. 52.
- 293 Rikhye in Mouat, p. 102
- 294 Urquhart, Brian. A Life in Peace and War, 1987, p. 205
- 295 Myint-U, Thant. The Next Secretary-General, Secretariat Reform, And the Vexed Question of Senior Appointments
- 296 Kille, Kent. From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 26 July 2015.
- 297 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969-1972, GAO pages 473-6
- 298 Mathiason, John. Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics, Kumarian Press, 2007. p. 84
- 299 Thant, p. 40
- 300 Thant, p. 46.
- 301 Thant, p. 52
- 302 Thant, p. 52
- 303 Mouat, p. 99
- 304 Thant, p. 42
- 305 Thant, p. 43
- 306 Chandran, para 10
- 307 U Thant, View from the UN: the Memoirs of U Thant, p. 452.
- 308 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969-1972, GAO pages 455-
- 309 Thant, p. 45.
- 310 Jackson cited in Mathiason, p. 206
- 311 Anstee, Margaret. Never Learn to Type. A Woman at the United Nations, 2003, p. 264-5.
- 312 Yale Oral History Interview with: Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Perm Rep of Argentina during U Thant and Waldheim years (http://s3.amazonaws.com/downloads2.unmultimedia.org/public/dhl_oral_history/transcripts/OrtizdeRozas30Oct90TRANS.pdf)
- 313 Schevchenko, Arkady N. Breaking with Moscow, Ballantine books, New York, 1985, p. 396. The Soviet Union at that time had a quota of 250 Soviet officials in the Secretariat, which Waldheim permitted them to fill.
- 314 Author interview, Dublin, June 2015
- 315 Schevchenko, p. 397; Mouat, p. 169.
- 316 UNEF II, UNDOF, UNIFIL
- 317 Daws, Sam and Loraine Sievers. The Procedure of the UN Security Council. Oxford University Press, [year], p. 166
- 318 Thant, p. 63.
- 319 Mouat, p. 136
- 320 Finger and Menon (Waldheim's speechwriter) in Mouat, pages 132 and 136.
- 321 Williwam Schaufele Jr. cited in Mouat, p. 170
- 322 Shevchenko, 1985, p. 394
- 323 Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, p. 229
- 324 Mouat, p. 170
- 325 Thant, p. 65
- 326 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. A Dangerous Place, 1975, p. 83
- 327 Kille, Kent. From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 26 July 2015.
- 328 For a fascinating series of internal memos on this see: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969-1972, GAO pages 455-475.
- 329 It was staffed by very capable people who would go on to long UN careers and were or are known to many of us: F.T Liu, George Sherry, Lisa Buttenheim, Jean-Claude Aime, Virendra Dayal, James Jonah (See Thant, p. 64).
- 330 Thant, p. 60
- 331 Schevchenko, 1985, p. 331
- 332 Mouat, p. 136
- 333 Schevchenko, 1985.
- 334 Shevchenko, 1985, p. 394-95
- 335 From the UN Archives, notes of the Secretary-General's meetings with ASGs/USGs (Series).
- 336 General Assembly Resolution 32/197. For a fuller account see Finkelstein. Also Thant, p. 66-67.
- 337 Childers, Erskine and Brian Urquhart, Reviewing the UN System, 1994, p 83
- 338 Luck, Ed, 2003, pages 25-6.
- 339 Mathiason, John. Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics, Kumarian Press, 2007. p. 80
- 340 Finkelstein, Lawrence S. The Coordinative Function of the UN Secretary-General in: Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker (eds), The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General, 1993, p. 63
- 341 Mathiason, John. Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics, Kumarian Press, 2007. p. 126
- 342 Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, p. 231
- 343 General Assembly resolution 2816 set up the UN Disaster Relief Office. In 1992 DHA was created and in 1997 OCA.

- ³⁴⁴ In 1984 the Office of Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA) was set up to deal with the drought which actually affected 20 countries and 35 million people across the Sahel
- ³⁴⁵ Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier. *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 1997, p. 26.
- ³⁴⁶ Mouat, p. 238.
- ³⁴⁷ UNTAG, UNTAC
- ³⁴⁸ Author interview, Dublin, June 2015
- ³⁴⁹ Malone, David in Mouat, p. 237
- ³⁵⁰ Picco in Mouat, p. 187.
- ³⁵¹ Mouat, p. 226.
- ³⁵² Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier. *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 1997, p. 168.
- ³⁵³ Mouat, p. 206
- ³⁵⁴ Malone, David in Mouat, p. 237
- ³⁵⁵ Kille, Kent. *From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-General of the United Nations*. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 26 July 2015.
- ³⁵⁶ Author interview, Dublin, June 2015
- ³⁵⁷ Urquhart, A *Life in Peace and War*, p. 334
- ³⁵⁸ Author interview, Dublin, June 2015
- ³⁵⁹ Mouat, p. 238.
- ³⁶⁰ UN Chronicle, Vpl L11, Numbers 1 and 2, 2015, page 11.
- ³⁶¹ In Mouat (p.186, p. 239). PdC himself recalls: “The diplomatic missions have always felt that security in the secretariat is lax and that any confidential information provided to the Secretariat would quickly be widely circulated. In general this is true; however, in the SG’s Office, any information given me in confidence was handled with great discretion. This was a major reason why, in dealing with sensitive problems, I relied on the support of a very small staff in whose loyalty I had complete confidence. Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier. *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 1997, p. 168.
- ³⁶² Mouat, p 186
- ³⁶³ From oral history ACUNS/Yale
- ³⁶⁴ Mouat, p. 239
- ³⁶⁵ UNTSO, UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNFICYP, UNMOGIP
- ³⁶⁶ Goulding describes one incident in 1987 where the SG consciously excluded him from a lunch with Shimon Peres, then the Foreign Minister of Israel, thereby suggesting “he did not trust me” and creating a rift between him and the SG that would last some time. See: Goulding, p. 86-7.
- ³⁶⁷ Goulding, p.29
- ³⁶⁸ with Hedi Annabi as deputy and so titled because the UN did not recognize the Vietnamese puppet regime in Phnom Pen, although it played a political role
- ³⁶⁹ Thant, p. 75.
- ³⁷⁰ Goulding, Marack. *Peacemonger*, 2003, p. 3
- ³⁷¹ Perez de Cuellar, Javier. In his Cyril Foster Lecture at Oxford, 13 May 1986 on: The Role of the UN Secretary-General
- ³⁷² Perez de Cuellar, Javier. In his Cyril Foster Lecture at Oxford, 13 May 1986 on: The Role of the UN Secretary-General
- ³⁷³ Sutterlin, James. *The UN Secretary-General as Chief Administrator in: The Challenging Role of the UN SG*, eds Rivlin and Gordenker, p.57.
- ³⁷⁴ Mathiason, John. *Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics*, Kumarian Press, 2007. p. 63-4
- ³⁷⁵ Thant, p. 77
- ³⁷⁶ Mouat, p. 243
- ³⁷⁷ Thant, p. 75.
- ³⁷⁸ Thant, p. 82
- ³⁷⁹ Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier. *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 1997, p. 6.
- ³⁸⁰ Meisler, Stanley. *United Nations. The First Fifty Years*, p. 279
- ³⁸¹ New York Times. *The Mission Not Accepted By BARBARA CROSSETTE* Published: December 31, 1995 (<http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/31/weekinreview/the-world-the-mission-not-accepted.html>) and Boutros-Ghali's Query to Albright: 'What Went Wrong?' By BARBARA CROSSETTE Published: January 1, 1997 (<http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/01/world/boutros-ghali-s-query-to-albright-what-went-wrong.html>)
- ³⁸² Vianello-Chiodo, Marco, *Under-Soldier*,
- ³⁸³ Thant, p. 93
- ³⁸⁴ Thant, p. 93
- ³⁸⁵ Newman in Mouat, p. 249.
- ³⁸⁶ Author interview, Dublin, June 2015
- ³⁸⁷ Mouat, p. 282
- ³⁸⁸ Diego Arria cited in Mouat, p. 252
- ³⁸⁹ Gharekhan Chinmaya R, *The Horseshoe Table: An Inside View of the UN Security Council*, 2006, p. 25
- ³⁹⁰ Annan, Kofi with Nader Mousavizadeh, *‘Interventions. A Life in War and Peace’*. The Penguin Press, New York, 2012, p. 38
- ³⁹¹ Traub, James. *The Best Intentions. Kofi Anna and the UN in the Era of American World Power*, p. 54
- ³⁹² Malone, David in Mouat, p. 303
- ³⁹³ Meisler, Stanley. *United Nations. The First Fifty Years*, p. 280
- ³⁹⁴ Worthen, Molly. *The Man on Whom Nothing Was Lost: The Grand Strategy of Charles Hill*, p. 290.
- ³⁹⁵ Mouat, p. 301

- ³⁹⁶ de Soto in Mouat, p. 266
- ³⁹⁷ Mouat, p. 254
- ³⁹⁸ Kille, Kent. From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 26 July 2015.
- ³⁹⁹ Sills, Jo cited in Mouat, p. 297
- ⁴⁰⁰ Preston, Julia. The UN's Peace Warrior, Washington Post 27 December 1993
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1993/12/27/the-uns-peace-warrior/de22f688-3e07-412e-a65b-2bb19ca41f54/>
- ⁴⁰¹ Worthen, Molly. The Man on Whom Nothing Was Lost: The Grand Strategy of Charles Hill, p. 290.
- ⁴⁰² Goulding, Peacemonger, p. 31.
- ⁴⁰³ Thant, p. 91
- ⁴⁰⁴ Kille, Kent. From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 27 July 2015, p.
- ⁴⁰⁵ Author interview, Greentree, February 2016
- ⁴⁰⁶ <https://newrepublic.com/article/91594/boutros-boutros-ghali-united-nations>
- ⁴⁰⁷ Luck, Ed. Reforming the UN: Lessons from a History in Progress, International Relations Studies and the United Nations, Occasional Papers, 2003, No. 1 (<http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/373430132.pdf>)
- ⁴⁰⁸ del Castillo Graciana, Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan, p. 163.
- ⁴⁰⁹ del Castillo Graciana, Guilty Party: The International Community in Afghanistan, p. 163.
- ⁴¹⁰ Meisler, Stanley. United Nations. The First Fifty Years, p. 284
- ⁴¹¹ DPA was a merger of ten pre-existing entities (some of them uneasy bedfellows to this day) while DPKO was created from the old Office for Special Political Affairs with the addition of some logistical support for peacekeeping that had been housed in the management department. The ten in DPA were: the old Soviet-headed Department of Security Council and Political Affairs, the Centre for Apartheid, the Division of Palestinian Rights, the Decolonization Division, the Office of Outer Space Affairs, the Office of Disarmament Affairs.
- ⁴¹² Goulding, Peacemonger, p. 31
- ⁴¹³ Bode, Ingvid Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations: The People of the United Nations Routledge Research on the United Nations. Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge. 2015, p. 122
- ⁴¹⁴ Goulding, Peacemonger, p. 31
- ⁴¹⁵ Mouat, p. 287
- ⁴¹⁶ Traub, James. The Best Intentions. Kofi Anna and the UN in the Era of American World Power, p. 73
- ⁴¹⁷ Mathiason, John. Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics, Kumarian Press, 2007. p. 144
- ⁴¹⁸ Mig Goulding, 'Practical Measures to Enhance the UN's Effectiveness in the Field of Peace and Security, 30 June 1997, para 27
- ⁴¹⁹ Mouat, p. 298
- ⁴²⁰ Meisler, Stanley. Insider : U.N. Leader May Be Digging In His Heels : Boutros-Ghali's plan to keep post irks, Washington. July 19, 1994, Los Angeles Times, 1994 http://articles.latimes.com/1994-07-19/news/wr-17289_1_boutros-boutros-ghali
- ⁴²¹ Thant, p. 95
- ⁴²² The best accounts include those by Traub, Jones, Melvern, DesForges, Prunier, Gourevitch and Barnett, although all have a slightly different take. The Carlsson report is a must-read: (<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC%20S19991257.pdf>). See also the Barnett piece on Council decision-making specifically: <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB472/Barnett.%20Michael%20-%20The%20United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20and%20Rwanda.pdf> New light is being shed all the time on the decision-making in capitals as the genocide unfolded, notably through recent declassifications of key US and French government documents.
- ⁴²³ Power, Samantha. Bystanders to Genocide. The Atlantic, September 2001
(<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/>)
- ⁴²⁴ Lynch, Column. 'Genocide Under Our Watch, Foreign Policy, April 2015
(<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/16/genocide-under-our-watch-rwanda-susan-rice-richard-clarke/>)
- ⁴²⁵ Cite Clinton's speech
- ⁴²⁶ Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics, Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 36
- ⁴²⁷ Jones, Bruce. Peacemaking in Rwanda. The Dynamics of Failure, Lynne Rienner 2001.
- ⁴²⁸ Grünfeld Frederik and Anke Huijboo The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007 , p. 48
- ⁴²⁹ Srebrenica report
- ⁴³⁰ Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics, Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 123
- ⁴³¹ Traub. The Best Intentions, p. 54
- ⁴³² See: Chinmaya R. Gharekhan The Horseshoe Table: An Inside View of the UN Security Council, pages 238-40
- ⁴³³ Uvin, Peter. Aiding Violence.
- ⁴³⁴ he suggested UNAMIR withdrawal and left himself on 21 April
- ⁴³⁵ He pushed to deal with the arms caches in advance of April and then pushed hard for reinforcements once the killing began.
- ⁴³⁶ Eckhard, get full cite

- ⁴³⁷ Dallaire disagreed and hadn't been seeking consent for the move but once instructed not to seize them, obeyed
- ⁴³⁸ Guehenno, Jean-Marie. *The Fog of Peace*, Brookings Institution Press, May 2015, p. 304
- ⁴³⁹ Traub, James, *The Secretary-General's Political Space*, in Chesterman (ed), page 185.
- ⁴⁴⁰ Author Interview (Louise Fréchette, Greentree, January 2016)
- ⁴⁴¹ Traub, James. *The Best Intentions*. Kofi Anna and the UN in the Era of American World Power, p. 70
- ⁴⁴² Author interview, Greentree, February 2016
- ⁴⁴³ John Ruggie quoted in: Eckhard, Frederic, Kofi Annan. *A Spokesman's Memoir*, p. 68
- ⁴⁴⁴ Eckhard in Mouat, p. 335
- ⁴⁴⁵ Author interview, Greentree, February 2016
- ⁴⁴⁶ Mouat, p. 107
- ⁴⁴⁷ Author interview, Greentree, February 2016
- ⁴⁴⁸ Author interview, Greentree, February 2016
- ⁴⁴⁹ Eckhard, Frederic, Kofi Annan. *A Spokesman's Memoir*, p. 24
- ⁴⁵⁰ Mig Gouding made a point of appreciating this change in his 1997 report on 'Practical Measures to Enhance the UN's Effectiveness in the Field of Peace and Security, 30 June 1997, para 34.
- ⁴⁵¹ Kille, Kent. *From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations*. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 26 July 2015.
- ⁴⁵² Author Interviews
- ⁴⁵³ Author Interview, London June 2015.
- ⁴⁵⁴ Weiss, Thomas cited in Mouat, p. 309
- ⁴⁵⁵ Author interview with Louise Fréchette, Greentree, February 2016 and Traub, James. *The Best Intentions*. Kofi Anna and the UN in the Era of American World Power, p. 92
- ⁴⁵⁶ Traub, James. *The Best Intentions*. Kofi Anna and the UN in the Era of American World Power, p. 230
- ⁴⁵⁷ Traub, James. *The Best Intentions*. Kofi Anna and the UN in the Era of American World Power, p. 229
- ⁴⁵⁸ Author interview at Greentree, February 2016
- ⁴⁵⁹ Author Interview London, June 2015.
- ⁴⁶⁰ Author interview, Greentree, February 2016
- ⁴⁶¹ Author interview, Greentree, February 2016
- ⁴⁶² Author Interview London, June 2015.
- ⁴⁶³ Williams, Abiodun, *Strategic Planning in the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General*, *Global Governance*, Vol. 16, No. 4, October – December 2010
- ⁴⁶⁴ Cite JIU report on strategic planning in UN system
- ⁴⁶⁵ Author Interview London, June 2015.
- ⁴⁶⁶ Traub, James. *The Best Intentions*. Kofi Anna and the UN in the Era of American World Power, p. 286-7
- ⁴⁶⁷ Traub, James. *The Best Intentions*. Kofi Anna and the UN in the Era of American World Power, p. 288
- ⁴⁶⁸ Author interviews
- ⁴⁶⁹ *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform*, UN Document A/51/950.
- ⁴⁷⁰ Traub, James. *The Best Intentions*. Kofi Anna and the UN in the Era of American World Power, p. 71
- ⁴⁷¹ Sutterlin in Mouat, p. 311
- ⁴⁷² <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/july-1997/un-reform-plan-will-provide-new-impetus-development#sthash.pe0k5NwH.dpuf>
- ⁴⁷³ Cited in Kille, page.
- ⁴⁷⁴ Eckhard, Frederic, Kofi Annan. *A Spokesman's Memoir*, p. 127
- ⁴⁷⁵ *Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization Worldwide*, A/60/692, 7 March 2006
- ⁴⁷⁶ *Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization Worldwide*, A/60/692, 7 March 2006
- ⁴⁷⁷ Malloch Brown, 'Can the UN be Reformed?', Holmes lecture to the annual meeting of the Academic Council on the UN system, 7 June 2007 (<http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic281297.files/Week05/Brown2007.pdf>)
- ⁴⁷⁸ Traub, James. *The Best Intentions*. Kofi Anna and the UN in the Era of American World Power, p. 293-4
- ⁴⁷⁹ Egeland, Jan. *A Billion Lives: An Eyewitness Report from the Frontlines of Humanity*, Simon and Schuster, 2008, page 12
- ⁴⁸⁰ Luck, Ed. *Reforming the UN: Lessons from a History in Progress*, *International Relations Studies and the United Nations*, *Occasional Papers*, 2003,, No. 1
- ⁴⁸¹ Eckhard, Frederic, Kofi Annan. *A Spokesman's Memoir*, p. 67
- ⁴⁸² Eckhard, Frederic, Kofi Annan. *A Spokesman's Memoir*, p. 126
- ⁴⁸³ Author Interview London, June 2015.
- ⁴⁸⁴ Eight pilot countries. Five pillars (Now applied in 44 countries but what difference has it made?)
- ⁴⁸⁵ The 2005 World Summit Outcome document invited the SG to strengthen the management and coordination of UN operational activities and to make proposals for consideration of Member States for more tightly managed entities in the field of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment. In response, Kofi Annan appointed the High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment. It finalized its report, "Delivering as One," in November 2006, just over a month before Annan would leave office.
- ⁴⁸⁶ Annan, Kofi. *We the Peoples*
- ⁴⁸⁷ McArthur, John W. *The Origins of the Millennium Development Goals*, p. 1.
- ⁴⁸⁸ Annan, Kofi with Nader Mousavizadeh, 'Interventions. A Life in War and Peace'. The Penguin Press, New York, 2012, p. 223.
- ⁴⁸⁹ Mouat, p.

- ⁴⁹⁰ Thomas L. Friedman argues that we hit an “inflection point” around 2007: ““In 2007, Apple came out with the iPhone, beginning the smartphone/apps revolution; in late 2006 Facebook opened its doors to anyone, not just college and high school students, and took off like a rocket; Google came out with the Android operating system in 2007; Hadoop launched in 2007, helping create the storage/processing power for the big data revolution; Github, launched in 2007, scaling open-source software; Twitter was spun off as its own separate platform in 2007. Amazon came out with the Kindle in 2007. Airbnb started in 2007. In short, on the eve of Obama’s presidency, something big happened: *Everything* started getting digitized and made mobile — work, commerce, billing, finance, education — reshaping the economy”. ‘Trump and the Lord’s Work’ in The New York Times, 3 May 2016 (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/opinion/trump-and-the-lords-work.html?_r=0)
- ⁴⁹¹ See: Bolton, John. *Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations*, year. Chapter He cites Condi Rice as saying “I am not sure we want a strong Secretary-General” (page 279) and also notes that he himself “was absolutely determined there weren’t going to be any more secular popes’ on the thirty-eighth floor” (page 282). Page 288
- ⁴⁹² Author interview
- ⁴⁹³ Among the high-level panels appointed by Ban over his ten years were panels on Access to Medicines; Global Response to Health Crises; High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing; High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO); Reviews of the UN peacebuilding architecture (2010 and 2015); Global Study on the Implementation of resolution 1325 ; 20 year review of the Beijing Platform for Action; High Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing ; High Level panel on global sustainability; High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis; Sustainable Transport; Technology Bank (?); Food Security; Post-2015 Development Agenda; Panel of inquiry on the Gaza Flotilla ; Gaza Board of Inquiry; Bhutto Commission ; Commission of Inquiry for Guinea.; [to complete this list].
- ⁴⁹⁴ Katz, Jonathan. The Secretary-General in his Labyrinth, The New Republic, 3 March 2015. The article also noted that “he had not gotten the job for his decisiveness or executive experience; as South Korea’s foreign minister, he’d earned the nickname *Ban-chusa*—roughly, “Ban the mid-level bureaucrat.” Yet this was the kind of decision he has faced consistently in eight years at the U.N. helm, and that U.N. leaders have faced for 70 years: how to balance competing desires for peace, human rights, and the rule of law, while placating the powers whose support the United Nations needs to survive” (<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121190/ban-ki-moon-profile-does-united-nations-still-matter>)
- ⁴⁹⁵ Myint-U, Thant. The Next Secretary-General, Secretariat Reform, And the Vexed Question of Senior Appointments
- ⁴⁹⁶ del Castillo and de Soto, 2015.
- ⁴⁹⁷ Jenkins, Rob.
- ⁴⁹⁸ Secretary-General speech to General Assembly April 2008
- ⁴⁹⁹ This is a core theory in: Cox, The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization’ (1969) 23(2) International Organization 205–30.
- ⁵⁰⁰ Kille, Kent. From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 26 July 2015.
- ⁵⁰¹ Kille, Kent. From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 27 July 2015, p. 219.
- ⁵⁰² Hochschild, Fabrizio. In and Above Conflict. A Study on Leadership in the United Nations, Geneva, July 2010, p. 106-7
- ⁵⁰³ Franck, Thomas. Nation Against Nation, p. p. 141.
- ⁵⁰⁴ Hazzard, Shirley. People in Glass Houses. Picador, 2004.
- ⁵⁰⁵ While the Clinton administration produced roughly three terabytes — or trillions of bytes — of records, including 20 million emails, the Bush administration eight years later had to transfer about 80 terabytes, including 200 million emails. Obama will turn over to his successor two and a half times as much: 200 terabytes. See ‘In an Age of Danger, an Early Start on Presidential Transitions’, New York Times, Thursday, 21 April 2016. (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/us/politics/in-an-age-of-terror-smoothing-the-transition-to-the-next-presidency.html?_r=0)
- ⁵⁰⁶ In 2013, the Secretary-General issued 102 reports to the Security Council and between 150-250 [precise # to follow] to the General Assembly
- ⁵⁰⁷ Stimson study, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Improving_Criminal_Accountability_June2009.pdf)
- ⁵⁰⁸ This has been noted by many colleagues who worked in the Organization in the 1990s and then spent time away before returning recently.
- ⁵⁰⁹ Statistics all come from internal EOSG and OSSG sources
- ⁵¹⁰ For more flavour of the frenetic pace of activity that this Secretary-General in particular has kept up for going on ten years now, an excellent video of his typical day during ministerial week can be found online (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUR0gzFg2ss>).
- ⁵¹¹ Although there is now a tendency to provide public read-outs of many private calls
- ⁵¹² From 1974-94, appointments of senior envoys tended to be initiated by the Security Council but since then they are almost always at the initiative of the Secretary-General (though in close consultation with the host government and the Council). See Daws, Sam and Loraine Sievers. The Procedure of the UN Security Council. Oxford University Press, [year], ‘The People’.
- ⁵¹³ Katz, Jonathan. The Secretary-General in his Labyrinth, The New Republic, 3 March 2015 (<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121190/ban-ki-moon-profile-does-united-nations-still-matter>)
- ⁵¹⁴ Crossette, Barbara. Ban’s Way, The Nation, 6 July 2009 (<http://www.thenation.com/article/bans-way/>)
- ⁵¹⁵ In fact, in its very first year at Lake Success, the Secretariat only had 500 staff. This was even smaller than the League of Nations – the first international secretariat – which had 630 at its 1929 height. See: Mathiason, John. Invisible Governance. International Secretariats in Global Politics, Kumarian Press, 2007. p. 4.

⁵¹⁶ Including the heads of all departments, the heads of agencies most answerable to the SG, all the Special Advisers at HQ and the SRSGs and other heads of mission in the field.

⁵¹⁷ UN Archives (https://archives.un.org/sites/archives.un.org/files/files/Finding%20Aids/2015_Finding_Aids/AG-011.pdf)

⁵¹⁸ See James Traub description of Riza in *The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power*, Chapter on ‘The Gentle King and His Court’.

⁵¹⁹ Among them the 1969 Capacity Study (also the Pearson report); the 1975 Gardner report; the 1979 Brandt Report; the 1986 Group of 18; the 1994 Childers and Urquhart report on Renewing the UN; the 1995 Commission on Global Governance; the 1996 Childers and Urquhart report on A World in Need of Leadership; the 1997 report of the Secretary-General on Renewing the United Nations; the 2004 High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change; the 2005 report of the Secretary-General on In Larger Freedom; the 2006 report of the High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence (Delivering as One); the 2015 HIPPO report.

⁵²⁰ 1991 Childers and Urquhart, 1992 Wilenksi Group Report on ‘Five Major Areas of Reform’

⁵²¹ Childers, Erskine and Brian Urquhart, *Renewing the UN System*, p. 158

⁵²² Childers, Erskine and Brian Urquhart, *Renewing the UN System*, p. 158

⁵²³ Mortimer and Lambert 1997, p. 19

⁵²⁴ Annan, Kofi *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform (A/51/950)* of 14 July 1997 and follow-up report of 7 October 1997 (A/51/950/Add.1). On 19 December 1997, the General Assembly established the post of Deputy Secretary-General, deciding “as an integral part of the Office of the Secretary-General, ... without prejudice to the mandate of the Secretary-General as provided by the Charter of the United Nations and, in accordance with the existing system of decision-making, with responsibilities delegated by the Secretary-General, including the following: (a) To assist the Secretary-General in managing the operations of the Secretariat; (b) To act for the Secretary-General at United Nations Headquarters in the absence of the Secretary-General and in other cases as may be decided by the Secretary-General; (c) To support the Secretary-General in ensuring intersectoral and inter-institutional coherence of activities and programmes and to support the Secretary-General in elevating the profile and leadership of the United Nations in the economic and social spheres, including further efforts to strengthen the United Nations as a leading centre for development policy and development assistance; (d) To represent the Secretary-General at conferences, official functions and ceremonial and other occasions as may be decided by the Secretary-General; (e) To undertake such assignments as may be determined by the Secretary-General” (A/RES/52/12B).

⁵²⁵ Chesterman final chapter

⁵²⁶ “Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization worldwide.” March 7th 2006

⁵²⁷ Center for UN Reform Education, *An Overview of U.N. Management Reform*, <http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/60>

⁵²⁸ Author interview, London June 2015.

⁵²⁹ Author interview, London June 2015.

⁵³⁰ An attempt to merge the Department for Disarmament Affairs into the Department of Political Affairs did not find favour with Member States

⁵³¹ This was a common observation in internal memos at the time, in particular in the context of a 2001-2 attempt to improve the efficiency of EOSG.

⁵³² This is true also of government. See Chapter 1: A Strategic Centre in: *Shaping Up. A Whitehall for the Future*. Institute for Government. <http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/shaping-up-a-whitehall-for-the-future.pdf>

⁵³³ Goulding, Marrack, ‘Practical Measures to Enhance the UN’s Effectiveness in the Field of Peace and Security, 30 June 1997, para 19.

⁵³⁴ Senior meetings chaired by the SG, Deputy-Secretary-General or Chef de Cabinet include the Policy Committee; Senior Action Group (SAG); Senior Advisers Meeting; Senior Management Group (SMG); Senior Advisers meeting on Management (core group); Senior Advisers meeting on Peace and Security (expanded group); Senior Advisers meeting on Development (core group); Senior Advisers meeting on Development (expanded group); Senior Advisers meeting on Management (core group); the Core Group (which focuses mostly on senior appointments).

⁵³⁵ Author interview

⁵³⁶ Author interview at Greentree, February 2016

⁵³⁷ This recommendation was made in the Brahimi report and again in the most recent report on peace operations (*Uniting our Strengths for Peace*, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO), June 2015 (http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf)). It has been made many other times [list].

⁵³⁸ The list of units that have been proposed or established to make sure that there is a central brain in the Secretariat that can filter and analysis information in a bureaucratically neutral way: ORCI; EISAS; PBSO; Policy Committee secretariat: PU analysis capacity etc.

⁵³⁹ Guehenno, Jean-Marie. *The Fog of Peace*, Brookings Institution Press, May 2015, p. 295

⁵⁴⁰ Hill, Charles. Letter to the Editor, *Wall Street Journal*, 30 December 1999

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB946504527554085868>

⁵⁴¹ The senior echelon at the UN which reports directly to the Secretary-General is composed of several types of official: the USG- and ASG-level special advisers, representatives and envoys who carry out good offices and diplomatic functions or advocate for certain thematic causes on behalf of the Secretary-General but who do not direct large departments; the heads of the major line departments in the Secretariat all of whom are USecretary-General level and who are responsible for implementing the work programme of the UN as contained in the Strategic Framework and; the heads of peace operations in the field who report through DPA or DPKO but are often serious heavyweights in their own right with direct access to the SG. The number of officials who sign compacts with the Secretary-General is XX.

- ⁵⁴² Myint-U, Thant. The Next Secretary-General, Secretariat Reform, And the Vexed Question of Senior Appointments (http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/sec_general_vexed_thant_min_u_apr11.pdf)
- ⁵⁴³ Transparency In The Selection And Appointment Of Senior Managers In The United Nations Secretariat 2011 https://www.unju.org/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_2011_2_English.pdf
- ⁵⁴⁴ Author interview, New York, 7 April 2015
- ⁵⁴⁵ A number of senior appointments are governed by specific General Assembly resolutions: Commissioner-General of UNRWA, High-Commissioner for Refugees, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Executive Director of UNEP, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Under Secretaries-General for Internal Oversight Services, UN Habitat, Safety and Security, UN Women and the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support. Various stipulations are placed on their appointment process ranging from term limits, due regard for equitable geographical representation or rotation, requirement for consultations with Member States and General Assembly approval or election of the nominee.
- ⁵⁴⁶ See for instance the interview with the incoming Undersecretary General for the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight, Heidi Mendoza, in which she describes the process by which she was hired: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTpWTFVjBqY> (transcript available).
- ⁵⁴⁷ See the 1for7billion campaign: <http://www.1for7billion.org/news/2014/12/3/top-un-appointments-should-be-based-on-merit-not-power-politics>
- ⁵⁴⁸ Transparency In The Selection And Appointment Of Senior Managers In The United Nations Secretariat 2011, Annex II https://www.unju.org/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_2011_2_English.pdf
- ⁵⁴⁹ Author interview
- ⁵⁵⁰ Holmes, John. The Politics of Humanity. The Reality of Relief Aid, Head of Zeus press, London, 2013, p. 328
- ⁵⁵¹ Holmes, John. The Politics of Humanity. The Reality of Relief Aid, Head of Zeus press, London, 2013, p. 2.
- ⁵⁵² Holmes, John. The Politics of Humanity. The Reality of Relief Aid, Head of Zeus press, London, 2013, p. 2.
- ⁵⁵³ Guehenno, Jean-Marie, The Fog of War, Brookings Institution Press, May 2015, Prologue
- ⁵⁵⁴ Goulding, Marrack. Peacemonger, 2003, p. 6.
- ⁵⁵⁵ Power, Samantha. Chasing the Flame. Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World, The Penguin Press, 2008, p. 63.
- ⁵⁵⁶ See Egeberg, M. (2006) 'Executive politics as usual: role behaviour and conflict dimensions in the College of European Commissioners', Journal of European Public Policy 13(1): 1–15 and Wonka, Arndt (2008) Decision-making dynamics in the European Commission: partisan, national or sectoral? Journal of European Public Policy 15:8 December 2008: 1145–1163
- ⁵⁵⁷ "Known as ministerial advisers in Australia and New Zealand, executive assistants in Canada and directeurs de cabinet in France, political advisers differ from civil servants in being appointed directly by ministers. They have close and direct access, their tenure depends on that of the minister, and they are exempt from the requirement to be impartial and non-partisan. The number of political advisers is increasing in Westminster systems but very little is known about their recruitment, roles, duties, interaction with the permanent civil service and effect on policy making" The number of special advisers in Whitehall doubled, from 38 under John Major to 81 under Tony Blair. In the Prime Minister's Office the numbers trebled. (King, Simon. Regulating the Behaviour of Ministers, Special Advisers and Civil Servants, June 2003. The Constitution Unit School of Public Policy, UCL (<https://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/publications/unit-publications/102.pdf>))
- ⁵⁵⁸ Language has also been added in recent years to the RC job description to highlight the importance of political acumen and human rights
- ⁵⁵⁹ Policies include several adopted through the Policy Committee (The RC Capacity Gap; Special Circumstances in Non-Mission Settings) and also provisions within the Human Rights Up Front Initiative.
- ⁵⁶⁰ All field operations in the area of peace and security receive some type of Security Council mandate, though peacekeeping operations are far more likely to be governed by a lengthy and ambitious negotiated resolution whereas SPMs might simply be subject to an exchange of letters. Peacebuilding missions (all of which are special political missions) may or may not also be on the agenda of the PBC, which is an advisory body to the Council. In theory the PBC's oversight and guidance shouldn't be contradictory to Council utterances but in practice PBC country-specific obligations have been additional and onerous tasks for already overstretched operations on the ground.
- ⁵⁶¹ The official term is Special Political Mission. This covers any mission funded from the regular budget.
- ⁵⁶² Until 2001, DPKO was in charge of peacekeeping operations and DPA led special political missions (which were fewer and smaller than they are today). With the advent of UNAMA, where the UN successfully resisted being given a military role (that went to NATO) but which was considered too large and too important to leave to the small, underfunded and less operational department that DPA was back then, this distinction broke down. Since then, DPKO has managed several special political missions. DPA continues to manage only special political missions but this category has grown in size, variety and complexity over time. At present, DPKO is responsible for sixteen peacekeeping operations. DPA is the lead department for eleven political and peacebuilding missions in the field, as well as for formulating and implementing the political strategy of the UN in or vis-à-vis all other countries around the world (obviously the desk officers for Sweden, Sri Lanka, and Somalia have quite different jobs). With the creation of a separate Department of Field Support (DFS), the distinction between DPKO and DPA has become harder to discern. Meanwhile, the creation of PBSO, which is not operational but must try to coordinate the key UN actors in cases designated as peacebuilding (with the exception of cases on the agenda of the PBC, there is no agreement in the system on how this determination should be made or how PBSO can add value to the role of the lead departments if they take their lead vis-à-vis the system seriously) further complicates the picture. Peacekeeping operations are funded from the Peacekeeping Support Account and special political missions from the Special Political Mission (SPM) provision of the Regular Budget (both types of mission also rely increasingly on voluntary contributions to implement core aspects of their mandates but that is another story). This is no minor distinction. The budgets are funded according to different scales and so different Member States bear different proportions of the cost. This results in very

different politics surrounding the respective budget negotiations (the different politics also have a lot to do with the investment in peacekeeping felt by many troop contributing countries from the Global South who are otherwise suspicious of political operations undertaken by the United Nations).

⁵⁶³ At headquarters, the department leading the field operation will bring together all the relevant parts of the house in an integrated task force that is supposed to mirror the joined up structures in the field and provide them with cohesive direction and support. In practice, these task forces rarely amount to more than information-sharing forums and the most crucial decisions regarding the mission still tend to be taken within the lead department or within the Security Council itself.

⁵⁶⁴ Author interview, April 2016

⁵⁶⁵ Weiss, Thomas G. *What's Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix it*. Polity Press, 2012

⁵⁶⁶ Hammarskjöld, Dag. *The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact*. Lecture Delivered to Congregation at Oxford University, 30 May 1961 (<http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/docs/internationalcivilservant.pdf>)

⁵⁶⁷ Civil Disobedience

⁵⁶⁸ ST/SGB/1997/3 of 8 September 1997

⁵⁶⁹ OIOS review of coordinating bodies

⁵⁷⁰ OIOS review of coordinating bodies

⁵⁷¹ ST/SGB/2012/4 of 27 July 2012 on The Senior Management Group

⁵⁷² A/51/950, para. 29

⁵⁷³ Background Note for DSG-chaired meeting to review functioning of the Executive Committees, March 2007.

⁵⁷⁴ Background Note for DSG-chaired meeting to review functioning of the Executive Committees, March 2007.

⁵⁷⁵ Follow up to Change Management Team Report. Note of the Working Group on Policy Coordination, May 2012

⁵⁷⁶ Footnote both reports: HIPPO and AGE, 2015.

⁵⁷⁷ EISAS would have been composed of the SitCen from DPKO and various existing policy units. It would mostly have synthesized existing information from the house but the “intelligence” label meant it was dead in the water.

⁵⁷⁸ Anthony Trollope, Phineas Finn

⁵⁷⁹ Internal note of a meeting amongst senior advisers on 25 January 2005 to discuss the High Level Panel proposal for a second Deputy Secretary-General

⁵⁸⁰ Internal note of a meeting amongst senior advisers on 15 January 2005 on follow-up to the High Level Panel

⁵⁸¹ In Larger Freedom, para 91

⁵⁸² ST/SGB/2005/16

⁵⁸³ Internal note of a meeting of confirmed members of the Policy Committee to discuss its functions and procedures, 1 April 2005

⁵⁸⁴ ST/SGB/2005/16

⁵⁸⁵ In Larger Freedom, para 91

⁵⁸⁶ Formally the members were designated as and participated in their capacities as Deputy Secretary-General, the Chef de Cabinet, the Chair of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (alternate ECPS Chair), the Chair of the United Nations Development Group, the Chair of the Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs, the Chair of the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Legal Counsel, the Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information and the Special Adviser on Africa

⁵⁸⁷ By 2012 the membership was the DSG, the Chef de Cabinet, the USGs of DPA, DPKO, DESA, OCHA, OLA and DPI, the UNDP Administrator, the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and two new members: the Under-Secretary-General for UN Women and the ASecretary-General for ODA.

⁵⁸⁸ SC Resolution 2098

⁵⁸⁹ Hochschild, p. 50

⁵⁹⁰ In 2005, there were 19 meetings resulting in 28 decisions. The numbers for the following years were: 2006: 34 meetings and 53 decisions; 2007: 33 meetings and 45 decisions; 2008: 25 meetings and 33 decisions; 2009: 24 meetings and 29 decisions; 2010: 24 meetings and 30 decisions; 2011: 25 meetings and 27 decisions; 2012: 19 meetings and 19 decisions; 2013: 17 meetings and 19 decisions; 2014: 7 meetings and 7 decisions; 2015: 3 meetings and 3 decisions. In other words, the Committee reached on average 37.6 decisions in its first five years of existence and 15 decisions on average in its second five years.

⁵⁹¹ Traub, James. *The Best Intentions*. Kofi Anna and the UN in the Era of American World Power, p. 297

⁵⁹² See Review of DPA's Experience with the Policy Committee, November 2010 (internal document).

⁵⁹³ See Review of DPA's Experience with the Policy Committee, November 2010 (internal document).

⁵⁹⁴ These include: “Achieving more through the Policy Committee” (2010); “Review of DPA's experience with the Policy Committee” (2010); “The Secretary-General's Policy Committee: Briefing for Incoming Deputy Secretary-General” (2012); and “Making Better Use of the Policy Committee” (2013). Also the Thematic evaluation of United Nations coordinating bodies: Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 9 April 2009

⁵⁹⁵ See Review of DPA's Experience with the Policy Committee, November 2010 (internal document).

⁵⁹⁶ See Review of DPA's Experience with the Policy Committee, November 2010 (internal document).

⁵⁹⁷ Change Management note

⁵⁹⁸ peace ops panel paras 165 and 306-7

⁵⁹⁹ Thematic Evaluation of UN Coordinating Bodies, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, April 2009 (E.A.C.51/2009/6), para 53.

⁶⁰⁰ Sherazi, Masoma. *United Nations Research on Cabinet-Level Decision-Making*. Report submitted to the Policy Planning Unit (PPU), Executive Office of the Secretary General (EOSG), 30th September 2014. (internal paper).

⁶⁰¹ Childers, Erskine and Brian Urquhart, *Reviewing the UN System*, 1994.

- ⁶⁰² Childers, Erskine and Brian Urquhart, *Reviewing the UN System*, 1994, p. 69.
- ⁶⁰³ Chandran, Rahul. *Governance of the United Nations Development System*, 2015, para 7.
- ⁶⁰⁴ Finkelstein, Lawrence S. The Coordinative Function of the UN Secretary-General in: Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker (eds), *The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General*, 1993, p. 66
- ⁶⁰⁵ UNDP, UN-Women, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, UNAIDS, UNCTAD, UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNODC and UNRWA
- ⁶⁰⁶ FAO, IAEA, UNESCO, ICAO, ILO, IMO, ITU, UNIDO, UPU, WIPO, WHO, WMO, UNWTO
- ⁶⁰⁷ Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, p. 120
- ⁶⁰⁸ Eckhard, Fred
- ⁶⁰⁹ Childers, Erskine and Brian Urquhart, *A World in Need of Leadership. Tomorrow's United Nations*, 199
- ⁶¹⁰ ACC restructurings took place in 1953; 1958-60; 1978-79; 1986-87; 1992-93; 1997; and Latest [get date]. Three were of particular significance: 1978 (GA resolution 32/197); 1985 (GA resolution 40/177 on all aspects of coordination in the UN) , 1993 and the most recent.
- ⁶¹¹ based on the Blanchard report
- ⁶¹² Ahmed, Rafeeuddin, Hans Blix and Franklin Thomas (The ACC Review Team), *The Role and Functioning of the ACC and its Machinery*, 22 March 2000, para 20.1
- ⁶¹³ See the Joint Inspection Unit report of 1999 on the Review of the ACC and its Machinery, August 1999 (A/54/288) and Ahmed, Rafeeuddin, Hans Blix and Franklin Thomas (The ACC Review Team), *The Role and Functioning of the ACC and its Machinery*, 22 March 2000
- ⁶¹⁴ Author interviews
- ⁶¹⁵ Gordenker, Leon *The UN Secretary-General and Secretariat*, 2013, p. 67.
- ⁶¹⁶ Hill, Martin. *The Administrative Committee on Coordination*, in Evan Luard, *The Evolution of International Organizations*, New York, Praeger, 1966, p. 133.
- ⁶¹⁷ Gordenker, Leon *The UN Secretary-General and Secretariat*, 2013, p. 67.
- ⁶¹⁸ Childers, Erskine and Brian Urquhart, *Reviewing the UN System*, 1994, p. 70
- ⁶¹⁹ From the UN Archive see: 113th private meeting in the Secretary-General's office at Lake Success on Thursday, 22 April 1948; Notes from EOSG to the SG on Forthcoming ACC Meeting, 2 October 1956, para 5.
- ⁶²⁰ From the UN Archives:
- ⁶²¹ Cited in Finkelstein, Lawrence S. The Coordinative Function of the UN Secretary-General in: Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker (eds), *The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General*, 1993, p. 61
- ⁶²² Childers, Erskine and Brian Urquhart, *A World in Need of Leadership. Tomorrow's United Nations*, 1990
- ⁶²³ The Brundtland Report, *Our Common Future*, Year? P. 318
- ⁶²⁴ See Background Note on Governance for ECOSOC Dialogue on the longer-term positioning of the UN development system in the context of the post-2015 development agenda, DESA, May 2015. Also, Chandran, Rahul. *Governance of the United Nations Development System*, 2015
- ⁶²⁵ Finkelstein, Lawrence S. The Coordinative Function of the UN Secretary-General in: Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker (eds), *The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General*, 1993, p. 66
- ⁶²⁶ Cited in many places, e.g. Traub, James. *The Best Intentions. Kofi Anna and the UN in the Era of American World Power*, p. 16
- ⁶²⁷ Hochschild, p. 44
- ⁶²⁸ The Secretary-General and his heads of department receive a constant stream of Ambassadors from countries such as Morocco, Russia, France, the UK, the US and others instructing them what to do about questions such as Kosovo, Western Sahara, Mali, Somalia, Palestine and so forth.
- ⁶²⁹ The 10 March 2016A blocking of a Security Council resolution on addressing SEA by peacekeepers is a case in point.
- ⁶³⁰ Cox and Jacobson 1973, 16
- ⁶³¹ Luard 1994, 120 in Kille, Kent. *From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-General of the United Nations*. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 27 July 2015.
- ⁶³² Elected member Ambassador commenting on the Council during a conference on the future of the Organization, January 2016.
- ⁶³³ Although not every provision in every resolution is binding and it is often a matter of interpretation since the Council doesn't always invoke Chapter VII but rather relies on specific code to signal whether or not each operative paragraph is binding or not. See: Security Council report on use of Chapter VII
- ⁶³⁴ Einsiedel
- ⁶³⁵ Check source. {TMU}
- ⁶³⁶ Langmore, John and Jeremy Farrall. Can Elected Members Make a Difference in the UN Security Council? Australia's Experience in 2013–2014" *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, Vol. 22, Issue 1., p. 63.
- ⁶³⁷ In 2014 it held 263 meetings compared to an average of 70 meetings per year during its first decade and 56 in its second decade. It issues 50-75 resolutions per year, up from about 22 in the days of the Cold War See: Daws, Sam and Loraine Sievers. *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*. Oxford University Press, [year], p. 166
- ⁶³⁸ From Highlights of Security Council Practice 2013 and 2014 <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/highlights.shtml>
- ⁶³⁹ Of the 110 resolutions adopted by the Council in its first decade, only three included explicit tasking to the SG. From 1961-70, 47 of the 131 resolutions charged the Secretary-General with specific tasks. By 2012, only 5 of the 53 resolutions that year did not entrust the Secretary-General with some task and those five were about the legal tribunals. See: Daws, Sam and Loraine Sievers. *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*. Oxford University Press, [year], p. 166
- ⁶⁴⁰ Ross, Carne, *The UN is failing. Is it heading the way of the League of Nations?* The Guardian (UK). Op-Ed 10/03/2016

641 Resolution S/Res/2210/15 of 15 March 2015

642 Ross, Carne, The UN is failing. Is it heading the way of the League of Nations? The Guardian (UK). Op-Ed 10/03/2016

643 See Repertoire of Practice of the Security Council (<http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/index.shtml>)

644 A full list of penholders is here: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2015-02/chairs_of_subsidary_bodies_and_penholders_for_2015.php

645 Keating Colin, “Power Dynamics between Permanent and Elected Council Members in: The UN Security Council in the 21st Century. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, editors, 2015

646 Keating Colin, “Power Dynamics between Permanent and Elected Council Members in: The UN Security Council in the 21st Century. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, editors, 2015

647 Langmore, John and Jeremy Farrall. Can Elected Members Make a Difference in the UN Security Council? Australia’s Experience in 2013–2014” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol. 22, Issue 1., p. 63.

648 Statement by New Zealand, Security Council open debate on “Respect for the Principles and Purposes of the Charter as a Key Element for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security”, UN Security Council, 15 February 2016

649 Security Council Report, In Hindsight: Security Council Decision-Making and the Veto, October 2015

(http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2015-10/in_hindsight_security_council_decision-making_and_the_veto.php)

650 This was demonstrated most recently by their campaign against the S5 initiative in 2011 but the fundamental mindset is not new.

651 See Mouat p. 167 and Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, p. 240

652 “Officials have admitted that certain UN reports are edited by permanent members before delivery to the security council (I did it myself once)” in: Ross, Carne, The UN is failing. Is it heading the way of the League of Nations? The Guardian (UK). Op-Ed 10/03/2016

653 Ross, Carne, The UN is failing. Is it heading the way of the League of Nations? The Guardian (UK). Op-Ed 10/03/2016

654 The first breakthrough came in 1999 when Mary Robinson briefed the Council as one of several speakers under a general ‘protection of civilians’ discussion. From 1999 through 2009, the High Commissioner addressed the Council 13 times, either in formal meetings or in consultations. In the period from the beginning of 2010 through the end of 2015, the High Commissioner, the Deputy High Commissioner or the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights (a post created at the head of the New York Office in 2010) addressed the Council 52 times, briefing repeatedly on situations such as Ukraine, Syria, Côte d’Ivoire or Burundi. In addition, the High Commissioner or his or her representatives met with the Council several times in informal formats, including retreats, workshops, Arria-formula briefings and expert-level briefings. See: Security Council Report (http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/research_report_human_rights_january_2016.pdf)

655 Ross, Carne, The UN is failing. Is it heading the way of the League of Nations? The Guardian (UK). Op-Ed 10/03/2016

656 NZ comment at Greentree

657 Up to the late 1980s, peacekeeping missions were operated by six officials in the United Nations Office of Special Political Affairs, which was created by Dag Hammarskjöld to take on projects that were not specifically under the mandate of the Secretariat, such as conflict control. For the first three years (1955-1957), the office was referred to as the Office of Under-Secretaries without Department. The first Under-Secretaries-General were Ralph J. Bunche (1955-1970) and Ilya S. Tchernychev (1955-1956), followed by Anatoly F. Dobrynin (1957), Sir Humphrey Trevelyan (1958), C.V. Narasimhan (1959-1961), Omar Loutfi (1962), Dragoslav Protitch (1963-1964), Jose Rolz-Bennett (1965-1970), Roberto E. Guyer (1971-1978), Brian E. Urquhart (1972-1985), Javier Perez de Cuellar (1979-1980), Diego Cordovez (1981-1988), and Marrack I. Goulding (1986-1991).

658 Tharoor, Shashi. ‘The “Most Impossible Job” Job Description’ in: Chesterman, Simon (ed). Secretary or General ? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, CUP, 2007, p.42

659 Tharoor, Shashi. ‘The “Most Impossible Job” Job Description’ in: Chesterman, Simon (ed). Secretary or General ? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, CUP, 2007, p.42

660 The P5 argue that the Council makes a decision on substance (rather than a simple procedural move) when deciding what goes onto the agenda, thus making such a decision subject to a veto.

661 The USSR vetoed a draft resolution in 1980 and the Council did not take up the issue for another ten years even though hostilities continued the entire time

662 Daws, Sam and Loraine Sievers. The Procedure of the UN Security Council. Oxford University Press, [year], p. 162. In his article on the use of Article 99, Walter Dorn only cites three explicit invocations recognized by the UN (Congo 1960, Iran 1979 and Lebanon 1989). See: Chapter 14 in Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality, Volume II: Opportunities and Innovations, Albrecht Schnable and David Carment (eds.), Lexington Books, Latham, ML, 2004, pp. 305-344

663 The Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel (IRP) on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka, November 2012

(http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf)

664 The Human Rights Up Front Initiative.

665 Ross, Carne, The UN is failing. Is it heading the way of the League of Nations? The Guardian (UK). Op-Ed 10/03/2016

666 Find original. Brian Urquhart? For now: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-22/un-chief-ban-nudged-toward-s-korea-presidency-by-polls-legend>

667 A common misconception is that the GA may not consider matters related to peace and security. Under Article 11 and subject to Article 12, the GA is permitted to make recommendations on the maintenance of international peace and security unless the Security Council is “exercising” its functions on a particular matter. Pursuant to its “Uniting for Peace” resolution of November 1950 (resolution 377 (V)), the GA may also take action if the Security Council fails to act, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member, in a case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of

aggression. “Uniting for Peace” was used extensively in the early days when the west still had a majority in the GA but rarely used any longer, even on issues such as Syria, Ukraine or Gaza where the conditions in the Council would appear to warrant. The P-5 tend to avoid resorting to it because they don’t want it used against them on another matter.

⁶⁶⁸ 1) The First Committee adopts more than 50 resolutions annually. About half the resolutions are adopted by consensus. The work is divided into seven clusters: nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, outer space (disarmament aspects), conventional weapons, regional disarmament and security, other disarmament measures and international security, and the disarmament machinery. ODA is the line department that supports the First Committee. 2) The agenda items allocated to the Second Committee are organized in ten clusters: macroeconomic policy, operational activities for development, financing for development, groups of countries in special situations, globalization and interdependence, eradication of poverty, information and communication technologies for development, agriculture and food security, sustainable development, and sovereignty of the Palestinian people over their natural resources. The Second Committee adopts about 45 resolutions, mostly by consensus. The majority are tabled by the G-77 and China. DESA is the main line department. Delegates dealing with the Second Committee often also cover the work of ECOSOC and the Funds and Programmes. 3) The Third Committee adopts about sixty resolutions annually, of which 30 percent are by vote. It has a dozen agenda of which “Promotion and protection of human rights” is only one, although it makes up half the work of the Committee. OHCHR is the main department in support. 4) The Fourth Committee covers decolonization, Palestinian rights and peacekeeping (the C34 reports through the Fourth Committee). It usually adopts about 25–30 resolutions annually. All draft resolutions related to the Middle East and some related to decolonization are usually adopted by vote. Otherwise, resolutions are mostly adopted by consensus. 5) The Fifth Committee is responsible for the regular budget (biennial), peacekeeping budgets (annual), human resources issues, management reform and governance and oversight issues. It also defines the “scales of assessment” every three years. All draft resolutions with budget implications must be examined by the Fifth Committee before they can be adopted in the Plenary. Until recent years, The Fifth Committee worked by consensus and only rarely voted. DM supports. 6) The Sixth Committee deals with all aspects of international law and other legal matters. The Sixth Committee adopts about 15–20 resolutions. Most draft resolutions are sponsored by Member States. Some draft resolutions or decisions are prepared by OLA, which is the main department in support. (Main source for this note is the UNITAR Handbook for the President of the General Assembly, 2011, p. 46

(http://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/UN_PGA_Handbook.pdf)

⁶⁶⁹ Peterson, M.J. The UN General Assembly, 2006, p.91

⁶⁷⁰ Swart, Lydia. Decision Making, Authority and Power of the General Assembly: An Interview with H. E. Sheikh Haya Rashed Al Khalifa (President of the General Assembly), September 2007, (<http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/272>)

⁶⁷¹ Weiss, Thomas G. What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix it. Polity Press, 2012, p. 54

⁶⁷² Peterson, M.J. The UN General Assembly, Routledge, 2006, p.91

⁶⁷³ UNITAR Handbook for the President of the General Assembly, 2011, p. 46

(http://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/UN_PGA_Handbook.pdf)

⁶⁷⁴ Of those 333, the breakdown is roughly as follows: 92 resolutions on Peace and Security, Nuclear (18), and Disarmament issues; 74 on Human Rights, Humanitarian, Rule of Law and Legal issues; 66 on Development, including financing for development, environment and disaster risk reduction; 42 on UN budget questions; 22 on internal UN procedural and admin issues; 22 on partnerships with other actors and 15 on cultural questions.

The GA agenda for every year since inception can be found here: <http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/69>

⁶⁷⁵ Article 18 of the Charter lists these as: “recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions”.

⁶⁷⁶ Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the “Western European and Other States Group” (WEOG)

⁶⁷⁷ JUSCANZ is usually comprised of 14 or 15 UN Member States: Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Andorra, Korea, Liechtenstein, Mexico, San Marino, Turkey and sometimes Israel.

⁶⁷⁸ Sheikh Haya Rashed Al Khalifa of Bahrain (sixty-first session in 2006); Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit of India (eighth session in 1953), and Angie Elisabeth Brooks of Liberia (twenty-fourth session in 1969).

⁶⁷⁹ The Fifth Committee includes all 193 Member States and is responsible for administrative and budgetary matters. The Fifth Committee meets during the main part of the GA session (September to December) as well as during its resumed sessions in March and May. The May session is primarily devoted to peacekeeping issues.

⁶⁸⁰ A serving Deputy Perm Rep from a large country made this observation at the IPI Commission on Multilateralism retreat at Greentree in February 2015

⁶⁸¹ Luck, Ed. Reforming the UN: Lessons from a History in Progress, International Relations Studies and the United Nations, Occasional Papers, 2003., No. 1 (<http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/373430132.pdf>)

⁶⁸² Luck, Ed. Reforming the UN: Lessons from a History in Progress, International Relations Studies and the United Nations, Occasional Papers, 2003., No. 1 (<http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/373430132.pdf>)

⁶⁸³ For an excellent description see the report which was requested by the Four Nations Initiative (4NI) on Governance and Management of the United Nations: Power, Purse and Numbers: A Diagnostic Study of the UN Budget and Finance Process and Structure by Francisco Sagasti, Ursula Casabonne and Fernando Prada (FORO Nacional/Internacional – Agenda: PERÚ) (http://www.academia.edu/2535431/Power_Purse_and_Numbers_A_Diagnostic_Study_of_the_UN_Budget_and_Finance_Process_and_Structure)

⁶⁸⁴ Annan, Kofi. ‘Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization worldwide’, A/60/692, 2006, para 15

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- ⁶⁸⁵ Piers Campbell and Judith Hushagen. *The Governance of Inter-Governmental Organisations*, Corporate Governance, Vol.2 No.1, 2002
- ⁶⁸⁶ The strategic framework (which replaces the earlier version called the medium-term plan, which covered the entire UN system) covers a two-year period and is developed by the Secretary-General's office in consultation with DM and all the departments and offices funded under the regular budget. However, the process is "not adequate as a real strategic planning tool. In the Secretary-General's view, the process is seriously flawed; it is complex, protracted, disjointed, time-consuming and rigid." (JIU 2012) (https://www.unjiu.org/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_2012_12_English.pdf)
- ⁶⁸⁷ A Mandate Registry was compiled in 2006 in response to the 2005 World Summit Outcome. 7,000 of the 9,000+ mandates identified at that time were older than five years. Ultimately very few (60 or so?) mandates were terminated as a result of the review, since Member States could not agree on criteria for terminating, the G77 feared the exercise would come at the cost of development activities, and there was no agreement on how the savings would be used (for development activities or reform). Moreover, the process revealed that there was not even agreement on what constituted a mandate: "Mandates are not easily defined or quantifiable; a concrete legal definition of a mandate does not exist. Guided by the Summit Outcome Document and subsequent discussions, and in order to facilitate the current mandate review exercise, we have, however, identified an agreed upon...working definition: a mandate is a request or a direction for action by the UN Secretariat or other implementing entity, that derives from a resolution of the General Assembly or one of the other relevant organs." Mandate Registry, "Frequently Asked Questions (<http://webapps01.un.org/mandatereview/searchStart.do>)
- ⁶⁸⁸ Hochschild, p. 44
- ⁶⁸⁹ Lord Giddens (Labour) in House of Lords debate <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2015-09-10/debates/15091038000246/UNSeniorAppointments>
- ⁶⁹⁰ Statistics come from Lykketoft, Mogens Who should lead the United Nations? The Malay Mail Op-Ed 07/04/2016.
- ⁶⁹¹ Childers, Erskine and Brian Urquhart, *A World in Need of Leadership*. Tomorrow's United Nations, 1990
- ⁶⁹² Hochschild, Fabrizio. *Leadership in the United Nations and the Challenge of Courage*, 2016 (forthcoming).
- ⁶⁹³ Lipsey, p. 447.
- ⁶⁹⁴ Annan, Kofi in: Chesterman, Simon (ed). *Secretary or General?: The UN Secretary-General in World Politics*, CUP, 2007, p. xii.
- ⁶⁹⁵ Find citation
- ⁶⁹⁶ Bauman,
- ⁶⁹⁷ Hoge, Warren cited in Kille, Kent. *From Manager to Visionary : The Secretary-General of the United Nations*. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 27 July 2015, p. 15.
- ⁶⁹⁸ Salman and Brahimi
- ⁶⁹⁹ Chesterman, Simon (ed). *Secretary or General ? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics*, CUP, 2007, p. 234
- ⁷⁰⁰ Guehenno, Jean-Marie. *The Fog of Peace*, Brookings Institution Press, May 2015, p. 307
- ⁷⁰¹ Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier. *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 1997, p. 28
- ⁷⁰² Reflections, The New Yorker, 25 September 1989, p. 80
- ⁷⁰³ Guehenno, Jean-Marie. *The Fog of Peace*. Brookings Institution Press, May 2015
- ⁷⁰⁴ Hochschild, Fabrizio. *In and Above Conflict. A Study on Leadership in the United Nations*, July 2010, p. 88
- ⁷⁰⁵ Author interviews
- ⁷⁰⁶ For instance: 1) an SG-chaired meeting that meets as needed with a handful of key officials to take big, well-prepared policy decisions; 2) a DSG-chaired meeting that convenes more frequently for regular decision-making on tactical issues and strategic matters not requiring Secretary-General attention; 3) Director-level meetings with variable geometry depending on the issue; 4) working-level issue-specific task forces.
- ⁷⁰⁷ From: ST/SGB/1998/18 on the 'Organization of the Executive Office of the Secretary General'
- ⁷⁰⁸ Sherazi, Masoma. *United Nations Research on Cabinet-Level Decision-Making*. Report submitted to the Policy Planning Unit (PPU), Executive Office of the Secretary General (EOSG), 30th September 2014. (internal paper). Ms. Sherazi's report, based on extensive interviews, assessed the degree to which cabinet principles are reflected in the execution of the Policy Committee's mandate.